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poetry, noting that Solon both linguistically distances himself from the concept of tyranny and emphasizes
that he does, in fact, possess autocratic powers. The result is a kind of verbal dance, wherein he reminds
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refusal to redistribute land. I find that debt cancellation in particular is one of the most common measures
used by tyrants as a means of gathering political support from the demos. I also proffer the notion that doing
away with debt-slavery may have done more damage than good, concluding that, despite his protests to the
contrary, Solon was a tyrant in all but name.
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 ABSTRACT
SOLON OF ATHENS: THE MAN, THE MYTH, THE TYRANT?
Kelcy Sagstetter
Jeremy McInerney
1I argue that, despite Solon's reputation as an enemy of tyranny, his approach to solving 
the political discord in Athens in 594 B.C. very closely resembles the way that archaic 
Greek tyrants succeeded at dealing with similar problems in other city-states. Because 
tyrants were often popular figures with widespread support, I suggest that Solon's anxiety  
to avoid the label of tyrant stemmed from the political unrest and bloodshed that arose 
from the attempted tyranny of Cylon in 632 BC, followed by the harsh and unsuccessful 
legislation of Drakon in 621. In the dissertation, I first establish that there are two 
traditions about Solon's motives and actions, indicated by many contradictions in our 
sources. In one version, Solon appears as a moderate politician who paved the way for 
the rise of democracy, in part because of his refusal to become a tyrant. In the other, 
Solon's actions were at times indistinguishable from those of contemporary tyrants, 
which later sources explain by referring to Solon's assertions in his own poetry to "prove" 
that these stories were false. I then analyze Solon’s poetry, noting that Solon both 
linguistically distances himself from the concept of tyranny and emphasizes that he does, 
in fact, possess autocratic powers. The result is a kind of verbal dance, wherein he 
reminds people: "I am not, nor do1 I wish to be a tyrant; but I could be, and if I were...." 
Finally, I examine various tyrants who, like Solon, had reputations as legislators. I 
consider Solon's agricultural reforms, known as the seisachtheia, concentrating in 
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particular on the abolition of debt-slavery, the cancellation of debt, and Solon's refusal to 
redistribute land. I find that debt cancellation in particular is one of the most common 
measures used by tyrants as a means of gathering political support from the demos. I also 
proffer the notion that doing away with debt-slavery may have done more damage than 
good, concluding that, despite his protests to the contrary, Solon was a tyrant in all but 
name.
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To be a lawgiver is a sublimated form of tyranny.
—Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches (1886)
Chapter 1
Introduction
The legacy of Solon of Athens is far-ranging. He was the chief of the seven sages,
a fierce opponent of tyranny, and a steadfastly moderate politician with the good of both 
rich and poor at heart; he was a philosopher, a poet, or any combination of the above. 
This blending of characteristics makes Solon a versatile and complicated figure, yet we 
have distressingly few contemporary sources about him. No source survives from the 
sixth century except his own poems, and his only extended appearance in the fifth 
century is in Herodotus, who gives his political activities a backseat to his persona as a 
wandering philosopher.1 By Herodotus’ day, more or less a century after Solon's death, he
had taken on the character of a mythological wise man. By the time Plutarch wrote his 
biography of Solon some seven hundred years later, he was cast as one of the seven sages
of antiquity—and the only sage to make every single iteration of the canon. By the end of
the fifth century and throughout the fourth, however, source after source focuses not on 
Solon’s wisdom, but on his constitutional reforms. Within a century, Solon changed from 
a wandering wise man to the political visionary whom the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia
calls the father of democracy (41.2).2 Meanwhile, he retained his reputation as a 
1. All dates are B.C. unless otherwise specified. Aristophanes mentions Solon briefly in Clouds (1187), 
where Pheidippides explains to his father how they can exploit a law of Solon’s to avoid creditors, on 
which see p. 164 n. 441. Other than a few scattered references like this, he is absent from any surviving 
fifth-century source except Herodotus. Szegedy-Maszak (1993: 203-05) argues that Solonian philosophy 
and motifs are present in Thucydides, going so far as to wonder if Solon is Thucydides’ model for his 
depiction of Pericles, but this is a very tenuous assertion based on perceived similarities between 
Thucydides’ discussion of the Spartan constitution and generalized statements opposing tyranny and civil 
discord.
2. Henceforth Ath. Pol. Though passed down under his name, this work was probably not by Aristotle; 
rather, it was likely written by an associate who was intimately familiar with Aristotle's political 
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philosopher, becoming a symbol of the moral compass of Athens as a city-state.3
Solon is most famous for his appointment to a special magistracy (the eponymous
archonship) in 594 B.C. In a rare moment of agreement between warring factions, Solon 
was commissioned to draw up a new code of laws in order to solve a civil crisis that was 
threatening the very fabric of Athens as a city-state. His goal was to stem a rising tide of 
class warfare, which had reached a critical point because wealthy landowners had 
enslaved or impoverished most of the poor farmers. To deal with this, he canceled all 
debts and ended the apparently wide-spread practice of debt-slavery. Unfortunately, no 
one was happy with Solon's new law code. The wealthy were upset at their losses from 
the debt cancellation, and the poor were not content because they wanted Solon to 
redistribute land in addition to canceling debt, which he refused to do. Solon was forced 
to leave Athens amid the resulting unrest. 
Solon garnered much praise in antiquity for his categorical refusal to use his 
initially widespread popularity to become a tyrant, despite the urging of various 
supporters—a stance he espouses in several of his surviving poems.4 Scholars since 
antiquity have taken these assertions at face value, spending very little time examining 
the implications of the fact that the only source we have for Solon's motives is Solon 
himself. This dissertation re-examines what we know of Solon, from both his own 
writings and those of later biographers and political historians, and re-contextualizes his 
philosophy. For a summary of the debates on the authorship of the Ath. Pol. and a convincing argument that
the author was one of Aristotle's associates rather than Aristotle himself, see Rhodes (1993: 61-63). Day 
and Chambers assume the work to be genuine, but not without reservation. For a summary of the 
inconsistencies and arguments for and against authenticity, see Day & Chambers (1962: 1-4).
3. This is not necessarily a contradiction. Pelling (2006: 104-05) describes how Herodotus (and presumably
his readers of the fifth and fourth centuries) did not distinguish moral from political; therefore, Solon's 
morals and philosophy were indicative of his skill as a politician.
4. Most notably, frs. 32, 33, and 34. All references to Solon's poems use the numbering in West 1972.
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reforms in the larger realm of archaic politics. Ultimately, I hope to show that Solon was 
operating within a political framework in which tyrants were often popular and arose out 
of exactly the kinds of conditions that Solon faced in Athens. The vilification of tyrants, 
both in his own poetry and in our later sources about him, arose from Athens' particularly 
violent experience with the attempted tyranny of Cylon, necessitating a rhetorical denial 
of the office. I show that, despite Solon's protests to the contrary, his attempted reforms 
have a more than passing similarity to those successfully employed by contemporary 
tyrants. I conclude that, despite his reputation and anxiety not to be labeled as such, Solon
was a tyrant in all but name. 
I. Outline
The goal of this study is to re-examine our evidence for Solon's life and career in 
the context of archaic Greek tyrannies, eschewing the more usual approach of focusing 
on the place of his reforms in the constitutional history of Athens. It is the goal of this 
dissertation to address the discrepancies in the historical record and examine the way 
Solon’s persona has been distorted by a too-heavy reliance on his poetic self-
justifications. I conclude that Solon's approach to solving the political discord (stasis) in 
Athens very closely resembles that of archaic tyrants elsewhere in the Greek world, who 
dealt (often successfully) with the same social and economic issues. 
In this introductory chapter, I first contextualize Solon's political activities by 
describing in detail the events that led to his appointment as mediator, or diallektes, along
with a rough summary of the various traditions about his life. I then examine the 
chronology and content of Solon's poetry, before moving on to specifics of his legal code.
I next discuss the nature of the agrarian crisis that was the catalyst for his appointment as 
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reformer. I start with what we learn from Aristotle, Plutarch, and Solon himself, then give
a brief overview of the history of modern scholarship on the nature of the crisis. Finally, I
examine the changing perceptions of tyrants and tyranny from the archaic period through 
to the classical, examining evidence that tyrants were popular in many parts of Greece. 
Many tyrants actually had the reputations, like Solon, of being lawgivers and passing 
legislation for the benefit of the citizens, and for implementing civic renewal projects 
which revitalized flagging economies and forged civic identity among their citizens. We 
shall see that whether Solon was aiming to be a tyrant outright, or merely trying to use 
methods of tyrants who had been successful at solving civil crises elsewhere, his 
contemporaries would not necessarily have considered his claiming a tyranny to be the 
act of self-serving treachery that sources from democratic Athens would have us believe.
In chapters 2 and 3, I establish that there are two traditions about Solon, which we
can still see in our sources if we look carefully. In one version, Solon appears as I 
described him initially: a moderate politician who assiduously refused a tyranny because 
he had the best interests of the people in mind; even if he was not the actual "father," he 
paved the way for the rise of democracy.5 In the other version, Solon's program was much
closer to that of a tyrant, a tradition persistent enough to require sometimes convoluted 
explanations by sources promulgating the view of him as a moderate. They invariably do 
this by referring to Solon's assertions in his own poetry to "prove" that these stories of 
Solon as a tyrant or associate of tyrants could not be true. 
In chapter 2, I begin by looking at traditions about Solon's more mythical aspects. 
5. Here and throughout the dissertation, I use the term "moderate" to indicate a stance that opposes drastic 
changes to the status quo in relation to the balance of power. Conversely, I use the term "radical" to 
describe a program of extreme change in the base of power or existing laws. 
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I examine the literary traditions about Solon as philosoper and sage, as lawgiver 
(nomothetes), and as tyrant-hater (misotyrannos). In the first section, I focus on 
Herodotus’ story of Solon and Croesus. I compare Herodotus' portrayal of Solon's 
thought to the philosophical concepts expressed in Solon’s own poetry, which are usually 
assumed to be the major source for the ethical guidelines laid out for the unfortunate 
Croesus by Herodotus' Solon. I conclude that Solon's life and activities were altered to fit 
into existing folkloric genres about wandering philosophers, which shows that, already in 
the mid-fifth century, authors were manipulating the tradition about Solon to serve 
literary ends.
The second section examines the tradition that regards Solon as a lawgiver, a 
designation with almost as many mythological connotations as that of sage. I find that 
while Solon technically fits all the criteria for a nomothetes, his story has to be twisted to 
make him qualify for this position—most obviously, because his constitution failed and 
plunged Athens back into civil strife for three decades. I conclude that the figure of Solon
was grafted retroactively onto the lawgiver topos much the same way as with the trope of 
sage. 
In the final section of chapter 2, I find that Solon's reputation as a tyrant-hater is 
completely based on his own assertions, which in several places actually contradict what 
we know of his activities from other sources. In fact, our tradition of Solon as 
misotyrannos is filled with stories about his connections with different tyrants, 
connections that are, once more, explained away by appeals to his poetry. This suggests 
that an interpretation of Solon's associations existed that placed him firmly in the realm 
of the archaic tyrant, but was suppressed by the anti-tyrannical rhetoric of later times, 
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assisted by Solon's own denials of desire for a tyranny. 
Chapter 3 continues the examination of inconsistencies in later portrayals of 
Solon, but moves away from mythological treatments to consider the way that fourth-
century authors in particular used Solon as a figure of appeal for matters of morals and 
politics. There is widespread agreement among ancient sources that Solon had a 
fundamental part to play in the foundation of democracy. In a political climate where 
democracy had prevailed and become almost a byword for integrity, Solon's stature grew 
accordingly, and he became a convenient precedent to lend authority to an almost absurd 
number and variety of arguments and assertions. I show that the political climate, 
combined with continual reliance on Solon's own poetry, caused this idea of Solon as a 
sort of protodemocrat to prevail over another tradition painting Solon as an aristocratic 
partisan, which we can still discern in our sources if we look carefully.
In chapter 4, I move to Solon's poetry. Ancient as well as modern scholars have 
used his writings to back up assertions about his moral character and philosophy, and as a
source for his political reforms and laws. I draw on the work of Elizabeth Irwin in noting 
that much of the language and vocabulary in Solon's poetry has more associations with 
tyranny than with that of more the polis-oriented sympotic poets with whom Solon is 
usually classed.6 I conclude, after Irwin, that Solon exploits a "language of tyranny" while
at the same time seeming to reject it. The result is a kind of verbal dance, wherein he 
reminds people: "I am not a tyrant; I do not wish to be a tyrant; but I could be, and if I 
were...." While Solon linguistically distances himself from the concept of tyranny, he 
simultaneously emphasizes that he does, in fact, possess autocratic powers. 
6. Irwin 2005 and 2006. 
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In the fifth and final chapter, I consider Solon's agricultural reforms, known as the
seisachtheia. These measures are almost always given as evidence that Solon was on the 
side of the lower classes (the demos). I concentrate in particular on the abolition of debt-
slavery, the cancellation of debt, and land redistribution. I find that the latter two reforms 
are closely linked with each other almost everywhere else they are mentioned in ancient 
literature, and are typically used by tyrants as a means of gathering political support from 
the demos. I also proffer the notion that doing away with debt-slavery was not an 
unmitigated good. Abolition of debts did not negate the need for loans, and the 
prohibition against offering oneself as collateral, combined with an understandable 
wariness on the part of the wealthy to lend after their losses in the seisachtheia, would 
have made loans nearly impossible to get. This would have resulted in a situation in 
which wealthy landowners had a shortage of labor to work their land, and poor farmers 
lost the ability to plant crops because they could not get loans to acquire seed. I conclude 
that, despite protests of moderation, most or all of these reforms were quite radical, and 
typical of tyrants elsewhere in the Greek world. Finally, there are two appendices, the 
first of which is a discussion of how the Athenian tyrant Peisistratos was able to adapt 
Solon's failed law code and stabilize the warring factions after Solon's departure from 
Athens. The second covers the extensive history of scholarship on agrarian reforms in the
archaic period, going into more detail than I can easily address in this brief introduction. 
II. Sixth-Century Attica in Context: The Political Background
The beginning of the sixth century in Athens saw a period of unrest following 
several political upheavals. Around 632 B.C., a popular Olympic victor named Cylon 
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gathered a group of young men around him, intending to make himself tyrant of Athens.7 
With the help of his father-in-law Theagenes, the tyrant of Megara, he attempted to seize 
the Acropolis, but the Athenians banded together and surrounded his forces.8 Besieged, 
starving, and with no chance of victory, most of the would-be revolutionaries took 
sanctuary at the statue of Athena Polias. The magistrates promised them clemency if they 
surrendered, but then, at the urging of the wealthy and influential Alcmaeonid clan, 
impiously slaughtered them.9 Plutarch elaborates that, not trusting the archons, the 
erstwhile conspirators had tied a braided thread to the statue of the goddess and kept hold 
of it to remain under her protection, but the thread snapped when they reached the temple
of the Furies. Megacles, the leader of the Alcmaeonid clan, declared this to be an omen 
that the goddess had denied the conspirators the rights of suppliants, and he massacred 
even those supporters who remained at various altars scattered throughout the city and 
countryside (Plut. Sol. 12). For their sacrilege and treachery, the entire Alcmaeonid 
family was exiled and incurred a blood curse that would haunt them for centuries. While 
Plutarch and others specify that the Alcmaeonids did not act alone, but rather in 
conjunction with their fellow archons, the lasting opprobrium attached only to the 
Alcmaeonids. 
Plutarch tells us that Solon managed to convince the Alcmaeonids to stand trial 
7. Hdt. 5.71, Thuc. 1.126, and Plut. Sol. 12, 17; see also Podlecki (1984: 120-21).
8. Thucydides tells us that Cylon thought he was acting on instructions from Apollo via the oracle at 
Delphi, who had told him to seize the Acropolis during the grand festival to Zeus. Being a champion athlete
himself, he assumed that the god referred to the Olympics. Apparently, though, the oracle had meant the 
festival to Zeus Melichios that took place in the Attic countryside, a misunderstanding that led to Cylon's 
defeat and death (Thuc. 1.126.4-6). See Podlecki (1984: 121).
9. Herodotus claims that Cylon was among the murdered suppliants, while Thucydides tells us that Cylon 
and his brother escaped. 
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and go into exile voluntarily (Sol. 12).10 He also tells us that the surviving partisans of 
Cylon rebuilt their base of support and carried on a feud against the descendants of 
Megacles, which of course implies that not all the Alcmaeonids actually left Athens (Sol. 
12).11 This conflict was so violent that the entire city was on the brink of civil war, with 
bloody fighting in the very streets. To complicate matters further, the Megarians took 
advantage of the instability to attack Athens and retake their former possession, the island
of Salamis (Sol. 12). I argue that this years-long experience of bloodshed and strife at the 
hands of supporters and opponents of tyranny resulted in the Athenians having a very 
particular, and particularly violent, conception of tyrants. Solon, therefore, had to take 
special care not to be associated with tyranny, a degree of caution that would not have 
been necessary in other cities.12
In 621/0, after almost a decade of conflict, the Athenians appointed Drakon to 
draw up a constitution to quell the stasis.13 The result was a law code so "draconian" that 
a sense of its harshness lingers in modern English vocabulary. Some traditions say that 
death was the penalty not only for crimes like sacrilege or murder, but for offenses as 
10. On the implausibility of the story of Solon and the Alcmaeonids, see Podlecki (1984: 141). The blood 
curse, however, was a genuine problem for the Alcmaeonids right through the fifth century. The Athenians' 
refusal to "drive out the curse of the goddess" (i.e., exile the half-Alcmaeonid Pericles) was one of Sparta's 
pretexts for declaring hostilities at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.126). Cf. Diog. Laert. 
1.10.
11. This implication is further supported by the late fifth-century inscription listing archons from the sixth 
century, which contains the names of aristocrats from the Alcmaeonid family (SEG 28.19, 33.23 = ML 6 = 
Fornara 23). On the archon list, see Meiggs & Lewis (1988: 9-13); see further p. 185 n. 478.
12. To be discussed further in ch. 5. 
13. Ath. Pol. 4, Plut. Sol. 17. On Drakon's law code, see generally Stroud 1968 and Gagarin 1989 and 1981.
Though no ancient source explicitly lists Cylon's conspiracy as the reason for Drakon's appointment as 
lawmaker, the closeness in chronology leads most scholars to assume this was the case. See Gagarin (2008: 
94-95). Humphreys (1991: 21-22) makes this connection most explicitly; see also Stroud (1968: 70-74) 
(with references), Thür (2002: 397-404), and Forsdyke (2005: 84-90). For problems associated with the 
wording of the Ath. Pol.'s description of the chronological relationship between Cylon's attempted tyranny 
and Drakon's law code, see von Fritz & Kapp (1950: 8 ff. and 152-53).
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petty as idleness and stealing cabbage (Plut. Sol. 17).14 When asked why he ordained the 
same punishment for vegetable theft as for murder, he replied that the lesser crimes 
deserved death, and he could think of no harsher penalty for the more serious ones, 
inspiring the witticism that Drakon's laws were written in blood instead of ink (Plut. Sol. 
17; Arist. Pol. 1274b17). Despite (or perhaps because of) Drakon's ruthlessness, his laws 
did nothing to end the strife. By 594, the situation had deteriorated so much that the 
Athenians appointed Solon as diallektes. He had a special commission to write another 
constitution to solve the problems, which he published in the Agora.15 His particular focus
was to address what amounted to class warfare between the aristocrats and the common 
people over the wielding of political power and inequities in landowning practices, as a 
result of which “the many [i.e., the poor] were enslaved to the few [i.e., the rich].”16
Solon’s reforms were unsuccessful, in implementation if not in concept. The rich 
were unhappy because of their diminished control over affairs of state, and in particular 
the losses they sustained under the seisachtheia, or "shaking off of burdens," the name for
the sweeping measures that cancelled all debts and abolished the apparently widespread 
practice of debt-slavery.17 The poor were unhappy because Solon failed to redistribute 
land along with revoking debt. The Ath. Pol. and Plutarch tell us that Solon somehow 
14. For the law on idleness, see Diog. Laert. 1.55 and Pollux 8.42. On Drakon's penalties for theft, see also 
Xen. Oec. 14.4 and Philodemos Oec. col. 7.14-21. Gell. NA 11.18.3, Paus. 9.36.8, and Athen. 13.569d also 
report that Drakon declared it legal to kill a man caught in the act of adultery with a female relative. 
Gagarin (1981: 116-21) has argued that Drakon probably did not set death as the penalty for most crimes, 
and that traditions of his severity descend from stipulations for atimia ("outlawry"), where death was the 
penalty for not going into exile. See Stroud (1968: 77-82) for the authenticity of a Drakonian code and for 
evidence for Drakon's laws other than that on homicide, which was supposedly the only law of Drakon's 
that Solon kept in force, and which was re-inscribed in 409 B.C.
15. Plut. Sol. 25.
16. Ath. Pol. 5; cf. Plut. Sol. 13-14.
17. Harris (2002: 415-30) distinguishes between debt-slavery and debt-bondage, and argues that Solon only
abolished enslavement for debt, not the institution of debt-bondage. 
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extracted a promise from all the citizenry to uphold his code, after which he took a 
sabbatical to escape the repeated requests by friends and foes to modify his law code in 
favor of their special interests.18 After his departure, the state dissolved once more into 
stasis for three decades.
Solon was followed by Athens' first real (or at least overt) tyrant. The factional 
leader Peisistratos rose to power in a series of attempted coups d’ état that saw him finally
take control permanently in 546 B.C. After his death, his son Hippias ruled until 511, 
when he was driven out of town because of the harsh retaliatory measures he took 
following the assassination of his brother Hipparchos in 514. In 508, the popular leader 
Cleisthenes instituted the radical democracy that we associate with Classical Athens. 
Despite evidence that they had in fact been popular, after the democracy had taken hold 
in the early fifth century, the Athenians vilified the Peisistratids. At the same time, there 
was a corresponding elevation of Solon to almost mythical status. His law code became 
hallowed by a patina of antiquity, and many considered it synonymous with democracy 
and moderate rule, to the point of Solon being associated with the foundation of 
democracy in very public ways.19
This exaltation of Solon gained momentum in the course of the fifth century, 
when his laws started being cited as a precedent for all things good and democratic.20 
Their veneration became most apparent following the oligarchic coup of the Four 
Hundred in 411, a bloody regime that seized power after two decades of fighting in the 
Peloponnesian War, but which was overthrown in less than a year. Following the 
18. Ath. Pol. 11.1. Plutarch adds the detail that he left the city to pursue commercial ventures (Sol. 2.1).
19. To be discussed more fully in ch. 3, p. 90-101. See also Shear 2011.
20. Ibid.; see also Shear 2011.
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restoration of democracy, an otherwise poorly attested official named Nicomachus was 
charged with heading a board of ten anagrapheis for the purpose of recording the laws of 
Solon and Drakon. Several fifth-and-fourth-century speech writers, including Lysias and 
Andocides, attacked Nicomachus, accusing him of changing the laws and exceeding his 
term of office.21 The vehemence of these accusations shows the seriousness with which 
the Athenians took the provisions of their ancestral lawgivers.22
III. Tyrants: Bad or Just Drawn that Way?
In order to have a meaningful discussion about Solon's relationship to tyranny, we
must first discuss the phenomenon itself. Robin Lane Fox called the study of tyranny 
"one of Greek history's most challenging black holes."23 Since all of our primary sources 
date from after the rise of democracy, they are filled with anachronistic assumptions and 
prejudices, generally portraying tyrants as evil-minded and immoral, and making their 
ejection by a freedom-loving populace all but inevitable. Anderson reminds us that "even 
for writers of the fifth and fourth centuries, events before ca. 500 B.C. belonged 
essentially to prehistory. For source material these authors were forced to rely on the 
largely mute testimony of timeworn monuments, on the often opaque musings of early 
poets, and above all on the vagaries of oral traditions."24 Aristotle associates tyranny with 
21. Lysias 30.2 (in 410) and Andocides 1.82 (in 403).
22. Ruschenbusch does not believe that Solon's reputation took off until 356 B.C. (when Philip II of 
Macedon began playing a large part in Greek politics), observing that there were only 4 citations of Solon's 
laws among Attic orators, while after 356 there are 32. See Ruschenbusch (1958: 398-424). For Solon's rise
to his reputation as "father of democracy," discussed more fully in ch. 3, see also Mossé (1979: 425-37), 
Szegedy-Maszak (1993: 201-14), and Hansen (1989: 71-99). Hignett (1952: 2-8) argues that Solon was 
regarded as a hero of democracy in the fifth century, as does Shear (2011: 19-69).
23. Lane Fox (2000: 38). 
24. Anderson (2005: 174 n. 2). See also McGlew (1993: 2-13). For difficulties with the reliability of 
sources for the archaic period, see Raaflaub (1988: 197-225) and Osborne (2009: 4-15). On specific 
problems with sources for tyrants, see Osborne (2009: 192-97) and Dewald (2003: 25).
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operating outside the law, and tyrants develop certain stereotypical characteristics in the 
fifth century in particular.25 
Herodotus gives us an ideological denunciation of tyranny in the so-called 
"Constitutional Debate" preceding Darius' succession to the throne of Persia (3.80-82). In
his account, the conspirators who had assassinated the usurper Smerdis meet to decide 
what sort of government they should institute, and each gives a speech advocating 
democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy in turn. Otanes, who favors democracy, gives a 
thorough denunciation on the evils of sole rule (3.80), with which Megabyzus agrees, 
though he ultimately champions oligarchy (3.81). Otanes claims that the absolute power 
of tyrants corrupts even the best of men, so that they become proud and envious, the 
result of which is violence. He elaborates that monarchs despise virtue and listen to 
slander, overturn the ancestral laws of the land, put men to death without trial, and rape 
women.26 
Periander provides us with perhaps the best example of this type of negative 
portrayal. This infamous tyrant of Corinth became the embodiment of the tyrannical 
clichés of greed, violence and sexual depravity. According to Herodotus, he first tried to 
steal his friend's buried treasure (Hdt. 5.92), then sent young boys from Corcyra to be 
castrated (Hdt. 3.48), and finally he murdered and sexually defiled his wife (in that 
25. On equating tyranny with lawlessness: Arist. Pol. 3.1285a18-19, 4.1292a7-30, 1292b5-10, and 
1259a1-24. On stereotypical behavior of tyrants: Arist. Pol. 5.1311a36-1313a17; see also Anderson (2005: 
174, esp. n. 2), and Stein-Hölkeskamp (2009: 101, 112-14).
26. See Lateiner (1989: 164-67) on Herodotus' programmatic characterization of tyrants, and 167-170 on 
the constitutional debate in particular. He refutes Waters (1985), who argues that Herodotus does not 
employ this sort of patterning and that the characteristics of monarchs and tyrants are naturally repetitious. 
See also Hartog (1988: 325-39), who argues that Otanes speaks from a Greek perspective, and sees 
monarchy/tyranny as a form of government that directly opposes the ancestral customs (patrios politeia). 
Darius, on the other hand, speaks from a Persian perspective, and sees democracy as contradicting the 
traditional forms of government (326-7). Waters (1971: 41) uses Darius' speech to argue that there is no 
theory of tyranny in Herodotus' day, and that the historian himself shows no antipathy toward tyrants.
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order), "putting his loaves in a cold oven" (Hdt. 5.92). Herodotus also tells us of the 
violent tendencies of Thrasybulus of Miletus, who advised Periander to lop the heads 
from the tallest stalks of grain as a metaphor for executing influential citizens who might 
destabilize his power (Hdt. 5.91-92).27 He also describes the sexual deviancy of 
Peisistratos, who married the daughter of his on-again, off-again political rival Megacles. 
After the bride's mother asked her some pointed questions, Megacles discovered that 
Peisistratos' marital relations with his daughter were ou kata nomon, that is, "not 
according to custom." This offense was so severe that even Megacles' enemies joined 
forces with him to drive Peisistratos out of Athens (Hdt. 1.61).28 
The abuse that tyrants received in later literature, however, is not consistent with 
the attitudes that we see towards them in earlier times.29 More recent scholarship has been
critical of the tradition of the "bad tyrant" and has produced a picture that is quite 
different from that presented in our ancient sources.30 Many scholars now see tyranny as 
an important transitional phase from traditional oligarchies to democracy, and there have 
been earnest attempts to rehabilitate the reputations of various individual tyrants, in 
particular the Peisistratids of Athens.31 Despite the dawning realization that there were 
many benevolent tyrants, scholars have achieved a rare unanimity in their understanding 
of the nature of tyrants' power: they were illegitimate rulers. Whatever good they may 
27. Aristotle tells the same story in Pol. 3.1284a and 5.1311a, but with the roles reversed. 
28. Herodotus tells us that Peisistratos committed this grave insult as a way to avoid fathering children with
familial ties to his political rivals. 
29. See below p. 150, n. 399 for positive associations with tyranny. See Andrewes (1956: 20-30), Podlecki 
(1984: 130-34), and McGlew (1993: 52-61) on the changing definition of a tyrant from Homeric through 
Classical times, and Anderson (2005: 203-11) on the fluctuating connotations of the word in the early poets.
30. Ibid. On the relationship between desire, sexual domination, and tyranny, with particular reference to 
this episode, see Hartog (1988: 331-32).
31. On the necessity of tyranny as part of the transition from rule by the elite to democracy, see Anderson 
(2005: 174-75), Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989, and De Libero 1996. For an excellent re-evaluation of the 
activities of Peisistratos in economic, political, social, and military spheres, see Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2000.
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have accomplished, they were first and foremost tyrants; that is, extraconstitutional 
usurpers who either overturned or ignored the existing governmental systems.32 
There are indications that this was not always the case.33 We see hints in 
Aristotle's Politics, in which he states that tyrants (including Peisistratos) were often 
merely demagogues with extraordinary power (1310b14-16, 29-31). We hear from 
multiple ancient sources that the Athenian people, both rich and poor, were eager for a 
tyrant to right the social ills that had befallen them. Solon himself explicitly states that he 
was voluntarily offered a tyranny (frs. 32.2, 33.6, 34.7-8), and Plutarch tells us, "At that 
time, the disparity between the rich and the poor had reached such a high point, and the 
city was in an altogether perilous condition; it seemed as if the only way to restore order 
and stop the turmoil was to establish a tyranny" (13.2; τότε δὲ τῆς τῶν πενήτων πρὸς τοὺς
πλουσίους ἀνωµαλίας ὥσπερ ἀκµὴν λαβούσης παντάπασιν ἐπισφαλῶς ἡ πόλις διέκειτο, 
καὶ µόνως ἂν ἐδόκει καταστῆναι καὶ παύσασθαι ταραττοµένη τυραννίδος γενοµένης).34 
Plutarch also reports that Solon's friends and family, when urging him to seize sole 
power, pointed to the virtues of the tyrants Pittacus and Tynnondas to further their 
argument (Sol. 14.4): 
And above all, his most intimate friends rebuked him with respect to the 
monarchy, for being averse to it because of a name, as though because of the 
virtues of the one who seized it would not straightaway become a [hereditary/
lawful] kingship, as had happened formerly in Euboea with Tynnondas, and as 
32. Drumann 1812 gave one of the first methodological studies on ancient tyranny in which he presented 
tyrants as illegitimate monarchs, which has remained the basis for the modern consensus; see Andrewes 
(1956: 7), Finley (1970: 107), Snodgrass (1980: 96), and Murray (1993: 137), to name a few examples. For 
further analysis of the "legality" of tyrants' regimes, see p. 19.
33. For fuller discussion of the ways tyranny arose naturally out of the existing aristocratic system, see 
McGlew (1993: 8-10) and Anderson (2005: 173-222).
34. Cf. Ath. Pol. 11.2, which suggests that the people were discontented with Solon because he had not 
done as they expected, which seems to indicate that they had wanted him to take up a tyranny. 
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was the case now with Pittacus, who had been chosen as tyrant by the 
Mitylenaeans.
µάλιστα δὲ οἱ συνήθεις ἐκάκιζον εἰ διὰ τοὔνοµα δυσωπεῖται τὴν µοναρχίαν, 
ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀρετῇ τοῦ λαβόντος εὐθὺς ἂν βασιλείαν γενοµένην, καὶ γεγενηµένην 
πρότερον µὲν Εὐβοεῦσι Τυννώνδαν, νῦν δὲ Μιτυληναίοις Πιττακὸν ᾑρηµένοις 
τύραννον.
In other words, even if the designation of the regime was distasteful, this was 
more than counterbalanced if the ruler were of excellent moral character and ability. 
Diogenes Laertius also tells us that, "Henceforward the demos looked up to him [Solon] 
and gladly would have had him rule over them as a tyrant" (2.49; τοῦ δὴ λοιποῦ 
προσεῖχον αὐτῷ ὁ δῆµος καὶ ἡδέως κἂν τυραννεῖσθαι ἤθελον πρὸς αὐτοῦ). In fact, tyrants
made many positive contributions to society and political development.35 If Solon were 
aiming to become a tyrant, it would not necessarily have diminished his popularity, since 
tyrants in many other poleis brought stability and peace. It is not even clear that all of the 
men whom history remembers as tyrants were recognized as absolute rulers by their 
contemporaries, especially as some of them seem to have been elected to their positions 
of power, just as Solon was appointed to his special archonship.36 
The eagerness of so many Athenians for Solon to become an acknowledged tyrant
suggests that tyrants had successfully resolved stasis elsewhere. There were several 
tyrannies contemporary to Solon, most of which were already in a second or third 
generation of a dynasty—most notably, Periander of Corinth and Cleisthenes of Sicyon, 
with whom Solon had close dealings.37 Just as we saw hints of negative stories about 
35. See below p. 150, n. 399.
36. See below p. 19.
37. For Solon's association with Periander and Cleisthenes, see below p. 171. For a more dubious 
connection between Solon and Periander in an odd sort of "wisdom contest," see ch. 2, pp. 58-59.
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Solon in chapter 2, we also find remnants of positive stories about tyrants.38 However, it 
is common for later sources writing about these autocrats to qualify any of their 
worthwhile achievements. Sometimes these positive contributions are part of some sort of
devious power-grabbing ploy, as when Plutarch lambasts Peisistratos for pretending to be 
a beneficent leader of the people for his own nefarious ends, making it seem as though 
any real benefits the tyrant provided were incidental to his quest for power (Sol. 29). 
Other times authors bury or invalidate any useful actions by stressing the tyrants' moral 
depravity. For example, Herodotus first implies that Cypselus' rule had divine sanction 
(5.92b-e), then, after a long recitation of Cypselus' sins, grudgingly admits that he made 
Corinth extremely prosperous. Herodotus then immediately allows that Cypselus' son 
Periander was "less violent than his father," but qualifies that statement with a lengthy 
account of Periander's bloodthirstiness (Hdt. 5.92g). Still other times, sources flat-out 
contradict themselves with little or no qualification. Diogenes Laertius, who glowingly 
relates Solon's categorical opposition to violence and the methods Peisistratos used in 
securing the tyranny, immediately records a letter that Solon wrote to Periander advising 
him to maintain his tyranny by brute force (2.49-52; 64-5).39 
The preservation of these positive stories, despite the obvious reluctance of later 
authors to admit that tyrants could have accomplished anything good, suggests that the 
traditions were too persistent to deny. Later sources would have struggled to reconcile 
stories of useful contributions with what they "knew" of the character of tyrants by 
making them fit the stereotype of the diabolical despot any way they could. We may 
38. On the tradition of the "good tyrant" in later literature, see Osborne (2009: 196-97).
39. See below p. 148 n. 386 for citations of specific legal measures of tyrants that were characterized as 
negative despite positive consequences. 
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therefore cautiously suggest that anything beneficial about tyrants preserved in the 
literary tradition, no matter how tortuously qualified, is likely genuine.40 I will even go so
far as to suggest that the more convoluted the attempt to make beneficial actions of 
tyrants part of some nefarious ploy, the more likely the story is to be authentic. 
According to Aristotle, tyrants almost always gained power by championing the 
people against the rich, and often arose as part of a general trend of opposition to extreme
oligarchies (Pol. 1306a6, 1308a19, 1310b12). He classifies tyrannies by four types. The 
first stems from the rise of a demagogue, the second from the abuse of the prerogatives of
a normal political office, the third from the breakdown of a hereditary kingship and 
neglect of ancestral customs, and the fourth from the voluntary delegation of power that 
was previously in the hands of a narrow oligarchy to an individual. Each type, though, 
essentially began as a leader of the people against the elite. Different poleis also found 
different ways to put an end to oppressive regimes that were not necessarily considered 
tyrannies, despite outward similarities. 
The basis of a tyrant's claim to power varied from city to city, as did the 
mechanism by which he secured power in the first place. For instance Lycurgus, though 
not called a tyrant, invoked the authority of Apollo when he solved Sparta's stasis with 
his Great Rhetra (Plut. Lyc.). At Corinth, Cypselus rested his right to rule on his Bacchiad
roots and a series of Delphic oracles (Hdt. 5.92b-e). Though ultimately unsuccessful, 
Drakon and Solon in Athens used their authority as elected legislators to attempt to quell 
civil turmoil fueled by aristocratic infighting (Ath. Pol. 1-11). Pheidon appealed to the 
40. See also Salmon (1997: 62) on the likelihood of the authenticity of stories about positive contributions 
of tyrants. 
18
family precedent of hereditary kingship to gain enough support to institute reforms that 
stabilized Argos (Hdt. 6.127; Ath. Pol. 1.10).41 Aristotle also mentions a class of tyrants 
called aisymnetes who were elected to powerful office, including Phalaris of Agrigentum 
and the Ionian tyrants.42 This sounds very much like Solon's extraordinary appointment as
eponymous archon in 594, especially since Aristotle specifies that aisymnetes often arose 
because of social stasis.43 
Thus we see that, despite Solon's apparent aversion to tyranny, tyrants often 
(though not always) were viewed positively by archaic contemporaries. This means that 
Solon's vehement condemnation of tyranny requires some explanation, which we can find
in the troubles caused by the Athenians' only experience with tyranny—the bloodshed 
and strife that arose as a result of Cylon's actions. But since tyrants often managed to 
quell the same sort of stasis that plagued Athens, it was reasonable for Solon to desire to 
emulate the successful measures taken by tyrants while avoiding the politically dangerous
label. After the rise of democracy, the political climate condemned tyrants, which assured
that Solon's legacy as an enemy of tyranny endured, despite the similarity of many of his 
reforms to those of tyrants, including those of the Athenian Peisistratos, who explicitly 
claimed continuity with Solon.
41. Pheidon possibly only instituted informal changes in the distribution of power, since there is no 
evidence of lingering alterations in the Argive constitution. Likewise the Orthagorid dynasty at Sicyon 
seems to have instigated few formal changes in the constitution until Cleisthenes. On the Orthagorid 
dynasty, see further Stein-Hölkeskamp (2009: 104-07).
42. For aisymnetes, see Arist. Pol. 5.1301b18-20, 25-28; 3.1285a31-34; cf. 3.1285b25-26. 
43. For more examples of elected tyrants see Salmon (1997: 62). Goušchin (1999: 21-22) discusses the 
elective tyrannies of Pittacus (Arist. Pol. 1.1285b25-26) and Dionysius of Syracuse (Arist. Rhet. 
1.1357b30-36), the latter based on his being appointed a bodyguard similar to Peisistratos' korynephoroi. 
Goušchin also suggests that Solon was actually elected as a tyrant but turned it down in favor of taking the 
position of a diallektes, though as we shall see the difference between the two positions was mostly 
semantic. 
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IV. Solon's Life
Given the political context in which Solon was operating, we now turn to what we
know of his personal life. We are fortunate to have many more detailed sources about 
Solon outside of his own writings than about any of the other archaic poets. 
Unfortunately, though, Solon's life has been reconstructed from much later accounts, 
which are also our main sources for the surviving fragments of his poetry. As always 
when investigating historical periods with scant written evidence, we have to establish 
carefully what our extant sources are, what problems are connected with them, and how 
we may extract as much reliable information as possible from them. Because many of the
later stories about Solon became fanciful (and in some cases, outright fantastic) as time 
went on, we must be cautious in too firmly asserting facts about his life. Ancient authors 
tended to present information about poets gleaned from their own poetry as fact, or to 
state with confidence things which were likely interpolation or conjecture. We must 
remember this when we talk about the life of Solon and be aware that much of what we 
"know" may be the result of later embellishment. We run into further trouble when we 
confront our lack of knowledge about the sources for these authors beyond Solon's 
poetry. In the fifth and particularly fourth centuries, he became something of what 
Noussia-Fantuzzi calls a "culture hero," the subject of a wide array of legends portraying 
him as sage, lawgiver, and founder of Athenian democracy, attributing to him many feats 
also credited to other archaic figures.44
Though Solon makes his first extended appearance in Herodotus in the mid-to-
late fifth century, his character in this work is steeped in folklore that largely ignores his 
44. Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 3).
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political reforms, and which gives us next to no biographical details.45 Our invaluable 
next source is the Ath. Pol., which details the history of Athens' constitution from the 
mythical reign of King Theseus to the author's present day, and contains a substantial 
section on the reforms of Solon. The Ath. Pol. gives us a very clear and precise 
discussion of Solon's life and political activities, providing an excellent framework in 
which to view his legislation. But we must remember that the author was working in the 
heyday of democracy, and we see constant appeals to Solon's poetry for explanations of 
his various actions.46 Diodorus Siculus, writing in the mid-to-late first century B.C., fills 
his account with anecdotes and bon mots. His work, while a valuable collection of 
popular and current stories about Solon, is rife with contradiction and historical 
anachronism, and promulgates wholesale the picture of Solon the sage and misotyrannos. 
Diogenes Laertius, who lived in the third century AD, writes in much the same vein.
The fullest record is Plutarch's Life of Solon, written in the late first/early second 
century A.D., approximately 700 years after Solon's death. As a biographer, Plutarch is 
most interested in Solon as an example of how to lead a good life, which makes his 
account susceptible to the sort of romanticization that I will address in chapter 2. While 
the lateness of the source and its high-minded tone necessitate caution, Plutarch does 
preserve much valuable information about Solon's life, laws, and poetry, particularly 
when we consider that he had access to many sources closer to Solon's time that are now 
lost to us. But because of the highly biased nature of Plutarch's moralizing biography, we 
45. Other fifth-and-fourth-century sources include scattered references in Aristophanes and small fragments
in other comic poets; see Martina (1968) for a full collection of references. See Monedero (2001: 156-207, 
208-10) on Solon in other comedians, Plato, and various fourth-century orators. 
46. Discussed in detail in ch. 3. 
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must be careful in differentiating between what comes from preserved earlier sources and
ideas in Plutarch's own day about what constituted an ideal lawgiver and statesman.47 We 
also have many passing allusions to Solon and his reforms in fourth-century oratory, but I
will discuss problems with these in chapter 3.
Solon's own poetry tells us that he was an Athenian by birth, though Diogenes 
Laertius claims that he was born on Salamis.48 Plutarch tells us that he was of a noble 
family and related to the Peisistratids, both of whom claimed descent from Kodrus, the 
last Athenian king, through whom they were related to Neleus and ultimately Poseidon.49 
Plutarch tells us that, although from an aristocratic family, he was of modest means, 
which obligated him from a young age to take up a career in commerce.50 We can identify
two periods during which Solon may indeed have spent time abroad, inferred from two 
vague references in his poems.51 All our sources agree that Solon left Athens immediately
after implementing his law code, the completion of which is usually dated to the 
archonship of Eukrates in 592/1. Solon extracted a promise that his laws would not be 
changed for either one hundred years (according to the Ath. Pol. and Plutarch), or ten 
years (according to Herodotus).52
The dates of Solon's life are a matter of some controversy. The primary issue is 
47. On differentiating between reliable tradition and Plutarch's ideas about proper statesmanship, see de 
Blois (2006: 429-40).
48. Sol. fr. 2; Diog. Laert. 3.1, quoting Thrasylos. 
49. Plut. Sol. 1.1 mentions his relationship with Peisistratos; Diog. Laert. describes his descent from Kodrus
(1.53).
50. That he was from an aristocratic background but of only moderate wealth is something on which our 
sources concur (see, for example, Ath. Pol. 5.3 and Plut. Sol. 1.2). It is possible, though, that this is an 
invention, since Plutarch and the Ath. Pol. both "prove" this using fragments of Solon's own poetry that 
criticize the wealthy as well as the poor. See further below, p. 152 n. 408.
51. Fr. 19, which refers to a voyage on a ship, and fr. 28, which mentions the mouth of the Nile. 
52. The Ath. Pol. (7.2) and Plutarch (Sol. 25.1) give the length of time as one hundred years; Herodotus 
(1.25) tells us it was ten years. This may have been an element inserted later to make Solon fit the 
stereotype of the lawgiver leaving after the implementation of his laws, on which see ch. 2, p. 63.
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the date of his reforms in relation to his archonship, which gives us a very tenuous basis 
for guessing the dates of his life. 594 is one of the only secure dates we have for Solon's 
life and political career.53 We can only surmise his age based on tenuous speculation—for 
instance, all of our sources agree on his involvement as a general in the war with Megara 
and the Salamis campaign. According to the Ath. Pol., for a man to be chosen as general 
in the late seventh century, he had to have at least two sons who were no younger than ten
years of age. If he was elected general around 601/0, the most commonly accepted date 
for the Salamis campaign, he must have met this requirement (Ath. Pol. 4.2). For a man 
to have two (legitimate) ten year old sons, he must have been married for at least twelve 
years. In fragments of his poetry Solon suggests that a man should marry in his early 
thirties (fr. 27.8-9), as does Hesiod in his advice to Perses (Op. 695-7). In later times, 
Aristotle and Plato both agree that a man should marry between thirty and thirty-five 
years of age.54 If we guess that he married at thirty, and accept the date of his eponymous 
archonship as 594, he could not have been younger than forty-five when he was 
appointed mediator, though Rhodes speculates that being elected as such when he was as 
young as thirty or thirty-five is not impossible; though it is apparent from this extremely 
qualified assessment that his age is far from secure.55 
More broadly, we know that Solon lived between the second half of the seventh 
century and the first half of the sixth, but we do not have precise dates for his birth or 
death. In fact, there are almost as many versions of the circumstances of Solon's death as 
there are sources.56 The Ath. Pol. (14.2) states that he was still alive when Peisistratos 
53. This is based on the Athenian Archon list (see above p. 9 n. 11); see also Rhodes (1993: 120-21).
54. Plat. Rep. 460e; Leg. 721b; Arist. Pol. 1335a28-30.
55. For further arguments for his age, with citations, see Owens (2010: 63-66) and Rhodes (1993: 121-22).
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came to power (an event he supposedly attempted to derail), but Peisistratos became 
tyrant during the archonship of Comeas (561/0), with Solon reportedly dying less than 
two years later, in 560/59.57 Diogenes Laertius (1.62) tells us that Solon died on Cyprus at
age 80, though others claim that he died on Salamis.58 There is also a tradition (which 
even Plutarch doubts) that his ashes were scattered over Salamis.59 
Others use his supposed visit to Croesus of Lydia, detailed in the first book of 
Herodotus, to fix the dates of his life, archonship, and reforms. If he did in fact interact 
with Croesus, the date of his archonship would have to be moved some twenty to thirty 
years later, as Miller in fact does argue.60 She bases this on his reference to a law 
borrowed from Amasis of Egypt and a reference in the Ath. Pol. to the introduction of 
coinage (10.1), but scholarly consensus is against her.61 Hignett and Sealey believe that 
there was a separation between Solon's archonship and his constitutional commission, 
based on gaps in the archon list, placing the former in 594 and the latter in the mid-to-late
580s, but given the unreliability of the evidence, I find it more plausible that Solon was 
special archon in the same year that he wrote/enacted his reforms.62 
56. The Ath. Pol. follows the account of Phanias (fr. 21 Wehrli = Plut. Sol. 32.3).
57. Phanias contradicts the account of Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 148 Wehrli), who claims that Solon died a 
long way into Peisistratos' tyranny, but this information is highly suspect. See Rhodes (1976: 219-33) and 
Davies 1971. 
58. For Solon's death on Salamis, see Cratinus, PCG 246; Anth. Pal. 7.87)
59. See Linforth (1919: 308 ff.) and Freeman (1926: 194).
60. See Miller (1959: 29-52), 1968, 1969, and 1971) for the historicity of Solon's visit to Croesus. 
61. On the impossible chronology of Solon's visit to Croesus, who could not have come to power earlier 
than the 560s, see How & Wells (1912b: 66-67) and Asheri, Lloyd, & Corcella (2007: 99). For sources on 
the possibility of Solon's visit to Egypt and his possible relationship with Amasis, see Martina (1968: nos. 
33, 62-9).
62. Hignett (1952: 317); Sealey (1976: 121). For defense of the traditional date of his reforms, see Podlecki
(1984: 141-42), Rhodes (1993: 120), and Linforth (1919: 265). On the archon list, see further p. 9 n. 11 and
p. 185 n. 478.
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V. Solon's Poetry
As mentioned above, our most important source for Solon's life and the motives 
behind his reforms is his poetry, fragments of which have come down to us via quotations
in later sources. There are thirty extant fragments of poetry attributed to Solon, spanning 
the genres of dactylic hexameter, elegy, iambus, and trochaic tetrameter. The best and 
most thorough edition of these fragments remains that of West, complemented by his 
widely-used translations of the Greek lyric poets.63 Five of Solon's fragments are doublets
with poems in the corpus of poetry that has come down to us under the name of 
Theognis.64 According to Plato, Solon was the "the noblest of poets," who could have 
been a second Homer had he not diverted his attention to politics (Timaeus 21c).65 
Modern scholars have been less kind, preferring to mine his poetry for information about 
his political reforms. The poetry itself, while an effective vehicle for moral philosophy 
and justification of his constitutional reforms, has been condemned by many eminent 
scholars as second-rate in style and quality. Campbell is particularly harsh, calling Solon's
poetry infelicitous, clumsy, and uneven, and sees his value almost exclusively as a 
historical source.66 Gerber damns Solon with faint praise, saying that his importance as a 
63. West 1972 and 1993, respectively.
64. The 2,800 verses that have been attributed to Theognis probably contain poems by other authors, 
especially since we have doublets of verses attributed to more than one person (including Solon). The 
collected passages attributed to Theognis are therefore known as the Theognidea to reflect the probability 
that some of them are spurious and/or wrongly attributed. For Theognis' dates and relationship to Solon, see
Podlecki (1984: 143-44); on Theognis and the Theognidea more generally, see Podlecki (1984: 143-51) and
Lardinois (2006: 15-16). On double attributions with Solon, Lardinois (2006: 18) cautions us, "Theognis 
may have borrowed these lines from Solon or Solon from Theognis or the material in both may derive from
a common source of some generic and (previously) anonymous elegiac couplets," though most scholars 
consider the Theognidea to be the derivative text, as does Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 58). West has reduced 
the number of demonstrably authentic verses to a little more than 300 (1993: 64-73). 
65. Barnstone (2010: 84); Podlecki 1984. Late Antique commentators credited Solon with 5,000 verses, 
though this high number may be due to attribution of verses that have come down to us in the Theognidea. 
See Podlecki (1984: 143).
66. Campbell (1982: 231-253, esp. 233).
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political figure has led scholars to "an undeservedly low opinion of him as a poet... [but] 
it would certainly be unjustified to include him among poets of the first rank..."67 Before 
this tepid endorsement, he thoroughly disparages Solon's poetry, commenting on fr. 13 
that Solon "rambles at times and the transitions are not always smooth," leaving "the 
impression that Solon has not thought out fully what he wishes to say before he says it," 
and that "it is hard to disagree with those who disparage the poetic quality."68 More 
recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in Solon. Christoph Mülke in 2002 and 
Maria Noussia-Fantuzzi in 2010 published exhaustive (and kinder) commentaries on his 
poetry, and Josine Blok and Andre Lardinois in 2006 edited an exhaustive volume on his 
political and literary activities, covering everything from his poetic endeavors to his 
reception to the authenticity of his laws.69 Ron Owens also published a book detailing 
Solon's life, philosophy and reforms, with a new commentary and translation of his 
poetry.70 Elizabeth Irwin also published a 2005 book dealing with Solon's place in archaic
politics, which I will discuss in some detail in chapter 4.71
In the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., elegy and iambus were prominent media 
for poetry, which were usually transmitted publicly and privately as vehicles for 
philosophy, morals, and doctrine. Poetry was the foremost means of communicating with 
and persuading the public or politically influential members of the aristocracy.72 Solon 
began writing poetry sometime before 600 B.C., since three fragments refer to the 
67. Gerber (1997: 13).
68. Gerber (1997: 116). Fränkel (1962: 272-73) and Spira (1981: 177) similarly criticize the quality of 
Solon's poetry. 
69. Noussia 2001, Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010; Mülke 2002; Blok and Lardinois 2006.
70. Owens 2010.
71. Irwin 2005.
72. Owens (2010: 84).
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Athenian campaign against Salamis, which was part of a larger war with the Megarians 
that took place in the late seventh century (frs. 1-3). In the fragments of Solon's poems 
that were written before his reforms, there is a concentration on the social and political 
problems that were plaguing the state.73 These mostly use the present tense, and are 
written in the elegiac meter. Others of Solon's poems were obviously composed after his 
reforms, since they refer to them, though usually without mention of specific measures. 
Still others highlight the continuing sociopolitical problems of Athens in general. This 
post-reform group includes poems mostly composed in tetrameters and iambics, 
employing the past tense, and providing rationale of Solon's actions in the wake of 
widespread dissatisfaction. 
Solon's poetry was apparently composed as a conduit for political and moral 
advice.74 One of his goals seems to have been to place the problems in Attica within a 
new framework of justice and what was best for the community as a whole, which he did 
by repeatedly referring to the doctrine of the mean: that is, the idea that the best way to 
live is to have "nothing in excess," the maxim made famous by the inscription "µηδέν 
ἄγαν" at Delphi.75 This idea seems to have been part of an attempt by Solon to present a 
framework for a new morality for the polis, which can be seen as a sign of the prevalence
of elegiac poetry as a medium through which to communicate with a larger public.76 It 
also indicates that archaic Athens was still largely an oral society, lacking a prose 
tradition, which should be borne in mind when considering the impact of Solon's literary 
73. To be discussed in more detail in ch. 4.
74. Owens (2010: 86-87); Adkins (1972: 49).
75. See ch. 2, p. 48-60.
76. See further ch. 4, p. 113-119. On justice as a concept in archaic politics, see Owens (2010: 86-87), 
Almeida 2003, and McGlew 1993.
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activities.77 
VI. Solon's Legal Code
Solon's poetry is our oldest concrete evidence for archaic legislation. Literary 
sources cite a plethora of Solonian laws, often taken from quotations of the poems in later
sources.78 The corpus of Solon's laws edited by Ruschenbusch has remained the standard 
point of reference since its publication in 1966, though various revisions have been 
proposed.79 Many of the laws referred to as Solonian were surely later interpolations, but 
at least some were certainly authentic.80 Ruschenbusch in particular is optimistic about 
the genuineness of Solon's law code, which he believes remained unaltered until it was 
updated in 411.81 The laws were supposedly written down on 16, or as many as 21 
whitewashed wooden boards called axones displayed publicly in front of the Stoa 
Basileus, or "Royal Stoa," a prominent building in the Agora.82 The scope of the laws 
covered legal procedure and the penal code, regulation of imports and exports, 
inheritance laws, funerals, religious practices, social and moral behavior, and an 
extensive reorganization of the entire structure of the government.83 The Athenians 
revised their law code at the end of the fifth century, including the "ancestral" laws of 
77. Owens (2010: 86); see also Thomas 1989 and 1992 on the transition from an oral to a literate society in 
this period. Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 48-55) discusses the possibility that Solon's poetry was actually 
composed orally.
78. See Sickinger (1999: 8-10) on the relationship between the original laws of Solon and the version 
reported in later sources; see also Hölkeskamp (1992: 87-89). 
79. For proposed revisions, see Scafuro (2006: 179), who adds to Ruschenbusch's black-and-white 
categories of "genuine" and "false" a third category, that of laws with a "kernel" of the original laws of 
Solon. For another optimistic view of the reliability of our record of Solonian legislation, with citations of 
controversies, see Rhodes (2006: 249-60).
80. On identifying genuine laws of Solon, see Scafuro (2006: 175-96).
81. Ruschenbusch (1966: 57 ff.). Hignett (1952: 17-27), however, argues that the false attribution of laws to
Drakon and Solon (to be discussed in chapter 3) indicates that Athenians of the fifth and fourth centuries 
had no actual laws preserved. 
82. See Stroud 1979 on the historicity of the axones; see also Rhodes (2006: 256 and n. 66).
83. See Noussia 2010: 23 for citations. 
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Solon, so we must treat evidence from later authors cautiously.
Modern historians generally divide Solon's legislation into two categories, 
economic and constitutional. Evidence for Solon's economic legislation comes mainly 
from his own work, together with the commentary supplied by Plutarch, Aristotle, and the
Ath. Pol. While the primary reforms seem to have been the cancellation of all debts and 
the abolition of debt-slavery, perhaps the most important was the introduction of 
formalized property classes on the basis of wealth, which determined eligibility for public
office.84 The pentakosiomedimnoi were those who produced 500 or more wet or dry 
measures (medimnoi) per year, followed by the hippeis, who produced at least 300 
medimnoi; the zeugitai, who produced 200 or more; and finally, the thetes, or everyone 
else. Various scholars have associated these property classes on the basis of etymology 
with different military divisions, with the hippeis being equated with knights, or cavalry.85
Since horses were expensive to maintain, cavalry required the sort of wealth that only a 
hippeis or pentakosiomedimnos possessed. Various explanations for the identity of the 
zeugitai have been proposed. Originally, many scholars assumed that the "yoke men" 
were a broad middle class who were wealthy enough to own a yoke of oxen.86 Now many
scholars believe that the term refers to hoplites, who consisted of men who were "yoked" 
in a phalanx and were wealthy enough to provide their own panoply, and the thetes were 
either men without military duties or light-armed troops.87
84. This reform is not considered genuine by all scholars; however, see Mossé (1979: 425-37). For 
descriptions of the property classes, see Ath. Pol. 73-4 and Plutarch Sol. 18.1. On differences between debt-
slavery and debt-bondage, see Harris (2002: 415-30) and Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 29 n. 58), with citations. 
85. For further discussion of the etymology of the property classes, and ambiguities over which classes 
were allowed to hold which offices, see von Fritz & Kapp (1950: 155).
86. E.g. Frost (1984: 283-85), Hansen (1991: 43-46), Foxhall (1997: 131), and Raaflaub (1997: 55).
87. See, as a representative sampling, Ehrenberg (1973: 52-53), Van Wees 2006352-54), Foxhall (1997: 
70-71), and Stahl & Walter (2009: 146-47). For further citations on both sides of the debate, see van Wees 
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It seems that only the top two property classes could hold magistracies 
(archonships), and only the pentakosiomedimnoi could hold the office of the Treasurer of 
Athena or be selected as eponymous archon (the highest magistrate).88 It is unclear which 
political offices were open to the lower classes, but it seems that even the thetes at least 
had the right to vote on laws proposed in the assembly.89 The prestigious council of 
elders, known as the Areopagus, remained composed exclusively of ex-archons (and 
therefore only members of the pentakosiomedimnoi and hippeis), a role they retained 
until 462, when the reforms of Ephialtes transferred a large part of their powers to the 
Cleisthenic Council of Five Hundred.90 
A passage in the Ath. Pol. tells us that Solon retained the four ancestral tribes and 
the four "tribal kings," and that within each tribe there were three trittues and twelve 
naukrariai, who controlled contributions and expenditure; further, many of the existing 
laws of Solon made reference to the latter no-longer-existing officials (Ath. Pol. 8.3). 
Various scholars have had differing opinions on the exact role of the naukrariai in pre-
Classical Athens. This confusion is exacerbated by our lack of sources and conflicts in the
accounts that we do have.91 Herodotus mentions the prytanies of the naukraroi (5.71), but
Thucydides contradicts him, telling us that the archons had control of the entire 
(2006: 352-54).
88. On the election of archons, see Develin (1979: 455-68).
89. Ath. Pol. 7.3 and Plut. Sol. 18.2 tell us that Solon allowed thetes to vote in the assembly, but Hignett 
(1952: 117 n. 23) believes that this is a later interpolation based on the Cleisthenic reforms. Rhodes (1993: 
140 ff.) makes the compelling point, though, that Thersites' abuse of Agamemnon (Hom. Il. 2.210-44) 
indicates that even the lowest classes were allowed to speak in assembly. While of course this scenario 
comes from epic, it would have had to resonate with contemporary audiences in order to make sense. See 
also Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 26).
90. See Plut. Sol. 19.2; also Freeman (1926: 79 n. 1) and Wade-Gery (1933: 24 n. 1), contra Hignett (1952: 
93) and Hansen (1989: 98 n. 121). On the possibility that Ephialtes' reforms were actually Solonian, see 
Ostwald (1986: 73). On Ephialtes' reforms more generally, see Ostwald (1986: 36-42, 62, 71, and 180).
91. Rhodes (1993: 151) and Amit (1965: 104) comment on problems arising from the scantiness of our 
evidence. 
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administrative apparatus (1.126.8). Later we hear that Cleisthenes replaced the naukrariai
with demes and turned their functions over to officials called demarchs (21.5).92 This 
gives us forty-eight naukrariai, which were subdivisions of trittues that were created by 
Solon and dissolved by Cleisthenes. The Atthidographer Kleidemos makes no mention of
Solon, but tells us that it was Cleisthenes who created this system, replacing the previous 
four tribes with ten new ones, which he then divided into fifty parts called naukrariai 
(FGrH 323 F8).93 Others give the credit to Peisistratos, theorizing that he created the 
naukraria as local administrative bodies, rather than in connection with the creation of a 
navy.94 Orthodox scholarship usually assumes that these were (at least partly) military 
divisions responsible for members of the navy and a logistical network for supplying, 
maintaining, and commanding warships.95 Whatever the specifics, the trittues and 
naukrariai seem to be some sort of administrative subdivision, possibly instituted (or at 
least exploited) by Solon, but we know virtually nothing about them. 
Plutarch and the Ath. Pol. both credit Solon with setting up the boule of Four 
Hundred, made up of one hundred members from each of the four ancient tribes of Attica,
which examined proposals before they were discussed in the popular assembly (Plut. Sol. 
19.1; Ath. Pol. 8.4, 21.3). While several scholars contest the existence of this council, 
92. The Ath. Pol. also tells us that, when the demes replaced the naukraria, people began using their deme 
designation in place of the traditional patronymic as an official part of their name. If the deme (one of the 
major features of Cleisthenes' democratic reforms) was so important, and it was a direct descendant of the 
naukrariai, this suggests that the post was a division of considerable importance (21.4).
93. On the account of the naukrariai in Kleidemos, see further Jacoby 1949 passim, and McInerney (1994: 
32-34). For a complete list of references to naukraroi in ancient sources, see Wallinga (2000: 131-34).
94. See Hignett (1952: 69 ff., 115), but others have discredited this theory on lack of evidence; for instance,
see Welwei (1992: 258 ff.) and Wallinga (2000: 131-32).
95. E.g. Böckh 1886, Thompsen 1964, and Wallinga 2000. Alternatively, Billigmeier and Dusing 1981 
suggest that rather than a naval office, the nau-prefix comes from naos, or "temple," and is therefore some 
sort of religious division. On this possibility see further McInerney (1994: 32, esp. n. 56) and Jordan 1970.
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most recent scholarly opinion gives credence to its historicity.96 Solon also opened access 
to the courts (dikasteria) and introduced the right of appeal, the reform that the Ath. Pol. 
calls his most democratic (9.1).97 Even the poorest citizens were given the right to appeal 
a sentence passed by the magistrates in a tribunal known as the heliaia.98 However, the 
Ath. Pol. tells us that, "In the time of Solon all [of the archons] were brought together in 
the Thesmotheteion. The archons had complete power to judge cases themselves, not just 
to hold preliminary hearings as now. Such then were the powers of the archons" (3.5; ἐπὶ 
δὲ Σόλωνος ἅπαντες εἰς τὸ θεσµοθετεῖον συνῆλθον. κύριοι δ’ ἦσαν καὶ τὰς δίκας 
αὐτοτελεῖς κρίνειν, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν προανακρίνειν. τὰ µὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦτον 
εἶχε τὸν τρόπον). So it seems that, while the lower classes could appeal, their fate was 
entirely in the hands of the aristocracy, or those wealthy enough to qualify for 
archonships.99 He is also said to have written a law of denunciation (eisangelia), which 
prosecuted anyone attempting to bring down the democracy, though the anachronism of 
this sort of terminology suggests that this was actually a law of Cleisthenes that was 
wrongly attributed to Solon.100
In the social sphere, Solon also passed many laws regulating public and private 
behavior. These laws seem to have been quite detailed. For example, slaves were not 
allowed to exercise in the palaestras or practice pederasty; a widow could only remarry 
96. One of the first to question the Solonian origin of this council was Beloch (1912). De Sanctis (1975) 
expresses similar doubts, as do Hignett (1952: 92-96) and Sealey (1976: 120 ff.) Among those who believe 
the council existed are Rhodes (1972: 208 ff.) and de Laix (1973: 13-17); see also Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 
25, esp. nn. 38 and 39).
97. See Ruschenbusch (1957: 257-74) and Ostwald (1986: 5 ff.) 
98. See Plut. Sol. 18.3, and also laws 15b and 23c in Ruschenbusch. It seems that this process of appeal was
also set in motion automatically if the sentence passed down by the heliaia exceeded the maximum penalty 
that Solon's laws allowed for a particular crime; see Wilamowitz (1893: vol. 1 60 n. 29), Hignett (1952: 97 
ff.), Ruschenbusch (1961: 386-90), 1965, and (1968: 72-74); see also Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 27-28).
99. For further explication of this passage, see Moore (1975: 211-12).
100. See in general Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 27-28), and in particular Hansen (1975: 17-19).
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from the family of her former husband; a wife was limited as to the size of the wardrobe 
she could bring along with her dowry; and the husband of an epikleros (roughly 
"heiress") was required to have sexual intercourse with her at least three times a month. 
Further, sons had to support their fathers (but only on the condition that the fathers had 
taught their sons a viable trade); no one was allowed to speak ill of the dead or slander 
the living when near public or religious buildings; women could not tear their clothes or 
beat their breasts at funerals; and no one was permitted to mourn a foreigner.101 
Individuals were allowed to will possessions to people other than family members, but 
only if witches had not interfered with their final bequests.102 Plutarch also reports a law 
forbidding the export of anything except olive oil, on pain of being cursed by the archon 
or paying a hefty fine.103
Particularly relevant to the present project is the so-called Solonian "law against 
tyranny." This provision, reported in Ath. Pol. (8.4), gave the Areopagus leave to 
prosecute anyone attempting to put down the democracy (τοῦ δήµου συνισταµένους). 
Swoboda believes that this law was passed in one of the two periods of Peisistratos' exile,
and renewed after the final expulsion of the Peisistratids.104 Ostwald attributes this law to 
Drakon, arguing that it was renewed in the period following the expulsion of the 
Peisistratids, which requires us to abandon Plutarch's statement that Solon repealed all 
Drakon's laws except the one on homicide (Sol. 27.1).105 Gagarin cites it as a new law of 
101. On the authenticity and function of Solon's funerary laws, see Blok (2006: 197-247).
102. See Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 40-42); for the text of the laws, see Ruschenbusch 1966.
103. Plut. Sol. 24.2 = Ruschenbusch fr. 65. Osborne (2009: 211) doubts the historicity of this law based on 
the reference to a fine in drachmae. For different views on the meaning of references to fines in drachmae 
in sixth-century laws, see Blok (2006: 197-247) and Scafuro (2006: 175-96).
104. Swoboda (1893: 60).
105. Ostwald (1955: 105-09).
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Solon, while Wallace believes that it was taken from a later inscription of an archaic 
law.106 Sickinger distinguishes between thesmia, or decrees enacted by a body of 
individuals called thesmothetai, and nomoi, or laws passed by the assembly. The 
thesmothetai were officials responsible for publishing decrees in response to a specific 
situation, which were not part of a larger law code, and argues that one of the thesmia 
against tyranny from the archaic period survived to be incorporated into the later law 
codes of the fifth and fourth centuries.107 McGlew believes that the genuineness of this 
law is "very nearly certain" based on a passage in Plutarch stating that Solon gave 
amnesty to all Athenians convicted of crimes before the passage of his legislation, except 
those whom the Areopagus had convicted of tyranny or homicide (Sol. 19.3).108 He 
vaguely cites "historical probability" as the grounds for this assertion; but, given the 
lateness of the source, the same argument for historical anachronism applies, especially 
given the contradictory statement in the Ath. Pol. that tells us that the laws about tyrants 
and establishing tyrannies were mild at the time (16.10).109 We must remember that the 
demos did not then have the control over the state that it did after the establishment of 
democracy, and further, that Solon clearly did not wish the demos to possess primary, 
much less exclusive political power.
The second Solonian law that many believe "proves" Solon's negative attitude 
toward tyranny is his puzzling law against neutrality. This law supposedly strips of 
citizenship any person who refrains not only from choosing a side during periods of civil 
106. Gagarin (1981: 71-77); Wallace (1985: 23, esp. n. 73). 
107. Sickinger (1999: 10-14).
108. McGlew (1993: 112).
109. McGlew (1993: 112-14).
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stasis, but from actively fighting (Ath. Pol. 8.5):
Seeing that very often the polis was in stasis, while some of the citizens through 
laziness were content to be satisfied with whatever happened, [Solon] set down a 
special law against them such that, whenever there was stasis in the city, whoever 
did not join one side or the other was to be disenfranchised and no longer have a 
share in the polis.
ὁρῶν δὲ τὴν µὲν πόλιν πολλάκις στασιάζουσαν, τῶν δὲ πολιτῶν ἐνίους διὰ τὴν 
ῥᾳθυµίαν ἀγαπῶντας τὸ αὐτόµατον, νόµον ἔθηκεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἴδιον, ὃς ἂν 
στασιαζούσης τῆς πόλεως µὴ θῆται τὰ ὅπλα µηδὲ µεθ᾽ ἑτέρων, ἄτιµον εἶναι καὶ 
τῆς πόλεως µὴ µετέχειν.
This law caused much confusion in ancient times and remains a source of puzzlement for 
modern scholars. The Ath. Pol. asserts that it was a measure intended to encourage civic 
involvement, but the penalty seems entirely too harsh for such a goal. Plutarch finds it 
mystifying, going so far as to call it a paradox (παράδοξος), but in the end explains it in 
the same way as the Ath. Pol. (Sol. 20.1):
 
He probably wishes that a man should not be apathetic or indifferent towards the 
common good, arranging his private affairs safely and priding himself on the fact 
that he does not share in the suffering and ills of his country, but should on the 
spot add to the better and more just cause, share its dangers and lend it aid, instead
of waiting in safety to see which side prevails.
βούλεται δ᾽, ὡς ἔοικε, µὴ ἀπαθῶς µηδ᾽ ἀναισθήτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν, ἐν 
ἀσφαλεῖ θέµενον τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τῷ µὴ συναλγεῖν µηδὲ συννοσεῖν τῇ πατρίδι 
καλλωπιζόµενον, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτόθεν τοῖς τὰ βελτίω καὶ δικαιότερα πράττουσι 
προσθέµενον, συγκινδυνεύειν καὶ βοηθεῖν, µᾶλλον ἢ περιµένειν ἀκινδύνως τὰ 
τῶν κρατούντων).
 (Sol. 20.1). Diogenes Laertius is also puzzled, citing Solon's famed neutrality and 
moderation (1.58). This confusion is understandable, especially since this law would have
indicted Solon himself, who built his reputation on neutrality and the refusal to take one 
side over another. McGlew explains this inconsistency in theoretical terms, asserting that 
Solon's ultimate goal was to make the law sovereign: once that happened, his own role as 
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diallektes became unnecessary.110 
However, I find this explanation unnecessarily convoluted. A law is not a 
theoretical construct; it is a specific enjoinder, the violation of which reaps a specific 
penalty, and in Athens' case, the problems were such that concrete solutions were 
needed.111 McGlew's rationalization strikes me as the same sort of grasping at straws that 
we see in Plutarch and the Ath. Pol.; thus, I agree with the many scholars who declare the
law not genuine and a later interpolation.112 Consider in particular a speech of Lysias 
against a man called Philon, who had retired to Oropos during the civil war in 404/3. 
Philon's unpatriotic behavior was used against him when he tried to gain admission to the
council. He argued that if it were a crime to absent oneself from the state during civil 
strife, there would have been a law against it, to which Lysias responded that this was 
such a heinous crime, that no lawgiver had ever imagined that a citizen could be guilty of 
it—an exchange that only makes sense if the neutrality law is not historical (Lys. 
31.27-8).113 
110. McGlew (1993: 117-20).
111. See Sickinger (1999: 9-10) on laws in the archaic period being a response to specific situations and 
crises.
112. See below n. 114.
113. For further arguments for the genuineness of the law, see Bers (1975: 493-98) and von Fritz (1940: 
91-126). See also Goldstein (1972: 538-45), who believes in the law's authenticity, but provides extensive 
bibliography for both sides of the debate. For an argument against the authenticity of the law, see Hignett 
(1952: 27), where he concludes, "whether the writer who first gave currency to [Solon's neutrality law] 
simply invented it or drew an over-hasty inference from some passage in Solon's poems on the dangers of 
neutrality in party strife, the fact remains that he had no documentary evidence for his assumed law, and 
had not the speech of Lysias against Philon been preserved the invention might have passed unchallenged." 
On this speech see also Bers (1975: 493-98). Van’t Wout (2010: 289-301) argues that this law actually 
promotes rather than punishes neutrality, based on a misunderstanding of the phrases "ὃπλα τίθεσθαι" and 
"µεθ᾽ ἑτέρων."
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VII. Aristotle, Plutarch, and Solon on the Agrarian Crisis
This dissertation focuses on laws pertaining to the agrarian crisis, since this was 
the legislation that was a) most likely actually passed by Solon, b) the most sweeping and
wide-ranging, and c) the most reminiscent of the methods employed by archaic tyrants 
for resolving civil stasis. Before discussion of Solon's response to the crisis, it is first 
necessary to understand the nature of the conflict; and, as it is the main focus of chapter 
5, I will go into some detail on the scholarship surrounding the agrarian reforms, 
beginning with the ancient evidence. 
There is considerable confusion over the nature of the land encumbrances in 
Solon's day. We know that the land was broken up by horoi, or boundary stones, which 
seem to have been mortgage markers of some sort.114 The Ath. Pol. and Plutarch make it 
clear that this practice was at the heart of the crisis that the Athenians called Solon to 
address. Solon himself only refers to the situation in vague and poetical terms in relation 
to his removal of the horoi and his refusal to redistribute land and thus become a tyrant 
(frs. 36 and 34, respectively). The breakdown of the land crisis according to Aristotle and 
Plutarch is as follows: the disparity between the rich and poor elements of society was so 
great that the entire demos was indebted to the wealthy, with some of the poor actually 
enslaved to the rich.115 This led to discontent that put the entire city in danger (Plut. Sol. 
13.2; Ath. Pol. 2.2, 7), though there is some confusion over the original causes of the 
114. On the horoi, see Forsdyke (2006: 339-40), Ober (2006: 441-56), Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 37-41), and
p. 38 n. 117 below.
115. Parallels for debt-slavery for default on loans and the use of one's person as collateral exist in early 
Crete, Sumer, Assyria, Ptolemaic Egypt, Palestine, and early Rome; it was also codified by Hammurabi 
(see below p. 154). See also Willetts (1955: 36) for mortgage with one's person as surety and enslavement 
due to debt on Crete; see Willetts (1955: 50) and Kristensen (2004: 73-79) for a discussion of debt-
enslavement for Cretan serfs in the Gortyn law code of the early fifth century (IC 4.41.4). See Eder (2005: 
241-42) on the difficulty in determining the original elements of the Gortyn code from later additions.
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lending crisis. The poor, known as hektemoroi, either worked the fields of the rich for a 
rent of one-sixth of the produce (Ath. Pol. 2.2, 9-10; Plut. Sol. 15.3), or, in addition to the 
one-sixth payment, pledged their person as collateral for debts (Plut. Sol. 13.2). 
If the poor could not pay their rent, they were subject to seizure and enslavement, 
either at home or abroad (Ath. Pol. 2.2, 11-13; Plut. Sol. 13.2). Solon outlawed debt-
slavery for non-payment of rent and canceled public and private debts, which was called 
the seisachtheia, or "shaking off" of burdens (Ath. Pol. 6.1-3; Plut. Sol. 15.4-5).116 Solon 
addresses the removal of the horoi in connection with the cancellation of debts and 
abolition of debt-slavery (fr. 36):117 
Of the purposes for which I brought the people together,
Which did I stop before accomplishing?
The great mother of the Olympian 
gods, the Black Earth, from whom I drew
up the horoi stuck in everywhere, 
witnesses these things in the court of time.
Before she was enslaved, but now she is free.
I brought many back to Athens, their divinely-founded
city, men sold, one unjustly,
another justly, and others fleeing
under compulsion of debt, who had wandered so wide that 
they no longer spoke the Attic tongue,
and others at home suffering shameful slavery,
now trembling before their masters,
these I set free...
ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν µὲν οὕνεκα ξυνήγαγον
δῆµον, τί τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάµην;
συµµαρτυροίη ταῦτ’ ἂν ἐν δίκηι Χρόνου
µήτηρ µεγίστη δαιµόνων Ὀλυµπίων
116. On the origins of the term, see Woodhouse (1938: 168-69).
117. On the nature of the horoi, see Woodhouse (1938: 75-77) and esp. (1938: 98-116); Andrewes (1982: 
377-78); Fine 1951; Ober (2006: 441-56). Harris (1997: 104) denies the connection between horoi and the 
seisachtheia, arguing instead that this is an anachronism found in the Ath. Pol. because there are no archaic 
parallels for the meaning; but this is a minority view. On ways that the horoi may have functioned as 
mortgage records based on fourth-century analogies, along with cautions on applying anachronistic 
economic principles to sixth-century Attica, see Andrewes (1982: 379).
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ἄριστα, Γῆ µέλαινα, τῆς ἐγώ ποτε
ὅρους ἀνεῖλον πολλαχῆι πεπηγότας,
πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρη.
πολλοὺς δ’ Ἀθήνας πατρίδ’ ἐς θεόκτιτον
ἀνήγαγον πραθέντας, ἄλλον ἐκδίκως,
ἄλλον δικαίως, τοὺς δ’ ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ
χρειοῦς φυγόντας, γλῶσσαν οὐκέτ’ Ἀττικὴν
ἱέντας, ὡς δὴ πολλαχῆι πλανωµένους·
τοὺς δ’ ἐνθάδ’ αὐτοῦ δουλίην ἀεικέα
ἔχοντας, ἤθη δεσποτέων τροµεοµένους,
ἐλευθέρους ἔθηκα...
We read that Solon refused to redistribute land, which led to discontent with his 
reforms among the poor (Plut. Sol. 15.1). The reason for the refusal to redistribute land 
was supposedly his resistance to the possibility of becoming a tyrant, an explanation 
accepted by almost all of our later sources (Solon fr. 34).118 If we rely exclusively on 
Solon's poetry, the unadorned particulars of the crisis were debt, some sort of slavery 
involving the persons and land of the debtors, and some sort of class conflict between 
what is termed the demos and a class variously called rulers, leaders, and "the greater/
better." The crisis was so violent, both sides agreed that a radical solution was called for. 
This description may seem straightforward, but there are a number of questions 
about the nature of the crisis and the structure of Athenian society that still provoke 
considerable scholarly debate. For instance, scholars quarrel over the imprecise language 
used by Aristotle and Plutarch. Both imply without explicitly stating that the demos was 
entirely comprised of debt-slaves and hektemoroi, with no free peasant farmers left in the 
118. While few scholars question Plutarch's version of "rich" versus "poor" (πλουσίοι and πένηται), Solon 
actually uses the terms kakoi and agathoi in fr. 15, which Plutarch takes to mean "poor" and "rich," 
respectively (Sol. 13.2). These terms merely describe opposing factions in the actual fragment, and in fr. 5, 
the opposition is between the demos and those who have power (οἳ δ’ εἶχον δύναµιν). Fr. 6 speaks of the 
demos and their leaders (δῆµος δ’ ὧδ’ ἂν ἄριστα σὺν ἡγεµόνεσσιν ἕποιτο), and fr. 37 uses the vague terms 
demos vs."those of greater and stronger power" (ὅσοι δὲ µείζους καὶ βίην̣ ἀµείνονες). See Wallace 2007: 51
on the use of the word kakoi in Solon and in Homer. On the use of the same terms in the Ath. Pol., see von 
Fritz & Kapp (1950: 157-58).
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whole of Attica. This implies a confusion of tradition in their sources. Aristotle 
distinguishes the hektemoroi from the debt-slaves by assuming that the latter were 
defaulted ex-hektemoroi.119 Plutarch, however, merely categorizes them as debt-slaves 
with no explanation of how they became enslaved. 
Whatever the details, the situation put all the land in the hands of a few (Ath. Pol. 
2.2, 10-11), so that tyranny seemed to be the only solution (Plut. Sol. 13.2).120 These 
sources' vague language, along with an alternate theory propagated by Androtion and 
"some other writers" (Plut. Sol. 13.4) that the seisachtheia merely consisted of interest 
reduction on loans, suggests that there were several versions of the exact nature of the 
reforms, and that Aristotle and Plutarch did not have reliable data on which to base their 
explanations. 
VIII. Historical Interpretations of the Agrarian Crisis
While the starting point for any study of the seisachtheia must be the facts 
outlined by our ancient sources, modern interpretations vary widely as to the origins and 
nature of the emergency and their effects on Athenian society.121 We are hindered by the 
fact that Solon himself makes reference to these reforms only in vague and ideological 
terms, suggesting that his poetry was less a vehicle for leaving a record of specific 
solutions that threatened to cause negative reactions than in cultivating a reputation as the
119. As opposed to Ruschenbusch (1972: 753-55), who disregards the Ath. Pol. as implausible, and posits 
that hektemoroi were former debt-slaves who had been given a sort of reprieve or second chance. 
120. Our report that the dissatisfied populace's first reaction to problems with social and economic 
inequalities was to install a tyranny implies that democracy did not exist as a concept at this time. Rather 
than credit him as the father of democracy, we can at most call Solon anti-aristocratic, though given his 
efforts to court the nobility even this strains credibility. 
121. For a more detailed summary of scholarly debates on the nature of the seisachtheia, with references, 
see Almeida (2003: 26-56) and Appendix II.
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man who saved the state from the hubris of the rich and the rapacity of the poor.122 Most 
scholars formulate their theories from attempts to make logical sense of the written 
historical record by applying social or economic theory to explain the scenario recorded 
in our sources. From the late 19th to mid-20th centuries, debates crystallized over 
whether land in archaic Attica could change ownership, though belief in the inalienability
of land has grown less and less common. The body of scholarship on the possible 
scenarios of land ownership is so extensive as to be, at times, frankly bewildering. To 
simplify matters for the purpose of this introduction, I will here give an overview of what
has become a fairly wide consensus about the situation in Attica in Solon's day, since it is 
the framework in which I assume Solon's reforms to have taken place. I leave a detailed 
history of the scholarship on the different species of land tenure for Appendix II. 
Current historical studies on the sixth-century crisis cite the dual factors of 
population growth and expansion of trade markets as the driving forces behind a 
breakdown of the traditional relationship between the elites and the masses in the late 
seventh and early sixth centuries, an expansion in part fueled by a shift from a barter to a 
monetary economy.123 Previously, the aristocracy had supported the poorer elements of 
society with aid in times of crisis, in return for which the demos granted the elite social 
and political leadership, privileges, and status. However, by the late seventh century, the 
elite had begun ignoring their traditional obligations to the demos in favor of pursuing 
personal profit.124 In this view, the elite classes and a subset of wealthy non-aristocracy 
122. See Podlecki (1984: 124) and Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 32, 40-41).
123. For evidence of this sort of reciprocity between mass and elite and its breakdown in the archaic period,
see Forsdyke (2005: 30-78).
124. Ibid.
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began the wholesale appropriation of common, private, and formerly uncultivated land to 
increase agricultural production for lucrative export markets in a fledgling monetary 
economy.125 
In this climate of expansion and increased available labor sparked by population 
growth, the wealthy began to ignore their ancestral obligations to the poor, placing ever 
higher demands on their labor.126 In the most extreme cases, the elite actually enslaved the
poor or sold them into slavery in order to confiscate their lands. The growing population 
in Attica, combined with increased use of chattel slaves, supplied the need for more labor 
required by new methods of intensive farming.127 
Much ink has been spilled over the exact nature of the relationship between the 
size and growth of the population and the archaeological data, but most people agree that 
Greece saw steady population growth from the tenth through the fourth centuries, mostly 
based on archaeological evidence for an increased number of both settlements and burials
all over Greece in the tenth century.128 Evidence for this includes the increased presence 
of Attic black-figure pottery in the Black Sea region as well as in Sicily at the end of the 
seventh century.129 From the eighth century onward, we also find more so-called SOS 
125. Mannville (1990: 83) discusses modern scholarship advocating this view. Forrest (1966: 154) argues 
that Athens was "catching up" to neighbors like Corinth, who had already made the shift from a primarily 
agrarian to a commercial economy; see also Podlecki (1984: 119-20). Murray (1993: 240) broadens this 
characterization to the entire Mediterranean, tracing development of an international market economy 
based on exchange, particularly of luxury items, on a large scale by the mid-sixth century. See also Polanyi 
(1968: 84) on ways in which the archaic Greek economy was embedded in social and other non-economic 
institutions. Kurke (1999: 13) actually argues that disparity in economic circumstances was one of the 
factors spurring the use of coinage as a means of the polis wresting control of the polis away from the elite, 
who had formerly had a monopoly on retail trade in the agora. 
126. Morris (2002: 36-41).
127. For the growth in slave labor in the archaic period, see Finley 1981, Rihll (1996: 89-111), and 
Cartledge (2002: 162-63); see further p. 205.
128. See Snodgrass (1980: 15-24), Podlecki (1984: 118-20), Morris 1987, Osborne (1996: 31-44) and 
(2009: 37-46), and Scheidel (2003: 120-40).
129. Osborne (1996: 31-44).
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amphorae, which would have carried luxury agricultural products like wine and olive oil, 
allowing us to speculate that Solon's law banning all exports except olive oil was an 
attempt to stem the export of agricultural produce at the expense of the masses.130 
Scholars have also recently interpreted the eighth-century increase in Greek 
settlements overseas as a sign of increased trade (and therefore increased opportunity 
and/or desire for profit).131 These overseas ventures are now frequently interpreted as 
private enterprises in pursuit of lucre rather than a state-sponsored response to 
overpopulation.132 A good indication of Athenian interest in trade in the archaic period is 
the late seventh-century conflict between Athens and Mytilene for control of Sigeion, 
which guarded the entrance to the Hellespont and the grain-rich Euxine region.133 One 
could also argue that Athens' war with Megara for control of Salamis indicates interest in 
overseas trade, since an island in such close proximity to the Attic coast would provide 
ships and convenient access to the sea in the time before Piraeus was a viable port.134 
Literary texts complement this archaeological evidence for increased interest in 
trade in archaic Greece, mostly seen in lyric poems lambasting the elites' greed and quest 
130. For this argument, see Forsdyke (2006: 336). On SOS amphorae, see Johnston & Jones (1978: 
103-41). On Solon's law banning the export of olive oil, see above p. 33.
131. Among others, Forsdyke (2006: 336-37), de Angelis (1994: 87-110), Osborne (1998: 251-69), and 
Foxhall (2003: 75-92).
132. Ibid.
133. On the presence of black-figure pottery abroad, see Bailey (1940: 62). For grain and oil export in the 
early sixth century, see Forrest (1966: 154), contra Garnsey (1988: 107-20), who argues that dependence on
Black Sea grain was not significant until the fifth century, and even then, it was less than most scholars 
assume. Also consider Plutarch Sol. 2.1 and 3.1, on Solon's own trade activities. Others, such as Starr 
(1977: 94), see such trade and commercial activities as more gradual, and not a direct or dramatic threat to 
the traditional agrarian way of life, citing a paucity of evidence for a large-scale conversion. Starr also 
argues against the evidence for an overseas grain trade in the seventh century. See also Forrest (1966: 155) 
on the lack of correlation between the period's distribution of pottery and a dramatic change in the basis of 
the economy. For the conflict over Sigeion and arguments for trade interests in the Black Sea region, see 
Alc. fr. 428 (Lobel-Page) and Hdt. 5.94-5, discussed by Forsdyke (2006: 337).
134. The connection between Salamis and increased trade must remain speculation, but see Podlecki (1984:
122).
43
for profit at the expense of the well-being of the polis.135 Theognis, for example, 
complains that bad men harm the people because they chase personal wealth and power 
to the detriment of the demos (44-50). Solon also chastises the citizens who destroy the 
city because of their desire for wealth (fr. 4.5-6), and who grow wealthy through 
dishonorable means (4.11).136 If the subject matter of these poets is any indication, the 
traditional, reciprocal relationship between the elite and the demos was being undermined
by an upper-class pursuit of material gain.137
Other agrarian societies provide useful parallels by which to draw a picture of the 
specific way in which the changing mindset of the elite threatened the balance of power 
and the livelihoods of the poorer strata of society. On this basis, we may first speculate 
that the rich were appropriating private as well as public land, including land that was 
previously uncultivated, in order to gain more goods for trade.138 We may also posit that 
the wealthy were forcing the poor to work for them, on harsh terms that became more and
more untenable.139 This seems to be the situation Solon describes in fr. 4.12-14: "They 
steal from each other through violent seizure, sparing neither sacred nor public property, 
nor preserving the foundations of Justice" (οὔθ’ ἱερῶν κτεάνων οὔτε τι δηµοσίων | 
φειδόµενοι κλέπτουσιν ἀφαρπαγῆι ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος, | οὐδὲ φυλάσσονται σεµνὰ Δίκης 
θέµεθλα). Mannville has compared the sentiments expressed in this poem with parallels 
in agrarian societies in modern Africa, and concluded that much of the arable land in 
135. See Forsdyke (2006: 337-40). Morris (2002: 36) calls it a "transformation of the ideology of gain"; see
also Von Reden (1995 and 1997: 154-76), Tandy (1997: 2-6, 166-227), and Balot (2001: 73-98).
136. See ch. 4, pp. 107-113.
137. Forsdyke (2006: 337-38).
138. Forsdyke (2006: 338), with citations.
139. Ibid.
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archaic Attica was actually public.140 If this is true, it seems that by the end of the seventh 
century, the elite were forcing the poor to work private as well as common land in order 
to gain a surplus for profitable trade.
Aristotle discusses two classes of laborers—the pelatai, who seem to have been 
hired workers, and the hektemoroi, more in the mold of sharecroppers, who were required
to surrender one-sixth of their produce to the elites who controlled of most of the land 
(Ath. Pol. 2.2).141 However long or to whatever degree of formality the two classes of 
dependent laborers had existed, by Solon's day it is clear that the terms of their dependent
arrangements had become so oppressive that they reached a breaking point.142 Solon's 
response was to abolish debt and remove the horoi that had been "fixed everywhere," 
thereby freeing land "which was formerly enslaved" (fr. 36.3-7).143 While the meaning of 
the "enslaved land" is not exactly clear, it is reasonable to interpret these horoi as some 
sort of tangible indicator of the elite's claim on both the land and its laborers—that is, the 
hektemoroi.144 
Thus the literary evidence dovetails with the archaeological in suggesting that the 
aristocrats were increasingly interested in securing profit by increasing production, which
they accomplished by seizing not only private but also public (including previously 
uncultivated) land. This would not have been possible without wide-scale exploitation of 
140. Mannville (1990: 110-11).
141. Since Athens was pre-monetary at this point, obviously the pelatai would have been paid in kind.
142. For the argument that the classes of pelatai and hektemoroi had been around since the Dark Ages, see 
Bintliff (2006: 321-33).
143. Cf. Megara's similar problems with land and debt, discussed by Van Wees (1999: 1-51) and 2000, and 
Forsdyke 2005.
144. For this line of reasoning, see Forsdyke (2006: 340-41), Rhodes (1993: 175), Mannville (1990: 112), 
and Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1991: 22). Harris (1997: 55-60), though, argues that the hektemoroi and the 
horoi were unconnected.
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poor agricultural laborers, who were necessary to make the land that had already been 
cultivated more profitable and to cultivate fallow land, thus landing Athens in the dire 
situation that our sources describe at the beginning of the sixth century. 
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Chapter 2
Solon's Contradictory Legacy
By Herodotus’ day, more or less a century after Solon's death, Solon had taken on 
the character of a mythological wise man, and by the time Plutarch wrote his biography, 
Solon was one of the canonical seven sages of antiquity. Around the same time, 
characterizations of Solon as one of the great lawgivers like Lycurgus made their 
appearance. By the fourth century, popular imagination had cast Solon as an impartial 
lawgiver who worked tirelessly against the forces of tyranny, ultimately instituting the 
reforms that paved the way for democracy. Ancient and modern authors, when evoking 
his authority, pick and choose which aspect of the man best suits their purpose, often with
confusing and self-contradictory results. This chapter and the next will explore how this 
mélange is presented in the literary tradition. Both chapters will point out contradictions 
in the literature that demonstrate that alternate traditions of Solon's activities and motives 
existed in antiquity than those most commonly associated with him. I begin in this 
chapter by examining representations of Solon that show him in a mythological, 
philosophical, and moral realm: as wise man, lawgiver, and tyrant-hater. In doing so, I 
will demonstrate that by the fifth century, Solon's legacy had become so malleable that 
later authors could evoke his authority in a wide array of contexts, some of which directly
contradicted other traditions. The next chapter, closely related to this one, will examine 
the specific use that sources made of Solon in the political realm as a precedent for the 
foundation of democracy in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. 
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I. Solon as Philosopher and Sage
In Herodotus' story of Croesus and Solon, the latter is portrayed as a wiseman and
a sage (1.29-32).145 Herodotus' Solon expounds the philosophical doctrine of the mean: 
one does not want to be poor and wretched, but grasping for wealth leads to hubris, which
calls down the wrath of the gods. The best course is to aim for middling circumstances, 
so as to be comfortable, yet not attract too much divine attention. Herodotean scholars 
have either regarded Solon’s speeches as an invention by which Herodotus espouses his 
own political philosophy, or an accurate representation of Solon’s thought based on 
Herodotus' knowledge of Solon's poetry.146 I shall contend that, while Solon’s thinking 
was a fundamental influence on Herodotus, close examination reveals a philosophical 
outlook not found in Solon's poetry. Rather than pure invention or accurate rendition of 
Solon's thought, we end up with what Chiasson calls “a recognizably Herodotean 
adaptation of Solon, in which the views of both authors are discernable."147 
I argue after Chiasson that the portrait we see in Herodotus, which was so 
influential on later interpretations of Solon's philosophy, does not entirely correspond 
with the figure we see in Solon's poetry. If we look closely, we can see inconsistencies 
that make it clear that what we are dealing with in Herodotus is a refashioning of the 
figure of Solon as a wise man that became entrenched in and inseparable from the 
historical tradition about him. To demonstrate this, it is necessary to examine the larger 
mythological traditions about sages to see how Solon became grafted onto this topos in a 
145. The scholarship on Herodotus' dialogue between Solon and Croesus is vast. For bibliography on Solon
in Herodotus see Martina (1968: 430 ff.) and Asheri, Lloyd, & Corcella (2007: 99-100). For discussion of 
the historical Croesus, see Bichler (2000: 244-54).
146. On Herodotus using Solon to describe his own views, see Shapiro (1996: 348), How & Wells (1912a: 
49 n. 1, 68), Lattimore (1939: 30-31), Nawratil (1942: 1-8), and Rémillard (2009: 11). 
147. Chiasson (1986: 249), Asheri, Lloyd, & Corcella (2007: 97-98), and Rémillard (2009: 11-20).
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way that does not quite fit our historical data. Additionally, we must examine where 
Herodotus' and Solon's philosophies differ, in order to trace the changing of some of the 
traditions about Solon's ideology.
When Herodotus describes Solon’s visit to Croesus’s court, he first relates the 
famous episode where Croesus gives Solon a tour of his treasuries to display his vast 
wealth, and then asks who, in Solon's opinion, is the happiest of men. Solon confounds 
his host when he replies that Tellus the Athenian wins the prize. He angers Croesus 
further by denying him even second place, reserving that honor for the Argive brothers 
Cleobis and Biton (1.29-33).148 The former earned his pre-eminence by being a 
moderately wealthy member of a successful polis, who produced well-brought-up sons 
who in their turns sired further offspring. The crowning achievement of Tellus’s life, 
however, was his death—he died nobly in battle while routing the enemy, after which his 
fellow Athenians honored him with a modest public burial.149 
Cleobis and Biton earned their rank as the second happiest of men because they 
too were moderately wealthy, and because they had the strength of champion athletes, 
which allowed them to draw their mother’s chariot to a festival at the temple of Hera 
when no oxen were available.150 This earned them the praise of their fellow citizens and 
their mother’s earnest request to the goddess that her sons be given the greatest happiness
148. Asheri raises the possibility that Tellus, Cleobis, and Biton were mentioned in poems of Solon's that 
are no longer extant, and suggests that Tellus actually existed and died in the war between Athens and 
Megara at the end of the seventh century. See Asheri, Lloyd, & Corcella (2007: 100), after Weber (1927: 
154-66).
149. Diog. Laert. 1.51 mentions the stories of Tellus and Cleobis and Biton. His Solon also displays a 
similarly modest outlook when he has Croesus ask Solon if he has ever seen any thing more beautiful than 
his royal garb, to which Solon cheekily replied that cocks and pheasants and peacocks, who came by their 
adornment naturally, were ten thousand times more beautiful.
150. On this festival, see Asheri, Lloyd, & Corcella (2007: 101-02), with citations. 
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it was possible to receive in gratitude for the honor they had shown her. The goddess 
responded by not allowing the two to wake after they had lain down to sleep in her 
temple, a variation on the philosophy Hesiod espouses in Works and Days, and an 
archetype for the idea that it is better to be dead than alive.151 Their fellow Argives 
acknowledged the truth of this nugget of folk wisdom by dedicating statues to the 
brothers at the temple of Apollo at Delphi.152 
The Herodotean Solon’s concept of ὄλβος ("happiness" or "blessedness") is that 
wealth plays a secondary role, which was a particularly stark contrast to the legendary 
oriental decadence of Croesus’s court.153 Further, it is essential for a happy man to 
participate in the activities and values of his family and his polis, and most importantly 
that he die a glorious death and receive posthumous honors from his fellow citizens. 
Solon goes on to explain the difficulty of achieving true happiness because a) the god is 
“utterly resentful and troublesome” (1.32.1; τὸ θεῖον πᾶν ἐὸν φθονερόν τε καὶ 
ταραχῶδες), and b) mankind is “utterly subject to chance" (1.32.4; πᾶν ἐστι ἄνθρωπος 
συµφορή). He follows up by expounding on the unpredictability of a jealous deity who 
151. Cf. Hesiod W&D 1.1-5 on the ease with which Zeus raises men up and smites them down again, 
248-270 on wicked men not being able to escape the justice of Zeus, and 320-325 on divine retribution for 
greed; see also Aristotle's exegesis on happiness (Eth. Nic. 1099b8, 1178b33), further discussed by Asheri, 
Lloyd, & Corcella (2007: 98). 
152. These larger-than-life-sized kouroi were discovered at Delphi by Homolle, along with inscribed bases 
that verify the identification, in the excavations of 1893, 1894, and 1907. Though the inscription names 
Cleobis and Biton, some speculate that the statues are actually of two anonymous athletes or of the 
Dioskouri. See Asheri, Lloyd, & Corcella (2007: 101), with citations, on the identity of the statues; on the 
excavations see Themelis (1991: 33). Jeffery (1961: 154-6. and pl. 26.4) dates the lettering of the 
inscriptions to the first half of the sixth century, and identifies the dialect and alphabet as Argive, which 
supports the identification of the statues with the two brothers. 
153. This definition also differs in the earliest Greek poets, in which ὄλβιος and ὄλβος mainly refer to 
material possessions. See de Heer (1969: 32-38). Herodotus also expresses the view that the fruitful eastern
lands produce men of lesser quality and character, that "soft lands breed soft people," which explains his 
evident distaste for the excesses of Croesus' court (Hdt. 9.122.4). On the conflict between ideas of Western 
freedom vs. Eastern despotism, see Asheri, Lloyd, & Corcella (2007: 98).
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resents human success, therefore limiting the duration of Croesus’s ability to enjoy his 
present riches. He explains that moderately wealthy people blessed with good luck are 
much more likely to escape the notice of the gods because their lower profile protects 
them from the ἄτη ("destruction") and ἐπιθυµίη ("jealousy") that is the manifestation of 
divine envy. Herodotus qua Solon makes no effort to explain why the divine fosters such 
hatred of human happiness; rather, it seems a self-evident truth that hubris brings down 
the wrath of the god(s). The historical Solon, however, insists that it is only those who 
gain wealth unjustly who are in danger (fr. 13.7-13):
χρήµατα δ’ ἱµείρω µὲν ἔχειν, ἀδίκως δὲ πεπᾶσθαι
οὐκ ἐθέλω· πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη.
πλοῦτον δ’ ὃν µὲν δῶσι θεοί, παραγίγνεται ἀνδρὶ
ἔµπεδος ἐκ νεάτου πυθµένος ἐς κορυφήν·
ὃν δ’ ἄνδρες τιµῶσιν ὑφ’ ὕβριος, οὐ κατὰ κόσµον
ἔρχεται, ἀλλ’ ἀδίκοις ἔργµασι πειθόµενος
οὐκ ἐθέλων ἕπεται, ταχέως δ’ ἀναµίσγεται ἄτηι.
I desire wealth, but not to hold it unjustly;
 for justice assuredly comes later.
Wealth which the gods give accrues to man,
steadfast from the deepest foundation to the top,
but that which men honor out of hubris, that does not come
according to its proper order, but is persuaded by unjust deeds
and does not follow willingly, swiftly mixes with disaster.
The final part of Solon’s speech is firmly grounded in the political and philosophical 
discussions of the late fifth century.154 In the same way that no land can survive 
completely self-sufficiently, no man alone has every advantage, and therefore only the 
man who maintained a good number of benefits and died retaining them deserved to be 
called ὄλβιος (1.32.8).155 
154. Cf. Thuc. 1.37: 2.36 and Ath. Pol. 2.6, 11.
155. For the similarity of these themes to contemporary tragedy, see Griffin (2006: 51-55).
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At first glance these themes—namely, that wealth is not a guarantor of happiness 
and one cannot be called happy until after death—seem to resemble one another. But 
there is an inconsistency in these two examples that indicate that Herodotus is 
transposing his own philosophy onto that of Solon. If Cleobis and Biton, despite their 
youth and strength, were better off dead at a young age, why did Solon think that Tellus 
was happier than either of them?156 There is no explicit answer, but when we think of 
Solon’s assertion immediately following this exchange that an ideal life spans seventy 
years, it is tempting to assume that Tellus wins first place in the happiness hierarchy 
simply because he led a full life. Therefore Cleobis and Biton’s deaths are premature 
rather than a great gift. Chiasson argues that this inconsistency of Solon’s is because of 
tension inherent in Herodotus’ combination of material from different sources, including 
but not limited to Solon’s poetry.157
Herodotus’s Solon clearly alludes to the historical Solon’s poem about the natural 
span of a human life being seventy years and the activities appropriate to each heptad of 
life.158 In the poem, Solon explains the proper activities for each age of life, and the last 
couplet proclaims, "and if a man completing the full measure should arrive at the tenth 
[heptad] | then he will not meet with the fate of death before his time" (27.17-18; τὴν 
δεκάτην δ’ εἴ τις τελέσας κατὰ µέτρον ἳκοιτο | οὐκ ἂν ἄωρος ἑών µοῖραν ἔχοι θανάτου).
 The idea from the poem that there are useful and good things to be had in one’s 
156. For further discussion on pessimism in Herodotus, and the idea that these ideas were more Herodotean
than Solonian, see Campbell (1898: 183), How & Wells (1912b: 49), Shapiro (1996: 348-64), and 
Rémillard (2009: 11-20).
157. Chiasson (1986: 252-55) gives a more detailed analysis of the discrepancies between Solon's poetry 
and Herodotus' description of the themes in the Cleobis and Biton story; cf. How & Wells 1912: 68 and 
Rémillard (2009: 11-20).
158. See Asheri, Lloyd, & Corcella (2007: 103) for the significance of the hebdomads and echoes of this 
idea in other ancient authors, and for the function of this idea in historiography more generally. 
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old age clashes with Herodotus' formulation of death being the greatest good. Indeed, in 
Solon’s poem man does not hit his stride until his forties, and is not at his best until his 
fifties or later (27.11-14):
τῇ δ’ ἔκτῃ περὶ πάντα καταρτύεται νόος ἀνδρός,
οὐδ’ ἓρδειν ἔθ’ ὁµως ἔργ’ ἀπάλαµνα θέλει.
ἑπτὰ δὲ νοῦν καὶ γλῶσσαν ἐν ἑβδοµάσιν µέγ’ ἄριστος
ὀκτώ τ’. ἀµφοτέρων τέσσαρα καὶ δέκ’ ἔτη. 
In the sixth [heptad] the mind of man is most disciplined in all things,
 nor does he desire to do foolish things.
He is at his best in the seventh and eighth, for fourteen years—
when his mind and eloquence are at their peak.
Elsewhere, the Solon of the poetic fragments celebrates old age: "I grow old always 
learning many things..." (fr. 18; γηράσκω δ’ αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόµενος...). Finally, rather 
than rejoice at his death, Solon prays that his friends will mourn his passing, not celebrate
his exit from life, as Herodotus' Solon would desire. Solon the poet, unlike Solon the 
sage, does not want to die: "Let death not come to me unwept, but to my friends, | in 
dying, may I leave behind grief and sorrow..." (fr. 21; µηδέ µοι ἄκλαυτος θάνατος µόλοι, 
ἀλλὰ φίλοισι/καλλείποιµι θανὼν ἄλγεα καὶ στοναχάς).
This combines to leave us with an impression of a man who thinks highly of life 
and displays an especial regard for old age, exactly the opposite of the Solon in 
Herodotus, who espouses that death, and death as soon as possible, is the highest 
attainable good.159 In fact, it runs counter to the Hesiodic wisdom that celebrates the early
demise of righteous youths like Cleobis and Biton.160 We see here a clear intrusion of 
159. Cf. Sophocles, who laments the advent of "friendless old age, wherein dwells every evil among evils" 
(OC 1237-8; γῆρας ἄφιλον, ἵνα πρόπαντα | κακὰ κακῶν ξυνοικεῖ). See also Rémillard (2009: 16).
160. Cf. Hes. Works and Days 174-9 and Bacchyl. 3.47 on death being preferable to toil, which is the 
inevitable lot of man; see also Soph. OC 1225-1235 and Thgn. 425-8: which both say that it is better never 
to have been born, but since that cannot be helped, it is best to die as quickly as possible. Similar stories 
occur in Plut. Cons. ad Apoll. 14, but it is Apollo rather than Hera (as with Cleobis and Biton) who bestows
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Herodotus’ philosophical outlook, perhaps influenced by his research at Argos and his 
viewing of the statues at Delphi, that uneasily overlays motifs from the historical Solon’s 
writings.161 Nowhere in the preserved poetry do we find the ideas that are so prevalent in 
Herodotus: wealth is intrinsically evil because it invites the envy of the gods, and no man 
is happy until he is dead (therefore no man is happy).162 As Murray phrases it, "prosperity 
causes the envy of the gods, regardless of the hero's moral status."163 Instead, the 
historical Solon contrasts the transient state of wealth with the persevering quality of 
arete (fr. 13.7-10).164 Riches can indeed make a man happy—provided that they are god-
given. It is only when they are acquired through hubris that they invite destruction by the 
gods. Divine envy has no place in the poems of Solon.
Another place where the Solon in Herodotus and the historical Solon show 
similarity is in their conception of telos, or "the end." In fr. 13, known as the Hymn to the 
Muses, Solon stresses the importance of looking towards the end, which is also very 
much present in Herodotus' Solon.165 However, the two teleologies have different 
implications. Solon stresses the inability of mortals to know the outcome of their affairs: 
Fate brings both good and bad to mortal men;
The gifts the immortals give are not to be shunned.
There is danger in every endeavor. No one knows 
how a thing once started will end.
One man tries to do noble deeds, 
the gift of death on Trophonius and Agamedes as a reward for building his temple at Delphi, and on the 
poet Pindar after he inquired about the greatest good man can receive. 
161. On Herodotus' findings at Argos and Delphi, see above p. 50 n. 152.
162. On Herodotus' use of the doctrine of nemesis and phthonos, as well as personal and inherited guilt, see
How & Wells (1912b: 49-50). 
163. Murray (2001: 32).
164. On the inconsistencies of Herodotus' portrayal of historical figures, see How & Wells (1912b: 47-48). 
They assert that Herodotus' tendency is to bring out individual traits rather than cohesive characters. The 
more remote the character, the freer Herodotus becomes in his portrayal, which is "not the result of 
adherence to historic fact, but rather the work of creative imagination." 
165. Rémillard (2009: 17-18).
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but all unknowing, falls into great and harsh disaster.
Μοῖρα δέ τοι θνητοῖσι κακὸν φέρει ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν,
δῶρα δ’ ἄφυκτα θεῶν γίγνεται ἀθανάτων.
πᾶσι δέ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ’ ἔργµασιν, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν
πῆι µέλλει σχήσειν χρήµατος ἀρχοµένου·
ἀλλ’ ὁ µὲν εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώµενος οὐ προνοήσας
ἐς µεγάλην ἄτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεσεν.
Consider also fr. 16: "It is very difficult to see the furthest boundary of wisdom, where 
lies the end of all things" (γνωµοσύνης δ’ ἀφανὲς χαλεπώτατόν ἐστι νοῆσαι | µέτρον, ὃ δὴ
πάντων πείρατα µοῦνον ἔχει). Both of these poems attribute the uncertainty inherent in 
human affairs to lack of foreknowledge, as opposed to the all-knowing gods. The gods 
are omniscient; human knowledge is limited. For Solon, this is why innocent people 
suffer misfortune. Even if they try to do good deeds, because they have imperfect 
knowledge of the future, they may unwittingly or unwillingly commit an injustice. The 
remedy for misfortune suffered through ignorance, therefore, is wisdom.166 Herodotus' 
stress on the same notion of looking toward the end of things may well imply that he is 
borrowing this idea from Solon. But when Herodotus looks to the end, he looks to the end
not of a chain of events, but to life. For Solon the telos of securing ὄλβος is wisdom, but 
for Herodotus the only way to secure happiness is the ultimate telos; that is, death.167 
In Herodotus, we see explicit references to Solon’s poetry in many of his motifs. 
These thematic affinities suggest very strongly that Herodotus was not only intimately 
familiar with Solon’s writings but also that he consciously tried to incorporate many of 
Solon's strongest thematic elements in his story of Croesus and Solon. We see in 
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid.
55
Herodotus’s Solon the same man who emerges in the poetry as one who is fascinated 
with wealth and its limitations, who believes that riches are only one aspect of prosperity,
who encourages men to take the long view, and who thinks that being a good citizen and 
serving one’s polis, as well as producing civic-minded offspring, are of the utmost 
importance.168 But the discrepancies are significant—the obsession with death, the 
hopelessness of the human condition, the vengefulness of an un-named deity waiting to 
strike down any human who attains worldly happiness—these are distinctly 
Herodotean.169 Solon the statesman’s Zeus only punishes those who unjustly gain wealth; 
the god of Herodotus’ Solon smites the financially fortunate indiscriminately, because the
very fact of having wealth is somehow an injustice.170 
Further evidence that the tradition of Solon the sage was altered by the time 
Herodotus wrote comes from examining his theoria. The descriptions of Solon's travels 
reveal philosophical doctrines at odds with what we know of the historical Solon, because
they were an attempt to fit Solon into a pre-existing genre of traveling wise men.171 Sages 
typically traveled and interacted with one another, and at some point ended up at the 
court of Croesus, usually contemporaneously.172 Herodotus stretches the limits of 
168. Rémillard (2009: 11-20) discusses further ways in which the historical and the Herodotean Solon's 
philosophies overlap and differ. 
169. Some have argued that Herodotus himself does not endorse the views that his Solon espouses, most 
notably Lang (1984 and 1985), but Shapiro (1996: 348-64) convincingly counters these objections point-
by-point. 
170. See Chiasson (1986: 261-62) for a discussion about wealth equaling injustice in and of itself. 
171. Ancients have submitted at least seventeen names for the "canon" of the seven sages, but the most 
common list is: Solon, Thales, Pittakos, Bias, Cleobulus, Chilon, and Periander, who in many stories 
interacted with each other, and all of whom seem to have ended up at the court of Croesus at the same time 
in order to have a sort of wisdom competition. The most coherent list and account is in Diog. Laert. 1, 
written more than 800 years after most of these men (possibly) lived, which of course brings up serious 
problems of source criticism and transmission. On the inextricable association between wise man and 
wanderer, and Solon's pivotal role in inaugurating that tradition, see Montiglio (2000: 88). For more on the 
origins of the legends of the seven sages, with particular reference to Herodotus and Plutarch, see Busine 
(2002: 15-46). 
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chronological credibility about Solon’s activities in order to associate him with folkloric 
itinerant sages, for which Solon's very act of leaving Athens makes him a candidate.173 
Other features of his career suggest that he belongs to this category.174 One shared 
feature of many of these sages was that they were tyrants or in positions of political 
power in their home cities, and many besides Solon were constitutional reformers.175 In 
addition to Solon, Chilon was a Spartan ephor in 565, a position of considerable influence
in the running of the Lacedaimonian government, which was almost universally admired 
in antiquity as a shining example of eunomia, or "good law." Periander was of course the 
tyrant of Corinth, known for being extremely volatile, even killing his own wife by either
throwing a footstool or kicking her while pregnant. Anacharsis the Scythian was the 
brother of the king of Scythia and a houseguest of Solon, and in a position of such 
political influence in Scythia that his own brother assassinated him because he introduced
Greek customs to his famously xenophobic people. Myson came from a family of tyrants 
in Chen, and Solon himself crafted the constitution of Athens that was meant to resolve 
civil strife in the wake of the Cylonian conspiracy, an act that required considerable 
personal and political power.176 The fact of Solon being a wise man, therefore, does not 
exclude my interpretation of him potentially aiming for a tyranny, though this is often the 
172. Diod. Sic. 9.2.2 follows Herodotus both in chronology of the contemporaneous appearance of the 
sages at Croesus' court and the philosophy that no man can be called happy until he is dead. 
173. On the unreliability of Herodotus' chronology of the sixth century, see How & Wells (1912b: 441-42). 
Herodotus gives few actual dates, instead relying on figures, i.e., ten years for Peisistratos' exile and thirty-
six for the dynasty up until the assassination of Hipparchos, and roughly synchronizes events, usually 
leaving the date completely uncertain. On problems with the specific chronology of Solon, see ch. 1, p. 22.
174. On Solon's chronology with specific reference to his visit with Croesus, see ch. 1, p. 24, esp. n. 61.
175. See Martin (1998: 115-20) for more detailed descriptions of the activities of each individual sage.
176. Martin (1998: 120) argues that the real glue that held the tradition of the sages together was the shared 
performative aspects of their careers—they were all poets, involved in politics, and had artistic endeavors 
wrapped up in their practical lives. He uses in particular the example of Solon feigning madness to recite in
public the poem that shamed the Athenians into attacking Salamis, described in Plut. Sol. 8.
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implication in literature speaking of him as being opposed to tyranny because of his 
fabled wisdom. Among a people who had programmatically begun rejecting tyranny in 
favor of democracy, it was easy to remember the philosopher and forget the tyrant. 
 Further, all of the sages acted agonistically—they all tried to “out-wise” one 
another, which necessitated that they all live at the same time and interact with each other
frequently. This is why we have them all situated at the palace of Croesus, the famous 
Lydian hellenophile who was fascinated with Greek oracles and customs, and delighted 
to have traveling philosophers visit his court.177 Of course, even the men whom we can 
say with some certainty actually existed, cannot have met. But in the popular tradition 
they still had to be in competition with one another, because as Martin puts it, “There had
to be an idealized corporate body of sages for the very notion of archaic sage to make 
sense. One wise man doesn’t work.”178 
An example of this combative element is the tale of the tripod, which involved all 
seven of the sages.179 The most common version says that a band of Ionian youths 
purchased a catch of fish from a Milesian fisherman, and got involved in a dispute over a 
tripod that had accidentally been hauled in with the catch of fish. They appealed to 
Delphi as to who should get it, and were told “whoever is most wise”. So they gave it to 
Thales, who gave it to another, and so on, until it came to Solon, who remarked that the 
177. Unfortunately the wisdom of his frequent guests did not have their effect until the moment of his 
impending death on a pyre, which landed him in his turn the role of sage and advisor to his conqueror, 
Cyrus (Hdt. 1.86-8).
178. Martin (1998: 120).
179. There are 11 variants on the tale of the tripod. Among others, Diog. Laert. 1.27-33, Diod. 9.13, Val. 
Max. 4.1, and Plut. Sol. 4 relate this story. For a more complete list, with the texts from all of the variants, 
see Wulf (1896: 12-20); see also Snell (1971: 114-27) and Martin (1998: 120-22). On the more general 
concept of an agon sophias see Busine (2002: 47-89).
58
god was most wise, and dedicated it to Apollo at Delphi.180 Once Solon was established 
as a wandering wise man on equal footing with the rest of the sages, it was no problem to 
insert him into such popular traditions, and even to give him the edge over others of his 
ilk by figuring out the riddle—no man can be wiser than a god; therefore the tripod 
belonged to Apollo. The Athenians by association gained prestige because their sage beat 
out the others in the wisdom competition.
The importance of this analysis is to show that there was a certain fluidity to the 
characterizations of Solon floating around in the early-to-mid-fifth century, visible in the 
inconsistencies of Solon's portrayal in Herodotus (our earliest independent treatment).181 
We see his legend adapted within a century of his lifetime to fit preconceived notions 
about the mythological topos of the wise man, which continued and grew in later 
literature with stories like that of the tripod.182 This means that Solon's legacy was 
malleable, making it ripe for alteration and adaptation, which later became entrenched in 
the record as fact. Busine argues that Herodotus was instrumental in the beginnings and 
development of legends surrounding an unspecified number of wise men, and that it is 
only in Plato that we find an increasing awareness of and familiarity with a group of 
seven sages.183 She assigns the key role in the genesis of the legends to the sanctuary of 
Apollo at Delphi. Most importantly for our study, she describes the process by which 
180. On the expansion of localized wisdom to panhellenic norms and long-distance competitions, see Nagy 
(1990: 143-45).
181. On Herodotus' methods of "generating local history" to suit his own ends, see Hornblower (2006: 
309), and esp. Jacoby (1909: 118, 506).
182. On Solon as the "tragic warner" in Herodotus, see Lattimore (1939: 34-35), following Bischoff (1932: 
78). The similarity in the treatment of Solon to that of Bias and Pittacus, all three of whom warn Croesus of
impending disaster, is in itself an indication that the story of Solon has been manipulated to fit this stock 
character. 
183. Busine (2002: 15-46). On the influence of Herodotus in the fifth century, see Hornblower (2006: 
306-18). 
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individual poleis appropriated and modified the legends for their particular interests and 
ideological concerns. Since fifth-and-fourth-century Athens had become widely 
acknowledged as a center for learning and art from all over the Hellenic world, the 
Athenian version of the seven sages, led by Solon, would have become the standard 
version handed down to posterity. In the process the sages transformed from their original
role of political actors to men whose penchant for pithy sayings took on an almost 
exclusively moralizing and philosophical turn. Historians and ethnographers did not feel 
compelled to confine Solon to a political sphere, and felt free to embellish his activities 
after his reforms, particularly those after leaving Athens. This makes it easier to 
understand how Solon, famed for his political reforms and philosophy, became attached 
to the mythological paradigm of a sage. As Lattimore put it, "It is not that the stories and 
situations adhere to the great names, it is the names that adhere to them" (1939: 34-35). 
II. Solon as Nomothetes
An aspect of Solon's wisdom that is closely related to his reputation as a sage is 
that of him as a lawgiver. For a lawgiver to be so highly respected that he is chosen to 
write a new constitution, he must in some sense be a sage. However, not all sages are 
lawgivers. The tradition that places Solon as a wise man overlaps significantly with his 
role in forming a new constitution, but the two aspects of the man are often treated 
separately, as we shall do here. In this context Solon once more has a story that does not 
quite fit the expected forms, and seems to be artificially inserted into the tradition based 
on elements in his circumstances that have been stretched to fit those of other famous 
lawgivers. Only with manipulation can Solon fill the requirements to pave the way for 
democracy despite the "hiccup" of the Peisistratid tyranny between his reforms and 
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Cleisthenes’ reorganization of the state. 
Solon does in fact share many elements in common with nomothetai in the 
tradition of Lycurgus of Sparta, Lygdamis of Naxos, Charondas of Catania, Diokles of 
Syracuse, Zaleucus of Lokri, and others.184 Aristotle makes a distinction between people 
who merely make laws and those who frame constitutions, and he puts Solon in the latter 
category when he credits him with founding democracy (Pol. 1273a). He even equates 
him to Lycurgus, the prototypical ancient nomothetes whose legend contains many 
elements of folklore.185 
The typical Greek lawgiver instigates a process that results in a polis' journey 
from anomia to eunomia in three stages.186 First, there is a crisis, usually in the form of 
stasis or active internecine conflict, as in the case of Athens post Cylon/Drakon and in 
pre-Lycurgun Sparta. Enter the lawgiver, who is uniquely qualified to assist because of 
his character, education, and exceptional virtue and wisdom. There is a consistent pattern 
on how they garner this wisdom, which comes in two principal methods, both of which 
are essential: extensive travel and study with one of the great philosophers. For example, 
Lycurgus went to Crete, Egypt and Ionia and met Thaletas to study constitutions; 
Zaleucus and Charondas were pupils of Pythagoras, with the variant that Thales 
instructed Zaleucus, who then served as teacher to Charondas. The Ath. Pol. complains of
184. Lygdamis had a more direct connection to Athens than these others. He was friendly with Peisistratos, 
who allegedly installed him in his position of tyrant; he was also connected with Polycrates, the tyrant of 
Samos, who was a fellow sage and ally of Solon. See also Arist. Pol. 1274a. On similarities in 
characteristics of early lawgivers, as well as the question of the historicity of Zaleucus, see Gagarin (1989: 
52-66).
185. The most coherent accounts of the life and activities of Lycurgus can be found in Plut. Lycurg. and 
Xen. Lac. 
186. See Gagarin (1989: 58). Eder (2005: 241-42) discusses the similarities between Solon's persona as 
nomothetes and the genesis of the Twelve Tables in Archaic Rome. 
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the impossible timelines of such intellectual genealogies (17), but absence of intelligible 
chronology is itself a hallmark of myth.
In the second or medial stage, the citizens elect the lawgiver to establish order, 
who then applies the knowledge gained during his travels and interactions with other 
wise men to make a new set of laws. This travel is crucial in its influence on the 
composition of the constitution—the nomothetes’ examination of codes of other peoples 
allows him pick and choose the best elements from each code he encounters.187 Many 
lawgivers also had divine assistance, most notably Lycurgus, whose Great Rhetra 
encompassed principles handed to him by Apollo at Delphi.188 
The code is always severely tested soon after its implementation. Sometimes the 
lawgiver is attacked and solves the problem by his personal authority, as in the cases of 
Lycurgus and Alkander. Often the new laws are tested when the lawgiver falls afoul of his
own code. For instance, we hear that Zaleucus decreed that anyone taken in adultery be 
blinded. When his own son was caught and convicted, Zaleucus gave up one of his own 
eyes so that his son would not be totally sightless rather than try to bend the law to make 
an exception for his own family (Val. Max. 6.5.4). Likewise Charondas declared it a 
capital offense to enter the assembly armed, but he forgot about the dagger he carried as 
protection against robbers on the road. When he was called out on this offense, he killed 
187. On the close association of theoria and lawgivers in Athens, as well as their political functions, see 
Ker (2000: 304-06). Ker also characterizes the presence of the axones and kyrbeis on the Stoa Basileus as a 
visual reminder of Solon and his legislative activities.
188. Plutarch comments that such stories might be true, but that some merely pretended to be acting on 
divine instruction in order to gain acceptance for decrees (Num. 4.6-8). He also connects Solon to Delphi, 
giving Apollo credit for setting Solon on the path to create a new law code, much like the stories we hear 
about the Spartan Lycurgus (Plut. Sol. 14.6). On the divine origin of these early law codes, see Gagarin 
(1989: 60-61).
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himself with his own weapon (Diod. 12.19; Val. Max. 6.5.4).189 This topos of the lawgiver
adhering to his provisions to his own detriment showed that law had become supreme.190 
In the final stage, the crisis is resolved by the stability of the new constitution—all of the 
legends contain provisions to ensure continuation in its original form, with specifications 
for the permanence of the code. There was always the threat, however, that the lawgiver 
would retain enough power to change the laws; therefore he was a potential threat to their
enforcement. This danger was usually resolved by either the death of the lawgiver or self-
imposed exile.191 
The problem with this narrative in the case of Solon is that while all of the 
elements of the legendary lawgiver are in place with, they are in the wrong order. We do 
have a crisis—civil stasis sparked by the harshness of Drakon’s laws, implemented after 
the failed Cylonian conspiracy. The situation in Attica had deteriorated into what 
amounted to class warfare, with the rich holding most of the land and the poor 
condemned in many cases to using their own persons as collateral against unpayable 
debts. Solon does seem to have been elected to a special archonship, during which he was
commissioned to solve the rising civil stasis.192 This all sounds like it fits the model, but 
the traditional wise man is qualified for the position because he has traveled widely, 
studied other law codes, and consulted with other wise men. 
189. Diodorus tells us that some attribute this act to Diokles (12.19).
190. For echoes of this attitude in Herodotus, see the speech Demaratus gives to Xerxes on the Spartans' 
legendary bravery stemming from their submission to law (Hdt. 7.104.4). Also see Hartog (1988: 334) on 
the similarity of language describing the relationship of masters and slaves and the status of citizens in a 
state that acknowledges the supremacy of law. 
191. For examples, see Szegedy-Maszak (1978: 207).
192. The very fact that Solon drew up a law code with equal punishments for every social class is suspect, 
since the other early law codes that survive in physical form draw sharp distinctions in the severity of 
penalties based on class. For instance, the inscription containing the Gortyn law code, dated to the first half 
of the 5th century, has markedly reduced fines for adulterers caught seducing a woman from the lower 
classes than one from the wealthier. See Adcock (1927: 95-96).
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Solon supposedly did his traveling by entering a career in commerce. This is not 
at all the same as a trip taken solely for the purpose of learning and associating with other
wise men. Plutarch hedges by saying, "Some say that he travelled to get experience and 
acquire information rather than to make money, for it is certainly true that he was a lover 
of wisdom..." (2.1-2; καίτοι φασὶν ἔνιοι πολυπειρίας ἕνεκα µᾶλλον καὶ ἱστορίας ἢ 
χρηµατισµοῦ πλανηθῆναι τὸν Σόλωνα. σοφίας µὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁµολογουµένως ἐραστής,).193 
The rest of the chapter is devoted to a rather tortuous and convoluted defense about why 
trade and acquisition of wisdom are not mutually exclusive. The vehemence of these 
justifications indicates that Solon's career in commerce counted against him in some 
quarters, and we are seeing a later attempt to square the traditions about him as a trader 
with those about him as a sage. Trade was not considered a completely respectable 
occupation for a member of the upper classes; in fact, it was considered rather vulgar. We 
know that Plutarch was heavily influenced by Plato, who claimed that "work" crushed 
souls and deformed bodies (Rep. 495d-e), and Aristotle, who more specifically addressed 
trade: "The citizen must not lead the life of mechanics or tradesman, for such a life is 
ignoble and an enemy of virtue. Neither must they be farmers, since leisure is necessary 
both for the development of virtue and the performance of political duties" 
(1328b-1329a; οὔτε βάναυσον βίον οὔτ’ ἀγοραῖον δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγεννὴς γὰρ ὁ 
τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος), οὐδὲ δὴ γεωργοὺς εἶναι τοὺς µέλλοντας 
ἔσεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς 
πολιτικάς). In the end, it is highly unlikely for anyone to embark in trade with no intent to
193. The tradition is further corrupted by the time of Diog. Laert., who adopts the later tradition by placing 
Solon's travels after Peisistratos has seized power, as well as making the tyrannies of Peisistratos and 
Periander contemporaneous (2.50). 
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make money, so these attempts to plead a special case for Solon seem inconsistent.194 
According to the next stock characteristic of an ancient lawgiver, Solon was 
supposed to write a constitution that solved the civil strife; instead he drew up a law code 
that made everyone, rich and poor alike, angry. He then left Athens and wrote self-
exculpatory poetry about how he was only trying to do his best and how he never wanted 
to be a tyrant. Solon never had to undergo the test of falling afoul of his own law code. 
He did take the required theoria, but he seems to have attained his wisdom in the travels 
he made after leaving Athens to implement his laws, not before (except possibly as a 
trader, which as mentioned above is an extremely suspect example). He did make 
provision for the permanence of the law code by extracting a promise from the Athenians 
not to change his laws for ten years, but as we have already seen, this did not happen 
amid a period in which the law code solved the problems of internecine conflict. Instead, 
he left town in the midst of turmoil even greater than before he drew up the new 
regulations, which was never in fact resolved until an actual tyrant, Peisistratos, stepped 
into the breach and took the reins of the state. Because of the turmoil caused by his 
reforms, the uprisings and unrest of people angry that their particular interests were 
slighted according to the new statutes, I suggest that Solon departed by necessity rather 
than choice.195
In fact, there is actually a tradition of the exiled philosopher, forced from home 
because of the hatred of his fellow citizens, that is glossed over in our stories about 
194. Cf. the Ath. Pol., which of course focuses on the political activity, and in which travels of Solon prior 
to his archonship are not mentioned at all. Ste Croix (1981) categorically denies the possibility that Solon 
engaged in trade. 
195. Contra Ker (2000: 304-29), who contends that Solon's exile was explicitly connected to his desire to 
retain his authority as legislator, and a deliberate reference to the tradition connecting lawgiver to theoria.
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Solon.196  The elements of the story are there, but they must be forced into the existing 
paradigm. Solon did not gain a reputation as a traveling wise man until after he 
implemented a law code that failed. Eunomia, that ultimate good, the final goal of all 
archaic and classical law codes, was ultimately no part of Solon’s creation. This indicates 
that the figure of Solon was grafted retroactively onto the topos of lawgiver, in 
contradiction to the ultimate failure of his reforms. 
III. Solon as Misotyrannos
Authors since antiquity have written about Solon as a man who opposed tyranny 
in everything he did. He refused out of principle to set himself up as a tyrant despite his 
supporters' urging, earning the Ath. Pol. 's endorsement as the father of democracy.197 He 
refers to his refusal to become tyrant despite urgings by his supporters in three of our 
surviving poetic fragments. In fr. 34, he claims that he did not want a tyranny, without 
elaboration. In fr. 32, we find a more vehement opposition, with an emphasis on the 
dishonor he would have brought on himself and his legacy by setting himself up as a 
tyrant (fr. 32). Finally, in a sarcastic commentary on how others must view his refusal to 
become tyrant, he implies that he would rather be skinned alive (fr. 33).198
196. Empedocles, for example, describes himself as an exile from the gods and a wanderer, hated by all 
(Diels & Kranz (1951: 115b). Montiglio (2000: 90-91) expounds on the connections between wandering 
sages and non-voluntary exile, and the pervasive association between wandering and suffering in Greek 
literature. 
197. See Ath. Pol. 9.1: which specifies that Solon's court reforms were the single most influential feature of
his legislation for the foundation of the eventual democracy. Plutarch concurs, stressing the importance of 
access to courts by the demos, going so far as to say that Solon deliberately made the wording of his laws 
vague so that they would have to go to court for interpretation by juries of commoners, thus making 
magistrates ultimately accountable to the people (Sol. 18). Aristotle also, without quite declaring that 
Solon's constitution was an actual democracy, admits that the jury-courts were the foundation of the later, 
more radical constitution, and stresses that access to and control of courts gave the poorer elements of 
society the necessary minimum of power to enable them to be politically enfranchised (Pol. 1273b-12744a; 
1256b).
198. I discuss these specific poems in detail in ch. 4, p. 126-132.
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The very number of denials of desire for tyranny on Solon's part warrant attention. 
Besides stressing that he could have taken up a tyranny had he wished, there are any 
number of mentions of the evils of greed and absolute power.199 The Ath. Pol. assumes 
that Solon had no intention of becoming a tyrant, since he could have seized power by 
allying himself with whatever party he liked, but instead chose to be the savior of Athens 
and an honest lawgiver despite knowing that he would incur enmity on all sides (Ath. Pol.
11). Once more, the source for this assumption is Solon's own poetry, yet this 
interpretation does not quite dovetail with statements that the Ath. Pol. and Aristotle 
make elsewhere. 
This idea of Solon as anti-tyrant is cemented by stories of his antagonistic 
relationship with Peisistratos, his much younger contemporary and possible relative and/
or lover.200 According to several ancient sources Solon actually warned the would-be 
tyrant about the evils of a tyranny and a totalitarian state (Ath. Pol. 14.2). Upon realizing 
that Peisistratos wanted to seize the tyranny, Solon supposedly tried to warn the demos of 
the danger. Most sources cite frs. 9-11 as "proof" that Solon wrote admonitory poetry 
warning against Peisistratos' impending tyranny, but this is far from secure.201 Different 
sources depict different reactions to Peisistratos' various coups. Plutarch has Solon try to 
convert Peisistratos to a democratic way of thinking (Sol. 29.2). He denounced 
Peisistratos' request for a bodyguard in the assembly, but when he was outvoted he armed
himself and tried to lead an insurrection in the Agora (Diod. 9.4.1, 9.20.1; Plut. Sol. 30.6).
199. On slavery stemming from the greed of the upper classes, see frs. 4.9 and 11.
200. See Plut. Sol. 1 on Solon's familial relation to Peisistratos, as well as the friendship between the two; 
cf. Ath. Pol. 17.2, where the author manifestly declares a love-relationship to be impossible based on 
chronology. Though the Ath. Pol. condemns it as hearsay (17), this is proof that the tradition was persistent 
and early. 
201. See, for example, Rihll (1989: 277-86), who argues that these poems actually refer to Drakon. 
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Unable to win any support, he laid his armor outside his front door in protest and went 
into retirement, ignoring the danger of having a tyrant as an enemy and refusing to go 
into exile despite his friends' urging (Plut. Sol. 30.7-8). 
Some say that despite his distaste for Peisistratos' rule, the tyrant pardoned Solon 
on the grounds that they had been old friends and lovers (Ael. 8.16), and Solon then 
became Peisistratos' trusted advisor (Plut. Sol. 31.2).202 Others had him seek refuge at the 
court of Periander (ps. Dio Chrys. 37.5) or in Ionia (P. Oxy. 4.664). Diogenes Laertius 
tells us that he sent letters to Peisistratos from exile trying to convince him to give up his 
tyranny, even though he called him the best of tyrants (1.66-67). However, Solon refused 
to return to Attica despite Peisistratos' entreaties (1.53-54) and died in exile on Cyprus 
(1.62), after which his ashes were scattered on Salamis, and he was publicly honored at 
Athens (Ael. 8.16).203 
These stories about Solon and Peisistratos stretch the bounds of believable 
chronology, as they would probably put Solon in his 90s in the 560s.204 It is more likely a 
later effort to place Solon, the moderate who assiduously resisted tyranny under the direst
of temptations, in a position to mentor the young Peisistratos.205 This contortion of 
chronology and plausibility is further evidence that the character of Solon, particularly as 
an anti-tyrant, was being manipulated for literary ends.206
202. Cf. the story of Croesus and Cyrus in Herodotus (1.86-90). On the figure of Solon as tragic "warner" 
to Croesus see Lattimore (1939: 34-35), following Bischoff (1932: 78).
203. Plutarch dismisses this story, though he notes that Aristotle accepts it (Sol. 9). See also Podlecki (1984:
124) and (1987: 9-10). For Solon's death on Cyprus, see also Val. Max. 5.3. Linforth (1919: 308) provides 
further ancient references. 
204. On the violence done to chronology in creating a relationship between Solon and Peisistratos, see also 
Adcock (1927: 108-09) and Rihll (1989: 277-78).
205. Rhodes (1993: 202), for example, dismisses the story as complete fabrication.
206. On the relationship between Solon and Peisistratos as a literary device, see Adcock (1927: 109).
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Whatever spin one puts on Solon's character and activities, however, there is 
agreement that despite his refusal of a tyranny, in the wake of his reforms neither the 
wealthy nor the poor elements of society were happy. The state dissolved into civil stasis 
that was only solved when Peisistratos stepped into the resulting power vacuum and 
cemented the contradictory reputation of harsh tyrant and congenial ruler. His popularity 
stemmed from the fact that he ruled moderately and constitutionally, a vague phrase 
which is usually presumed to refer to the law code of Solon.207 In fact the Ath. Pol. cites 
the reign of Peisistratus as a Golden Age, mainly due to his respect for the law, citing the 
example of his appearance in court to defend himself against a commoner's charge of 
murder (Ath. Pol. 16.8): 
For he was willing to administer everything according to the laws in all matters, 
never giving himself any advantage; and once in particular when he was 
summoned to the Areopagus to be tried on a charge of murder, he appeared in 
person to make his defence, and the issuer of the summons was frightened and 
left. 
ἔν τε γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐβούλετο πάντα διοικεῖν κατὰ τοὺς νόµους, οὐδεµίαν ἑαυτῷ 
πλεονεξίαν διδούς, καί ποτε προσκληθεὶς φόνου δίκην εἰς Ἄρειον πάγον, αὐτὸς 
µὲν ἀπήντησεν ὡς ἀπολογησόµενος, ὁ δὲ προσκαλεσάµενος φοβηθεὶς ἔλιπεν. 
There is no mention anywhere of whom Peisistratos allegedly murdered. Despite 
Peisistratus' popularity, his star fell after the assassination of his son Hipparchos in 514, 
and his regime became synonymous with the harsh rule of his other son Hippias, which 
grew more autocratic after the death of his brother. 
We see further contradiction in Herodotus about Peisistratos' adherence to 
207. "Peisistratus' administration of the state was, as has been said, moderate, and more constitutional than 
tyrannical" (Ath. Pol. 16.2; διῴκει δ᾽ ὁ Πεισίστρατος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν µετρίως καὶ µᾶλλον
πολιτικῶς ἢ τυραννικῶς).
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established laws and the warm welcome he received on his return to Athens after his first 
exile (1.60), versus the depiction of a sexually dissolute tyrant in his unnatural (οὐ κατὰ 
νόµον) relations with Megacles' daughter (1.61). Plutarch also paints Peisistratos as a 
master deceiver, fooling everyone except Solon into thinking he was a moderate and 
civic-minded demagogue, when in actuality he was a depraved monster. Despite 
formidable acting skills, though, he could not fool the master anti-tyrant, Solon. (Sol. 
29.2-3). In other words, Peisistratos seemed to be everything that Solon actually was; the 
harsher the portrait of the tyrant, the more vehement and admirable Solon's misotyrannos 
position became. Plutarch is obviously aware of the tradition that Peisistratos was a good 
and popular ruler, but by Plutarch's day tyranny was an evil; therefore Peisistratos must 
have been pretending to any good qualities in evidence from earlier literary depictions.208 
This of course made his contrast with Solon all the more striking.
Another echo of this attitude is in Aristotle's acknowledment that Solon actually 
did have absolute power because of the disturbed state of the country, even saying that all
agree that this is indisputable (Ath. Pol. 6). At the same time he maintains that Solon 
refused absolute power because of his moderate nature and civic-mindedness. Aristotle 
once more explains away the inherent contradiction in this situation by referring to 
Solon's poetry, and stating that his intentions were in the best interests of both the rich 
and the poor. Further, the fact that Solon had a reputation as a philosopher contributed to 
views about him as a tyrant-hater. 
Diodorus Siculus, writing in the second half of the first century, more explicitly 
connects Solon with the downfall of tyranny. As a preface to a version of the story of 
208. See ch. 5, p. 14 on stereotypes of tyrants.
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Solon at Croesus' court, he addresses Solon's childhood and claims that he strove to attain
wisdom from a very young age, with his fellow citizens marveling at the sageness of his 
advice and reasoning (9.1.3). He claims that Solon worked to make the effeminate and 
dissolute Athenians a more virile people, like others equating Solon's activities with 
morality as well as learning and legislation. It was directly because of Solon's anti-
tyrannical and moral bent, Diodorus claims, that Harmodius and Aristogeiton rose up and
assassinated the tyrants (9.1.4), rather than Thucydides' more sordid version describing 
the murder as resulting from a messy love affair.
Another episode conjures ghosts of Solonian anti-totalitarian philosophy, though 
it does not explicitly mention him. In this anecdote about Plato, Diodorus equates 
philosophy with anti-tyranny. He tells a story of Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, 
imprisoning Plato and arbitrarily selling him into slavery because some offhand remark 
displeased him. Plato's fellow philosophers, however, pooled their resources and bought 
his freedom. When they sent him back to Greece they admonished him that, "a wise man 
should associate with tyrants either as little as possible or with the best grace possible" 
(15.7.1; διότι δεῖ τὸν σοφὸν τοῖς τυράννοις ἢ ὡς ἥκιστα ἢ ὡς ἥδιστα ὁµιλεῖν). Here there 
is clearly an association between wise men and distrust of tyrants.
Diogenes Laertius, writing in the third century C.E., gives us a rather jumbled 
account of Solon's refusal to be tyrant. His demurral seems to have been entirely for the 
purpose of foiling Peisistratos, whose designs he had smoked out, but this makes little 
sense as a reason for refusing to become a tyrant himself (1.49). It appears that by the 
third century he was so inextricably bound with hatred of tyranny that even his 
philosophical principles, originally the reason for his refusal of a tyranny, take a backseat 
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to his working publicly against Peisistratos. His failure to prevent the tyranny was the 
reason for his leaving Attica, presenting even more chronological problems than have 
already been discussed. Diogenes also makes much of the fragment of Solon's poetry in 
which he seems to be predicting the tyranny of Peisistratos (fr. 9).209 Peisistratos even 
wrote Solon a letter while he was in exile, justifying his seizure of power by claiming he 
was not the first to aim for such. Peisistratos promised him to leave in place the new 
constitution if Solon would come back and advise him, because, "they were better 
governed than they would be under a democracy" (1.53; καὶ ἄµεινόν γε πολιτεύουσιν ἢ 
κατὰ δηµοκρατίαν), which is of course an anachronism referring to a form of government
that did not yet exist. 
Peisistratos was also not the only tyrant with whom Solon corresponded. 
Diogenes also includes a purported letter of Solon to Polycrates advising him on how to 
remain in power. He says that if he wanted to be free of reproach he should resign power, 
but if he wanted to keep it he should get rid of all conspirators by making his personal 
mercenary force stronger than that of the citizens' (1.64).210 Contradictorily, at the very 
end of the chapter Diogenes has Solon explain to Croesus that he desired above all else to
live in a democracy, which shows considerable confusion and alteration of the traditions 
surrounding Solon and tyranny within a single source. Pausanias, writing in the second 
century AD, also associates Solon with tyrants and warfare, despite an earlier 
209. Rihll (1989: 277-86) contends that in fact these fragments refer to Drakon. She suggests that the 
problems that riddle discussions of Solon's relationship to Peisistratos can be reconciled if we understand 
these poems to be products of Solon's youth, referring to the harsh rule of Drakon, rather than to 
Peisistratos with all of the chronological problems that accompanies this assumption. 
210. This of course also suggests a military bent, more closely aligned with activities of other tyrants, than 
other sources. Cf. Herodotus 1.64, where Solon describes Peisistratos' army of epikouroi, or foreign 
mercenaries. Frost (1984: 283-84) examines and dismisses the idea that Solon's four property classes were 
a way of mobilizing a citizen army.
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juxtaposition of Solon with domesticity and peace.211 He then describes the maxims γνῶθι
σεαυτὸν, "Know thyself" and µηδὲν ἄγαν, "Nothing in excess," both written in the fore-
temple at Delphi, by Thales, Bias, Pittacus, Cleobulus, Solon, and Chilon (10.24).212 All 
of these men were on one or other of the lists of seven sages, and two of them were also 
tyrants: Pittacus of Mytilene and Cleobulus. Immediately after this, Pausanias describes 
how the sages helped the Amphictyons conduct a war against the Cirrhaeans, putting 
Cleisthenes, the tyrant of Sicyon, at the head of their army. He allegedly brought Solon 
over as his advisor on the conduct of the war, in contradiction to Solon's earlier principled
refusal to advise Peisistratos as long as he held the tyranny. There follows a list of the 
stratagems that Solon employed to defeat the Cirrhaeans, including diverting their water 
supply during a siege and eventually poisoning their wells with hellebore. 
This indicates that a tradition about Solon's association with violence and/or 
tyrants remained even into late antiquity. Though such stories may not have raised 
eyebrows during the so-called "Age of Tyrants" in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., 
democracy had been overthrown and restored twice in the last decade of the fifth century.
Demonstrating continuity between the legislation of Solon and democracy gave the 
present political climate the authority of the past. Because authors like that of the Ath. 
Pol. and Plutarch wrote after democracy had been firmly (re)established, they were 
required to explain away the persistent stories of Solon's less-than-democratic activities, 
211. He describes the laws of Solon that are inscribed in the Prytaneum, near the statues of the goddesses 
Eirene (Peace) and Hestia (Hearth). 
212. The theme of moderation implicit in these bits of wisdom rest particularly uneasily with the 
descriptions of Solon's tactics in the First Sacred War in Paus. 10.37. The historicity of the entire war, 
however, has come under much scrutiny—see Cassola (1964: 26-34) and Davies (1984: 285-90). 
Elsewhere, Pausanias firmly locates Solon among the great lawgivers, describing the bronze statue of Solon
on the Stoa Poikile in the agora (1.16).
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allowing the demos to sustain the fiction that their forebears—with the important 
exceptions of the Peisistratids, the Four Hundred, and the Thirty—had always valued 
democratic principles.213
Solon's reputation as a mild and moderate politician working for the good of the 
people and standing up to anyone who tried to seize absolute power is not consistent. We 
see ghosts of a different tradition, often side-by-side with denials of any other motive for 
Solon's actions. An excellent parallel case wherein a sage has explicit alternate 
reputations as a democrat and a tyrant is Cleobulus. Cleobulus is in places merely a wise 
man, but Clement of Alexandria calls him "king of the Lindians" (Stromata 4.19). 
Plutarch explicitly calls him a tyrant (de E ap. Delph. 3). Diogenes Laertius, however, 
quotes a letter from Cleobulus to Solon offering him refuge from tyranny, claiming that 
Lindus is a democracy (1.93). Upon close examination, even the stories attributed to 
Solon about his hatred of tyranny suggest a different reality, or at the very least a co-
existing tradition, even as late as the third century AD. On the surface incompatible, the 
two versions become so entwined as to be inseparable, with the idea of Solon as a 
moderate winning out and stories of Solon as a grasping politician or a collaborator with 
tyrants explained away as slander, usually by citation of his poetry. In a remarkably short 
period of time, the moralizing tone of the poetry and frequent assertions of hatred of 
tyranny come to overshadow any other interpretation or account of his activities.
213. On the overthrow and restoration of democracy, see ch. 1, p. 77. On the invention of tradition for the 
purpose of legitimacy, see generally Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983), Hobsbawm (1983: 1-9), Thomas (1989: 
13), Strauss (1993: 58-99, 181-2), Hobsbawm (1997: 11), and Shear (2011: 11-15).
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IV. Conclusion
Solon's persona changes drastically over time, becoming whatever aspect of the 
man best fits the needs of the author.214 This is not surprising in view of the far-reaching 
political changes that took place in the Athenian state after the time of Solon. Studies of 
oral tradition and social memory have shown that group memory is mutable and based on
the particular needs of a group at any given time, particularly with respect to justifying 
the contemporaneous political order and legitimizing current social and political 
ideologies.215 As groups change, so versions of the past change, sometimes by wholesale 
invention.216 In Solon's case, rather than replacing older themes and characterizations, 
newer stories and themes accrete to the existing traditions, even if contradictions and 
anomalies had to be (often tortuously) explained away. Solon's own poems were the main
source for explanations of his motivations for his political reforms and philosophy, but 
close examination shows that his representations as philosopher, lawgiver, and 
misotyrannos do not entirely square with our historical evidence. The stock 
characteristics  of these types of figures instead provide a foundation for Solon's eventual 
persona as a mythological precedent for a wide variety of activities—most importantly 
his relationship to the foundation of democracy, to which we now turn. 
214. A good comparandum is the changing biographical depictions of Aspasia over time. See Henry 1995. 
See also Lefkowitz (2012: 47-49) on later biographers and historians inventing a sort of mythology about 
Solon based on his own poetry. She points out that many of the poems and epigrams that later authors point
to as "proof" of their version of Solon are so general in nature that they do not always even have certain 
attributions.
215. See Thomas (1989: 4) and Forsdyke (2006: 226, 238 n. 7) for bibliography of the most important 
recent studies on oral and group memory.
216. Ibid.
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Chapter 3
Solon the protodemocrat
At the end of the fifth century and throughout the fourth century, accounts of 
Solon focused on the political aspects of his activities and his constitutional reforms. At 
this point the democracy was firmly (re)established and studies of constitutional history 
abounded, and it was appropriate to examine Solon's activities in light of their place in 
the development of democracy. This was also the heyday of the logographers and orators,
and the laws of Solon were a convenient antecedent for more or less anything the orators 
wanted to argue, particularly laws that had explicit democratic overtones. Speechmakers 
used lawgivers such as Solon as authorities to support contemporary political conflicts 
and positions.217 The simple fact of the triumph of the democracy after the turmoil of the 
fifth century and the Peloponnesian War ensured that records of these reforms and ideas, 
as well as the supporting fragments of Solon's poetry, survived as the ones most akin to 
contemporary politics. In this climate Solon became a lodestone for political discussions 
regarding democracy. The goal of this section is first, to demonstrate that there is a 
widespread agreement among ancient sources that Solon had a fundamental part to play 
in the foundation of the democracy, and second, that this interpretation ultimately 
prevailed over an alternative tradition that painted Solon as more of an aristocratic 
partisan. 
The most famous treatment of Solon and his "constitution" is of course the Ath. 
Pol., likely composed in the 320s, the author of which was a contemporary of Aristotle, 
217. Eder (2005: 242) points out that after the destruction of written records during the Persian sack of 
Athens there may well have been "nothing to limit the imagination of later authors and commentators."
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who also has much to say about democracy and tyranny as forms of government more 
generally in his Politics.218 The Ath. Pol. details eleven major changes in the Athenian 
constitution, from the monarchy under Theseus to the fall of democracy in 411 and its 
restoration after the tyranny of the Thirty in 403. Finally, he gives an exhaustive overview
of how the democracy functioned in his own day. It is worthwhile to examine the Ath. 
Pol. closely because it intimately associates Solon with the foundation of the Athenian 
constitution, the telos of which is the democracy under which Aristotle and his 
contemporaries wrote. He sees democracy as a process beginning with Solon and arising 
naturally out of Solon's reforms, with minor blips in the form of the tyranny of the 
Peisistratids and that of the Thirty: "The third [constitutional change] was the one 
following the stasis in the time of Solon; from this the democracy arose. The fourth was 
the tyranny of Pisistratus; the fifth the constitution of Cleisthenes, after the overthrow of 
the tyrants, which was of a more democratic character than that of Solon" (Ath. Pol. 41.2;
τρίτη δ᾽ ἡ µετὰ τὴν στάσιν ἡ ἐπὶ Σόλωνος, ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἀρχὴ δηµοκρατίας ἐγένετο. τετάρτη δ᾽ 
ἡ ἐπὶ Πεισιστράτου τυραννίς. πέµπτη δ᾽ ἡ µετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἡ 
Κλεισθένους, δηµοτικωτέρα τῆς Σόλωνος). This formulation of a road to democracy 
beginning with Solon would set the stage for treatments of his political activities for 
millennia.219
Aristotle believed that the polis was a natural phenomenon, resulting from man's 
status as a "political animal" (ζῷον πολιτικόν), which he describes in detail in the 
218. There is widespread agreement that the Ath. pol was published in the period between 329/8 and 323/2. 
For a summary of discussions on the dating, see Keaney (1970: esp. 326 n. 1). Holkeskamp (2005: 280-93) 
is more cautious in calling Solon's reforms a "constitution," positing that the legislation amounted more to a
"collection of laws" rather than a code. 
219. For more on Aristotle's political teleology, see Day & Chambers (1962: 50-54).
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Politics.220 In Aristotle's view, political phenomena could be explained in the same ways 
as natural phenomena, and since nature always acts with purpose, the development of 
various types of government can be explained in natural terms. Any type of government, 
then, is the result of a natural process.221 In Aristotle's view, democracy is a corrupt form 
of government, a deviation from the natural telos of government, the ultimate goal of 
which is to live well (ζῆν καλῶς).222 Democracy, however, has its own telos, which is 
freedom.223 Despite Aristotle's views expressed here and elsewhere on the pitfalls of 
democracy as a form of government, the view of democracy as an organic result of a 
process that took nearly three centuries is striking in that it began with Solon. If any form 
of constitution has its own telos, then, it can be argued that the history of the Athenian 
constitution had been moving toward its final form of democracy from the beginning, and
that tracing the history of the constitution would demonstrate how this phenomenon 
reached its inevitable fulfillment.224 He even admits in the Politics, in a description on the
natural evolution of governments from monarchy, to aristocracy, to oligarchy, to tyranny, 
220. Pol. 1.1252b27-1253a18; 3.1278b15-30.
221. Keaney, Wilamowitz, and Jacoby all comment on the differences between the views expressed in the 
Ath. Pol. and the Politics, assuming that Aristotle authored both works. See Keaney (1963: 115-16) on 
distinctions between Aristotle on political philosophy in the Politics and Aristotle the historian in the Ath. 
Pol. He argues that Aristotle's philosophical beliefs about teleological principles invade his historical 
writing as well as his philosophical writing, a position similar to that of Jacoby (1949: 210), who says that 
he was a philosopher who was only accidentally an historian. Wilamowitz (1893: 356), who calls Aristotle 
primarily an historian.
222. Pol. 3.1278b. See also 1.1252-24 where he specifies that the best method of investigating the rise of 
constitutions (along with everything else) is to study the process of development from the beginning. 
223. Rhet. 1.1366a2-7; see Day & Chambers (1962: 66-67).
224. See Rhodes (1993: 7 and 1962) for the argument that Aristotle constructs history based on his 
philosophical doctrines. See also Keaney (1963: 136-38), who argues that Aristotle's goal was to explain 
how the radical democracy came into being, employing a characteristic stylistic pattern wherein he 
discussed notions of beginning, development, and maturity. If his end goal was to explain the growth of 
democracy, he had to begin with Solon as the founder, subordinating the pre-Solonian constitutions to his 
main topic except as they made contributions to the democratic phases of development. However, he does 
not believe that this structure necessitates the idea that the development of the state was a phenomenon 
predetermined by nature; rather, that Aristotle uses teleological principles merely as a literary pattern. Cf. 
Bloch (1940: 372).
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to democracy, that "perhaps it is not easy for another form of constitution beside 
democracy to evolve" (3.1286b, 20; ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ µείζους εἶναι συµβέβηκε τὰς πόλεις, ἴσως
οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον ἔτι γίγνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἑτέραν παρὰ δηµοκρατίαν).225 It is unlikely that 
Aristotle believed that Solon intended the eventual democracy that arose partly because 
of his reforms, as he is swift in pointing out that Solon himself was not a democrat, but 
instead a "moderate politician," but this is irrelevant.226 Despite the vicissitudes of the 
Athenian government in the fifth century, democracy inevitably won out. He summarizes 
(Pol. 1273b 35-40):227
As for Solon, some people consider him a good lawgiver, as
having put an end to oligarchy when it was too unqualified and as having 
liberated the people from slavery and restored the ancestral democracy with a 
skillful mixing of the constitution: the Areopagus as an oligarchic element, the 
elected archonships an aristocratic one, and the law-courts as democratic.
Σόλωνα δ᾽ ἔνιοι µὲν οἴονται νοµοθέτην γενέσθαι σπουδαῖον: ὀλιγαρχίαν τε 
γὰρ καταλῦσαι λίαν ἄκρατον οὖσαν, καὶ δουλεύοντα τὸν δῆµον παῦσαι, καὶ 
δηµοκρατίαν καταστῆσαι τὴν πάτριον, µείξαντα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν: εἶναι 
γὰρ τὴν µὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς 
ἀριστοκρατικόν, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια δηµοτικόν.
This conception of the democratic bent of Solon's activities and intentions is born 
out in the way that the Ath. Pol. describes his reforms (5-13).228 In addition to the general 
tenor of giving more power to the people, the author flags several of Solon's actions as 
especially democratic ("τὰ δηµοτικώτατα"): the seisachtheia, that is, his cancellation of 
225. Cf. Polybius' theory of anacyclosis in the second c. B.C.E (6.4.7-10). 
226. For Solon as a moderate, see Ath. Pol. 5.3, Arist. Pol. 1296a18-20, 1273b35-1274a21. See also 
Keaney (1963: 120-21) on Aristotle's views of Solon's intentions, and that his contributions to democracy 
were accidental (Politics 2.12.1274a1 ff.). 
227. Cf. Ath. Pol. 9.2, where the author comments that one cannot judge Solon's long-term intentions from 
what happened at the time but only in conjunction with the rest of his law code. von Fritz & Kapp (1950: 
155-56) see Ath. Pol. 8, in which he claims that archons were selected by lot, as a "correction" of this 
passage from the Politics.
228. Cf. his interactions with Peisistratos described in Ath. Pol. 14. 
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debts, the standardization of weights and measures in order to regulate monetary 
interactions such as lending and borrowing, the abolition of debt-bondage, the right of 
anyone to claim redress for wrongs, and most importantly, the right all classes of society 
to appeal to jury courts, for, "when the democracy is master of the vote, it becomes 
master of the constitution" (Ath. Pol. 9-10; κύριος γὰρ ὢν ὁ δῆµος τῆς ψήφου, κύριος 
γίγνεται τῆς πολιτείας).229
It seems clear that the view of Solon as protodemocrat was clearly already present
in the sources of Aristotle and his contemporaries, as are alternative views for Solon's 
motives and activities, usually at odds with one another. There are many instances in the 
Ath. Pol. where Solon is presented as having the good of the common people foremost in 
his thoughts during his year as διαλλακτής. There seems, however, to be a discrepancy in 
the traditions and sources that the Ath. Pol. uses, which he glosses with his own opinions 
to make them more consistent, often not entirely successfully. One source seems to paint 
Solon as a protodemocrat; and a second shows him to hold sympathy mainly with the 
wealthy classes.230 Aristotle and the author of the Ath. Pol. themselves seem to interject 
their own opinions frequently in order to portray Solon as, if not a democrat, at least an 
impartial moderate in cases where the evidence suggests otherwise. Upon closer scrutiny, 
it seems that the main thrust of the Ath. Pol.'s major source(s) were pro-democratic. But 
229. Cf. Lycurgus the orator's reiteration and expounding upon of these points in Leocr. 3-4, though he does
not specifically name Solon. He says that the three most important features of the democracy are: "first the 
system of law, second the vote of the jury, and third the method of prosecution by which the crimes are 
handed over to them" (Leoc. 4; πρῶτον µὲν ἡ τῶν νόµων τάξις, δεύτερον δ᾽ ἡ τῶν δικαστῶν ψῆφος, τρίτον 
δ᾽ ἡ τούτοις τἀ δικήµατα παραδιδοῦσα κρίσις). On Solon's supposed reform of weights and measures, see 
Kurke (1999: 90), in which she suggests that the anachronistic association of coinage with Solon is a 
displacement of the positive aspects of a monetary economy onto the revered figure of Solon. See also von 
Fritz & Kapp (1950: 156-57) for the argument that the Ath. Pol.'s criticism of the scheme of Androtion was 
unfounded, and a contrasting argument for the genuineness of Solon's monetary reforms.
230. On the possibility of a "First Narrative" and a "Second Narrative," that is, two sources with opposite 
political leanings, see Adcock (1912: 9-13).
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the presence of alternate traditions, most of which were swallowed up in the tradition of 
Solon as a moderate and by the Ath. Pol.'s own commentary on various stories, suggests 
that there were difffering views about Solon's intentions that have been buried in the 
intervening centuries. 
For instance, the Ath. Pol. tells us that the poor were slaves to the rich and calls 
Solon the first champion of the people (2). Then we hear that the demos rose up in revolt, 
which indicates that he had the masses in mind when he stepped into office, but in the 
same chapter we have a fragment of Solon's poetry in which he styles himself as an 
impartial moderator between the poor and the rich (Ath. Pol. 5.1; Solon fr. 28).231 In the 
next chapter, the author details rumors accusing Solon of engaging in insider trading by 
letting his wealthy friends know about the seisachtheia in advance. This allowed them to 
borrow heavily and buy land, knowing that they would never have to repay the loans 
(Ath. Pol. 6). This was even supposedly the source of wealth for later influential 
aristocratic families, which they tried to pass off as having been theirs since ancient times
(παλαιοπλούτους). It can be argued that this unsavory accusation is an attempt to 
discredit the most prominent members of the aristocracy as being oppressive, with Solon 
expressly complicit in their machinations against the poor. The author of the Ath. Pol., 
though, calls this story a slander (διαβάλλειν) and offers as proof of the untrustworthiness
of this tale the "fact" that Solon was moderate and public-minded in all his other 
actions.232 He cites the generalized agreement on Solon's good character and the 
231. Adcock (1912: 4) argues that we have an account written from a democratic bias, which is re-worked 
by the author of the Ath. Pol., whose personal view was that Solon was moderate and an impartial arbiter 
rather than a champion of the poor. But it is clear that his views co-exist uneasily with those of a pro-
democratic source.
232. Cf. Plutarch's account of the same rumor in Sol. 15.6-7, with similar reasons for dismissal as slander.
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descriptions Solon himself gave of his actions in his poetry, as in the following passage 
(Ath. Pol. 12): 
ταῦτα δ᾽ ὅτι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔσχεν οἵ τ᾽ ἄλλοι συµφωνοῦσι πάντες, καὶ αὐτὸς 
ἐν τῇ ποιήσει µέµνηται περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖσδε:
δήµῳ µὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας,
 ὅσσον ἀπαρκεῖ, τιµῆς οὔτ᾽ ἀφελὼν οὔτ᾽ ἐπορεξάµενος:
οἳ δ᾽ εἶχον δύναµιν καὶ χρήµασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί,
 καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάµην µηδὲν ἀεικὲς ἔχειν.
ἔστην δ᾽ ἀµφιβαλὼν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀµφοτέροισι,
 νικᾶν δ᾽ οὐκ εἴασ᾽ οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως.
The truth of this view of Solon's policy is established by common consent, and by
the mention he himself has made of the matter in his poems: 
To the people I gave so much privilege as to suffice, 
neither taking away their honor nor offering them more,
And those who had power and were magnificent in their wealth,
I made sure they had nothing shameful.
I stood throwing a mighty shield around both sides,
Not permitting either side to win unjustly.
In chapter 8 we have another problematic contradiction. The Ath. Pol. tells us that 
Solon introduced selection by lot (kleros) for the archonship, an indisputably democratic 
measure. Before, archons had been appointed by the Council of the Areopagus. Then he 
tells us that Solon actually founded the Council as a measure to preserve the ancient laws,
but in the same sentence says that the Areopagus was founded to try anyone convicted of 
attempting to overthrow the fledgling democracy; that is, "to try those who conspired to 
overthrow the demos (Ath. Pol. 8.4; τοὺς ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήµου συνισταµένους 
ἔκρινεν).233 Further confusion arises when we read that, "in the archonship of Telesinos 
[487/6] they cast lots for the nine Archons by tribes from the five hundred previously 
233. Adcock (1912: 4-5) sees this ch. as the Ath. Pol. 's attempt to "correct" the narrative as a whole in the 
form of a parenthesis. 
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elected by the demesmen; this first happened after the tyranny; all their predecessors 
were elected" (Ath. Pol. 22.5; ἐπὶ Τελεσίνου ἄρχοντος, ἐκυάµευσαν τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας 
κατὰ φυλὰς ἐκ τῶν προκριθέντων ὑπὸ τῶν δήµων πεντακοσίων, τότε µετὰ τὴν τυραννίδα 
πρῶτον. οἱ δὲ πρότεροι πάντες ἦσαν αἱρετοί). He also outlines how nine of the ten tribes 
contributed archons, the tenth providing their clerk (Ath. Pol. 55.1). The selection of 
archons by lot was supposedly a feature of the constitution of Solon, but twice in the 
Politics Aristotle tells us that they were elected (1273b: 1274a16). Selection of the 
majority of officeholders by lot was a feature singular to the radical democracy in order 
to produce equal opportunity among all of the candidates, and stories of Solon's relation 
to the measure are extremely confused. 
Selection by lot is not in accordance with the character of Solon's legislation, 
which was widely believed to be a compromise that preserved a significantly oligarchic 
element while providing just enough political enfranchisement to appease the demos. It is
apparent, therefore that the idea of the selection of archons by lot being a feature of 
Solon's constitution had credence among some of the fourth-century Atthides. Scholars 
before Jacoby tended towards the assumption that the work of the Atthidographers were 
mostly antiquarian in nature, rather than political or historical, which would indicate that 
they would not have dealt with such matters in their works.234 But Jacoby, and many after 
him, persuasively made the case that the Atthidographers were in fact often quite 
politically charged and partisan; therefore, I submit that much of the material used by 
Aristotle and his fellow intellectuals surely came from the works of the 
234. The most influential of these were Mathieu 1915, Busolt (1920: 82-97), and Bloch (1940: 303-55).
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Atthidographers.235 This could be explained by a preconception that Solon was the "father
of democracy" that we see early on in the Ath. Pol., in combination perhaps with the 
close association between the use of kleroi and democracy.236 
More inconsistencies arise as the Ath. Pol. further discusses the points of Solon's 
reforms which were considered especially democratic. One puzzling passage is on those 
of Solon's laws which were difficult to interpret. The author of the Ath. Pol. explains this 
by positing that the laws were left deliberately obscure in order to give a broader swath of
power to the people, but interjects on his own behalf that this was an accidental 
byproduct, and one of the reasons that Solon left Athens (Ath. Pol. 9.1). The following 
chapters are more or less a summation of Solon's activities, depicting him as a paradigm 
of the ideal statesman. However, the basis for this evaluation is mostly the author of the 
Ath. Pol. 's interpolated comments denying the radical nature of the reforms based on the 
evaluation of Solon's character as determined from his poetry. This suggests perhaps a 
pro-democratic source that the Ath. Pol. modifies in order to make Solon's activities more
in accordance with his own views.237 We see therefore that the near-universal acceptance 
of Solon's moderation is problematic and relies heavily on commentary on his reforms, 
much of which stems from his own explanations of his motives, only preserved in 
fragmentary verse form. If we put aside the Ath. Pol. 's commentary, or "corrections," we 
get a picture that is far less moderate than history would have us believe. 
The other major source on Solon's political activities and democratic bent is 
235. For this view, see Jacoby (1949: . For a summary of the debate through 1994, see McInerney (1994: 
17-37). See also von Fritz & Kapp (1950: 15-16).
236. See Moore (1975: 220-21) for a more detailed discussion of the use of lots pre-and post-Solon. See 
also Adcock (1912: 6 n. 4) on the possibility that the fourth century tradition knew nothing of the use of lots
beginning with Solon. 
237. See Adcock (1912: 6).
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Plutarch in his Life of Solon. Both Plutarch and the Ath. Pol. make extensive use of 
Solon's poems, often quoting them to back up their assertions about his character and 
political agenda.238 Their selections of poems often but not always coincide, and there is 
agreement about the content of most of Solon's reforms. Similarities in the general 
outline and many of the details between Plutarch and the Ath. Pol. suggest that Plutarch 
used the Ath. Pol. as a major source, but the fact that his selection was not identical 
suggests that he also had access to other (often pro-democratic) sources, probably in 
common with the Ath. Pol. and Aristotle himself.239 He does make explicit references to 
Aristotle in several places, so there is no question that Plutarch was familiar with 
Aristotle's works.240 
Plutarch tells us that Solon first gained political prominence as a mediator 
between the Alcmaeonids and the followers of Cylon who had escaped the former's 
illegal slaughter of the latter's associates.241 He next describes the squabbling factions that
Peisistratos later exploited to gain power—the Hillmen, who favored radical democracy, 
the Plainsmen, who favored oligarchy, and the Shoremen, who were moderates. Because 
of the factionalism and the debt problems between rich and poor (Sol. 13.2-3), 
It seemed as if the only way to establish order and end the turmoil was to 
establish a tyranny...But the most and strongest of [the moderate faction] started 
banding together and exhorting one another not to submit to their wrongs, but to 
choose a trustworthy man as their leader, set free the enslaved debtors, 
redistribute the land, and wholly change the constitution.
238. Plutarch assumes that Aristotle wrote the Ath. Pol. 
239. Plutarch draws much more heavily than the Ath. Pol. on the tradition of Solon as sage and wiseman. 
See Adcock (1912: 7-8), on the possibility that Androtion was the major source for both Plutarch and the 
Ath. Pol.; see above p. 83 the possibility of other of the Atthides as sources for Aristotle, his 
contemporaries, and later authors. 
240. Plutarch specifically mentions Aristotle at Sol. 25.1, Them. 10.6, Cim. 10.2, Per. 9.2 and 10.8, and Nic.
2.1. On Plutarch's sources, see Adcock (1912: 7 ff.) and Adcock (1914: 38-40).
241. See ch. 1, p. 7.
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καὶ µόνως ἂν ἐδόκει καταστῆναι καὶ παύσασθαι ταραττοµένη τυραννίδος 
γενοµένης...οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι καὶ ῥωµαλεώτατοι συνίσταντο καὶ παρεκάλουν 
ἀλλήλους µὴ περιορᾶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑλοµένους ἕνα προστάτην ἄνδρα πιστὸν ἀφελέσθαι 
τοὺς ὑπερηµέρους καὶ τὴν γῆν ἀναδάσασθαι καὶ ὅλως µεταστῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν.
We see, however, the same sort of contradiction in Plutarch about Solon's agenda 
that we do in the Ath. Pol. This indicates that Plutarch was also confronted with differing 
accounts of Solon's intentions, and like Aristotle and his associates chose to believe the 
versions that stressed Solon's even-handedness, based on his own writings and assertions.
While the Ath. Pol. perfunctorily reports and summarily dismisses rumors of under-the-
table dealings with his friends in land speculation, Plutarch gives more detail about a 
rumor perpetrated by Phanias the Lesbian that Solon was only able to get enough support 
to enact the seisachtheia by employing a deception (χρησάµενον ἀπάτῃ), by promising 
the poor redistribution of land, and at the same time promising the rich security for their 
debts. Plutarch says that Phanias qualifies this double-dealing by claiming that it was to 
save the city (ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῆς πόλεως), implying a selfless motive for this bit of 
chicanery, which never had more than the smallest chance of success. Plutarch then 
immediately dismisses this claim by citing Solon's assertions in his poetry that he was 
forced only reluctantly into public life (Sol. 14.1-2). 
Another contradiction appears immediately after this, when Plutarch says that 
both the rich and poor chose Solon partly because of his saying, "equality breeds no war."
This suggests that he was chosen as mediator specifically because of his "democratic" 
tendencies. Then Plutarch asserts that citizens of both rich and poor factions, because of 
his ideology of equality, urged him to take a tyranny, going so far as to cite an oracle of 
Apollo encouraging him to take over the state (Sol. 14.3-4). Once more we see hints of a 
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different tradition that is summarily dismissed because Solon's own poetry suggests 
otherwise. Plutarch even reports that some say that his reform was not quite as drastic as 
history has passed down, indicating that he and others were uneasy with the implications 
about the radical nature of the reforms. Plutarch tells us that Androtion claims that Solon 
relieved the poor not by a complete cancellation of debt, but by a reorganization and 
regulation of the currency and interest reduction that would equally benefit rich and 
poor.242 He dismisses this un-democratic notion because "most writers" agreed that the 
seisachtheia was a complete cancellation of debt, and because this interpretation is more 
in line with Solon's own poems, which he then quotes (Sol. 15.4).243 
There is clearly disagreement even in the fourth century about the nature of the 
seisachtheia, which muddies the waters further for modern scholars.244 It has been widely 
claimed that the only reason Androtion could have put forth this explanation was political
bias, to exculpate Solon from implementing a reform as radical as cancelling all debts.245 
Plutarch does the next thing to outright condemnation of the cancellation of debt when he
credits the Athenians for being the first to come up with euphemisms for offensive things 
(τὰς τῶν πραγµάτων δυσχερείας), telling us that the seisachtheia was the first of these 
circumlocutions (15.2-3). He admits that Solon, even though he rejected a tyranny, did 
not administer affairs in a "mild" manner, but, "as he himself says, he accomplished those
242. Kraay (1968: 9) condemns the account of Androtion quite forcibly, saying that it makes "economic 
nonsense," and that Aristotle's account (and therefore the versions of everyone following him) is clear and 
consistent. 
243. Androtion, FGrH 324 F 34. See also Ath. Pol. 10.1.
244. For a comprehensive bibliography of this debate, see Kraft 1959: 21 n 1. See also Kraay 1968:9 and 
Harding 1974: 281-83.
245. Jacoby, FGrH 3b Suppl. 1.145 claims that "this interpretation absolves Solon from the revolutionary 
measure of a confiscation of property, a menacing idea which alarmed the bourgeosie of the fourth century. 
The precedent in their own history had to be eliminated." On Androtion and the seisachtheia, see also Day 
& Chambers (1962: 76) and Harding (1994: 129-33, 46-53, and 68).
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matters in which he hoped to find them open to persuasion or susceptible to compulsion, 
joining both force and justice" (Sol. 15.2; ἃ δὲ καὶ λέγων ἤλπιζε πειθοµένοις καὶ 
προσάγων ἀνάγκην ὑποµένουσι χρήσασθαι, ταῦτ᾽ ἔπραττεν, ὥς φησιν αὐτός, ὁµοῦ βίην 
τε καὶ δίκην συναρµόσας).246 This seems to be at odds with his statements elsewhere, in 
which he says that Solon worked for the good of both rich and poor as a moderate 
politician, with no hint of the use of violence. Further, the means by which he was able to
compel the populace is unclear, though Solon does refer to a κέντρον, or "goad" in fr. 36, 
which implies that he had the ability to use force if he had desired.247 I suggest that the 
reason for Plutarch's confusion and contradiction of Androtion's version, which would 
have fit the mold of the moderate version of Solon's character, was exactly what he said it
was: the fact that the tradition of debt cancellation was too pervasive among the sources 
to deny (15.2-3). We have already seen that Plutarch and other sources contain many 
contradictions about Solon's actions and motives; this is yet another example of our 
sources manipulating the facts to fit their preconceived narrative about Solon.248 
We see the same rumor that Solon told his close associates about his plans to 
cancel debts that we read in the Ath. Pol., but Plutarch puts a very different, though no 
less exonerating, spin on it. Whereas Aristotle reports the rumor that Solon deliberately 
leaked the information about the forthcoming law about debt cancellation and dismisses it
based on knowledge of his character, Plutarch says that he was betrayed by his friends 
who took unfair advantage of him when he came to them for advice. When this brought 
him into bad odor with the people, he immediately demonstrated his integrity by being 
246. Solon fr. 36.14. On Solon's combination of βίη and δίκη see ch. 4, p. 113-119.
247. On this fragment and the implications of the imagery of a κέντρον on the populace, see ch. 4, p. 118.
248. See above p. 17 on the ways in which ancient authors contradict themselves in these ways. 
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the first to cancel debts owed to himself, in accordance with his new law (Sol. 15.7):249
One of the most striking and prevalent inconsistencies is Plutarch's inability to 
decide whether Solon was on the side of the rich, the poor, or those whose wealth put 
them in the middle. In his first description of the civil stasis he states unequivocally that 
the poor were oppressed and rightly discontented, their lives made completely miserable 
and untenable by greedy and unjust (ἀδικία) landowners (Sol. 12-14). Solon was tapped 
as mediator because of his sympathies with the poor. But then in chapter 14 we see a 
different view emerging; that of Solon the moderate who tries to please rich and poor 
alike. It is now the middle class who receives praise. 
This theme alters slightly in chapter 16, where the poor become even more greedy
than the rich. We see a reiteration of Solon's stance against the greed of both the rich and 
the poor, praising instead those of moderate means, which of course satisfies no one 
(16.1). Once more, the "proof" that he refused to gratify either party on principle is 
further citation of his poetry (16.2). Then he complains that if anyone else had been in 
charge, things would have been even more unsatisfactory: "for another would not have | 
restrained or checked the demos | until he had churned the milk and skimmed the cream" 
(Sol. 16.2; οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆµον, οὐδ᾽ ἐπαύσατο, | πρὶν ἀνταράξας, πῖαρ ἐξεῖλεν 
γάλα.)250 
He further castigates the demos in his discussion of the Areopagus council and the
formation of the boule of 400. In Plutarch's explanation, the Areopagus was not enough 
to contain the boldness of the people after their release from debt, so he created the 
249. See ch. 2, p. 62 about the lawgiver's mandatory adherence to his own laws.
250. Ad loc. Ath. Pol. 12.5 = Sol. fr. 34. See ch. 5, p. 176 on the violence associated with the metaphor of 
"churning the milk and skimming the cream."
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council of 400 to oversee legislation before it was introduced to the assembly and thus 
control what measures which the demos could vote on. This seems to be of a distinctly 
different character from his original assertion that the people were justly unhappy and 
suffering. He now switches to a rather anti-democratic condemnation of the pride and 
discontent of the poor, instead sympathizing with the rich, not even employing the 
moderation of the µεσότης standpoint. 
While Plutarch tells us that the Areopagus and the council of 400 were created as 
a check on the demos (Sol. 19), he asserts in the very next sentence that the Areopagus 
and council are meant to guard and uphold the constitution.251 This indicates an uneasy 
co-existence of two sources—one democratic, which makes Solon appoint the Areopagus
to help the fledgling constitution that eventually becomes the democracy survive, and the 
other source, which has Solon as the µεσότης, who helps the people by taking away debt, 
but also restrains their boldness by taking measures to prevent their access to every piece 
of legislation.
I. Solon as an Authority Figure in Fourth-Century Oratory
Beginning in the late fifth century, Solon became a figure of appeal for questions 
ranging from politics to morality to digestive ailments.252 We especially see this sort of 
allure in the figure of Solon as a catch-all authority figure in the orators of the fourth 
century. For them, Solon became a referee on questions of morality, which by this time 
was equated to democracy. Not only did the orators use him as a generic democrat, they 
251. Cf. Ath. Pol. 8.4.; see also Adcock (1912: 11-12).
252. Engels (2010: 113) discusses a late third century AD Roman wall painting from the Termi dei Sette 
Sapienti at Ostia depicting all seven of the sages, with advice from each on various intestinal issues. Under 
a picture of Solon, we find the following advice for those suffering from constipation, Ut bene cacaret 
ventrem palpavit Solon. 
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used his character as evidence for whatever they were arguing, sometimes in direct 
opposition to one another, and at other times with only tangential relevance to the case at 
hand. Thus we see the same sorts of contradictions in forensic oratory of the fourth 
century as we do with Aristotle, the Ath. Pol., and Plutarch.
a. Solon, Demosthenes, and Aeschines
Demosthenes in particular frequently uses Solon as precedent for everything from
traditional morality to democracy to divine intention. For example, in Against Leptines, 
he says that whoever does not follow or appreciate the laws of Solon is not a patriot 
(20.103). He further comments on the democratic nature of Solon's laws in Against 
Eubulides (57.32), and castigates the prosecutor for violating Solon's law against 
idleness.253 In fact, in most of the cases in which he cites Solon, democracy and good 
morals are inseparable. For instance, in Against Androtion, he solicits Solon's authority 
for the framing of the current constitution, which he frequently touts as democratic. 
Solon, he argues, had the best interests of everyone in mind, and framed his laws so that 
the common man would not be bamboozled out of a share in government, whereas he 
accuses Androtion of bias in his legislation (22.25). 
He uses the same tactic against Timocrates, by accusing him of being the 
antithesis of Solon in his legislative activities, since he gives impunity to offenders of the 
type that Solon deemed worthy of punishment (24.103-106; 113-115). He blasts corrupt 
253. Herodotus tells us that Solon took over an Egyptian law requiring all citizens to prove that they had 
means of earning a living, on pain of execution. Herodotus praises this law, calling it "faultless" and 
recommending that the Athenians take up the practice (2.177.2). Plutarch attributes to Solon a slightly less 
harsh version of this ordinance, saying that Solon instituted a law freeing sons who had not been taught a 
trade as well as sons born out of wedlock from supporting their fathers, and saying that Solon decreed that 
the Areopagus was to examine every man's means of livelihood and punish those who had no work (Sol. 
22.1-4). But later he cites Theophrastus, who tells us that it was Peisistratos and not Solon who enacted the 
law (Sol. 31.2). For a detailed description of the ancient evidence on this law, see Stroud (1968: 79-80).
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politicians who arbitrarily repeal the tried-and-true laws of Solon in order to obey their 
own, which are detrimental to the democracy (24.142). A bit later he makes the point that 
if you are justified in praising Solon, you are obligated to despise men like Timocrates 
(24.211). He further explicitly equates Solon with democracy in On the Crown, when he 
praises the laws which were first framed by Solon, a good democrat and friend of the 
people (18.6):
[The trial] being about these things, I implore and beseech all of you to listen 
fairly to my defence concerning these charges, just as the laws command—those 
laws which Solon originally set down, who, being well-disposed toward you and a
friend to the people, thought essential to validate, not only by writing them down 
but by the oath of you who are judging... 
περὶ τούτων δ᾽ ὄντος τουτουὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀξιῶ καὶ δέοµαι πάντων ὁµοίως ὑµῶν 
ἀκοῦσαί µου περὶ τῶν κατηγορηµένων ἀπολογουµένου δικαίως, ὥσπερ οἱ νόµοι 
κελεύουσιν, οὓς ὁ τιθεὶς ἐξ ἀρχῆς Σόλων, εὔνους ὢν ὑµῖν καὶ δηµοτικός, οὐ 
µόνον τῷ γράψαι κυρίους ᾤετο δεῖν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τοὺς δικάζοντας 
ὀµωµοκέναι...
Further proof of Solon's flexibility as a rhetorical device comes from instances 
where he was invoked by two parties arguing against each other. Aeschines, for example, 
in a speech against Ctesiphon, a client of Demosthenes, dramatically implored the jury to 
imagine Solon himself standing on the speaker's platform. They were to picture that 
philosopher and good lawgiver (ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον καὶ νοµοθέτην ἀγαθόν), the very man 
who equipped the democracy with the best laws, and not hold the words of his archrival 
Demosthenes as of more weight than the laws of Solon (3.257). 
Conversely, Demosthenes in On the False Embassy lambasts Aeschines for 
talking about the calm demeanor of a statue of Solon as evidence of the restraint and 
dignity exercised by the great orators of old, while asserting that Aeschines' character 
could not be further from the great lawgiver's. He remarks on the audacity of the man to 
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bring up Solon, who helped the Athenians defeat Salamis with his clever ploys, while 
contrasting Solon's deeds with Aeschines' part in the loss of Amphipolis to Philip II, 
allegedly because Philip II had bribed him (19. 252-4).254 He even calls for a reading of 
some of Solon's elegiac verses to demonstrate how much Solon hated people like 
Aeschines. 
Demosthenes further demonstrates the haphazard manner in which he uses Solon, 
cherry-picking whatever aspect of Solon's character suits his purpose, in his Erotic Essay 
(61.49-50): 
...Solon, both living and dead, was deemed worthy of the highest glory. He was not 
disqualified for the other honors but left behind him a memorial of his courage in 
the trophy of victory over the Megarians, of his cunning in the recovery of Salamis, 
and of general wisdom in the laws which most Greeks use to this day. Yet in spite of
these great claims to distinction he set his heart upon nothing as much as becoming 
one of the seven sages, believing that philosophy was no reproach, but brought 
honor to those who pursued it, being no less wise in this very judgement than in the 
others in which he showed himself superior.255 
Σόλωνα δὲ καὶ ζῶντα καὶ τελευτήσαντα µεγίστης δόξης ἠξιωµένον: ὃς οὐκ 
ἀπεληλαµένος τῶν ἄλλων τιµῶν, ἀλλὰ τῆς µὲν ἀνδρείας τὸ πρὸς Μεγαρέας 
τρόπαιον ὑπόµνηµα καταλιπών, τῆς δ᾽ εὐβουλίας τὴν Σαλαµῖνος κοµιδήν, τῆς δ᾽ 
ἄλλης συνέσεως τοὺς νόµους, οἷς ἔτι καὶ νῦν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων χρώµενοι 
διατελοῦσιν, ὅµως τοσούτων αὐτῷ καλῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἐπ᾽ οὐδενὶ µᾶλλον 
ἐσπούδασεν ἢ τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφιστῶν ὅπως γένηται, νοµίζων τὴν φιλοσοφίαν οὐκ 
ὄνειδος, ἀλλὰ τιµὴν τοῖς χρωµένοις φέρειν, καλῶς ἐγνωκὼς αὐτὸ τοῦτ᾽ οὐχ ἧττον ἢ 
καὶ τἄλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ οἷς διήνεγκεν.
In this passage Demosthenes lauds Solon as a military hero and a lawmaker, but claims 
that his greatest goal was to become a philosopher. This pretty much covers any area of 
254. Demosthenes refers here to Aeschines' invocation of Solon in the speech Against Timarchus (Aesch. 
1.25).
255. See Pelling (2006: 104-05) on the inseparability of the moral and the political sphere particularly in 
Herodotus' episode of Solon and Croesus. Rather, Herodotus and other authors use particular political 
issues to demonstrate the correct moral stance to take on issues such as tyranny, free choice, or divine 
necessity. See also Dodds (1973: 45) and MacLeod (1983: 28-29), discussing similar themes in the 
Oresteia. 
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excellence one could wish for—Solon was a polymath who encompassed every virtue, 
and can therefore be cited as an authority for any sort of intellectual, political, or moral 
endeavor. 
In Against Macartatus, Demosthenes even compares Solon to the god Apollo when 
he claims that the law of Solon concerning relatives uses the same wording as an oracle 
of Delphi. This is in context of Theopompus and Macartatus' theft: these men do not obey
the laws of Solon, which are identical to the pronouncement of the god; therefore they are
defying the god by refusing to acknowledge Solon's authority (43.62-67). Further 
association of Solon with the divine occurs in Against Phaenippus, when Demosthenes in
the same sentence invokes a blessing on the jury members and upon Solon, who was 
responsible for the law on which the jury would be deliberating (42.1). He frequently 
slanders his opponents' morals because they engage in behavior that runs contrary to 
Solon's laws, which have become inseparable from his values. Aeschines similarly 
conflates laws with morals in Against Timarchus, and invokes Solon and Drakon, who 
legislated the steps to be taken at each age to ensure that children grew up well, who 
entrusted the Athenians to care for their laws as they did their children (1.16-17).
 b. Solon and Isocrates
Isocrates is even more explicit about Solon's connection to democracy.256 In the 
Antidosis he puts Solon as the chief of a list of great orators who brought the city 
prosperity. He gives him credit for setting up a government and legal code, such that 
"even now Athens is well satisfied with the institutions that he established" (15.232; ὥστ᾽
256. de Blois (2006: 28) notes the tendency of Isocrates and other orators to invoke Solon's verses to depict
him as a "benevolent aristocrat who supported the people but did not give them real power." 
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ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀγαπᾶσθαι τὴν διοίκησιν τὴν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου συνταχθεῖσαν). This seems to 
indicate that Isocrates is equating the democracy of his time with Solon, yet in the very 
same sentence he gives Cleisthenes credit for establishing "that same democracy to which
the cause of Hellas owes its greatest good" (τὴν δηµοκρατίαν ἐκείνην κατέστησετὴν 
αἰτίαν τοῖς Ἕλλησι τῶν µεγίστων ἀγαθῶν γενοµένην). This sort of confusion and 
inconsistency is a strong indication that Solon and Cleisthenes are figureheads, almost 
mythical precedents so strongly associated with democracy and morality that their very 
names lend authority to any argument, regardless of its internal consistency. 
We see the same confusion in the Areopagiticus, where Isocrates gives 
Cleisthenes credit for restoring the democracy that Solon originated. Indeed, those who 
lived under Solon's constitution "performed many worthy deeds, won the admiration of 
all mankind, and took their place, by the common consent of the Hellenes, as the leading 
power of Hellas (7.17; πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ διαπραξάµενοι καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις 
εὐδοκιµήσαντες, παρ᾽ ἑκόντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν ἡγεµονίαν ἔλαβον). Later in the same 
speech he answers the charge of trying to incite insurrection (νεωτέρων) by claiming that 
he is merely advocating a return to the ancestral (Solonian) constitution, which was 
established by impeccable democrats, and it is therefore absurd to accuse Isocrates of 
favoring revolution (7.59). Isocrates clearly uses Solon as a figure of stature to be 
summoned when needed to lend weight to statements about the good of democracy, 
whatever the context; however, his assertions are inconsistent from speech to speech. For 
instance, while in the aforementioned example, he uses Solon as a model for solving civil
strife, in the Panathenaicus he condemns debt cancellation and land redistributions as 
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being symptoms of stasis.257 
Isocrates uses the same sort of appeal to Solon as a moral authority in the 
Antidosis when defending himself against charges of corruption of youth through 
sophistry. His defense is that Solon himself was a sophist. Since the name of sophist is 
being dishonored by this trial, by extension the Athenians are dishonoring Solon by trying
Isocrates (15.235). Further, he says that their ancestors admired sophists and envied their 
students, so much as to put one (Solon) at the head of the state (15.313), also naming 
Pericles and Themistocles as venerable sophists. The obvious implication is that since 
Solon was both sophist and head of state, the prosecution was not only irrational but 
immoral to try him, a man who took after Solon. Clearly, Isocrates is here using the terms
"sophist" and "philosopher" interchangeably, despite the very different implications the 
two terms have elsewhere, particularly in the dialogues of Plato. Lysias uses Solon in a 
similar manner. In Against Nicomachus, he accuses Nicomachus of overstepping the 
bounds of his commission to restore the law code of Solon, extending his original four-
month term to six years. The bulk of Lysias' argument is that Nicomachus corrupted the 
laws of Solon, who was chosen along with Themistocles and Pericles because their laws 
would be in accordance with their good characters. He lists the breaking of these laws in 
the same context of dishonorable activities like cowardice in warfare, embezzling, and 
ignoring civic obligations. He ends by comparing the wisdom of the jury's ancestors in 
choosing as lawgivers Solon, Pericles, and Themistocles, men who were instrumental in 
fashioning the democracy, as opposed to their own corruption by choosing a moral 
reprobate like Nicomachus to set down laws inferior to those of the lawgivers of old 
257. Rosivach (1992: 154).
96
(30.26-28).258
c. Solon and Plato
One of the best and clearest examples of the blending of myth, history, literature, 
and politics in an appeal to Solon as an authority figure is in Plato's Timaeus. Plato 
recognizes the prevalence of oral history and the manner in which it passes down through
the ages, yet criticizes this practice even while indulging in it. In his Timaeus, he has 
Critias verify the authenticity of a story of Solon visiting priests in Egypt by claiming that
he had the story from his grandfather, who had it from his father, who had it from his 
friend Solon, who was a famous wiseman and one whose word could be trusted 
(20d-20e): 
Listen, Socrates, to a tale which, though strange, is certainly true, as it was 
attested by Solon, the wisest of the seven sages. He was a relative and bosom 
friend of my great-grandfather, Dropides, as he himself says many times in his 
poems; and he told the story to Critias, my grandfather, who remembered and told
it to us. 
ἄκουε δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, λόγου µάλα µὲν ἀτόπου, παντάπασί γε µὴν ἀληθοῦς, ὡς ὁ 
τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφώτατος Σόλων ποτ᾽ ἔφη. ἦν µὲν οὖν οἰκεῖος καὶ σφόδρα φίλος ἡµῖν 
Δρωπίδου τοῦ προπάππου, καθάπερ λέγει πολλαχοῦ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ ποιήσει: πρὸς
δὲ Κριτίαν τὸν ἡµέτερον πάππον εἶπεν, ὡς ἀπεµνηµόνευεν αὖ πρὸς ἡµᾶς...
This convoluted fourth or fifth-hand "proof" of authenticity, substantiated by tying a story
to a famous character sometimes only peripherally related to the events being discussed, 
is characteristic of oral history and a common manner of adding credibility to even far-
fetched happenings.259 Critias goes on to bolster Solon's (and thereby his grandfather's 
and great-grandfather's) reliability by praising his reputation as a poet. He recalls the 
258. On Lysias' treatment of Nicomachus, see Bers (1975: 494-95) and Carawan (2010: 71-95).
259. See generally Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983), Hobsbawm (1983: 1-9), Thomas (1989: 13), Strauss 
(1993: 58-99, 181-2), Hobsbawm (1997: 11), and Shear (2011: 11-15).
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boys' poetry recitations at the Apaturia festival, where he and other youths recited poems 
of Solon. One of the audience members judged that Solon was both the wisest of men and
the noblest of poets (21c).260 Critias' great-grandfather agreed, and added that if Solon had
been only a poet instead of a statesman, he could have been a second Homer. Therefore 
Solon's reputation as a sage is bolstered by his skill as a poet, and vice versa.261
What follows is a remarkable piece of perfectly circular reasoning on the 
credibility of Critias' story. Critias relates Solon's tale of the Egyptian priests chiding him 
because the most ancient tales of the Greeks are but a drop in the bucket compared to the 
antiquity of the stories recorded by the Egyptians, which have been entrusted to the 
priestly class (23b). 
It leaves you and other nations without refinement, so that you become like a 
baby, knowing nothing of what happened either in ancient times or now, in your 
land or any other. As for those genealogies of yours which you just now recounted
to us, Solon, concerning your countrymen, they are no better than the tales of 
children...
τε καὶ ἀµούσους ἔλιπεν ὑµῶν, ὥστε πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἷον νέοι γίγνεσθε, οὐδὲν 
εἰδότες οὔτε τῶν τῇδε οὔτε τῶν παρ᾽ ὑµῖν, ὅσα ἦν ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς χρόνοις. τὰ 
γοῦν νυνδὴ γενεαλογηθέντα, ὦ Σόλων, περὶ τῶν παρ᾽ ὑµῖν ἃ διῆλθες, παίδων 
βραχύ τι διαφέρει µύθων...
260. At first this may seem to contradict Plato's position on poetry in the Ion and books 2, 3, and 10 of the 
Republic, but Plato (via Socrates) mainly addresses epic and deceptions perpetrated by poets that distract 
listeners from knowing the truth about a virtuous and moderate lifestyle. We read in Proclus' Timaeus, 
however, that Solon was an exception because he was not a "popular" poet, but blended philosophy with 
composition (1.90). In the Gorgias, where rhetoric is cast as a species of poetry, Plato (again via Socrates) 
defends philosophy as a discipline from the diatribe of Callicles the sophist (486a-492c). The ultimate 
question here for Socrates is how one should live one's life, a question that the poems of Solon address 
extensively (500c). Socrates even qualifies his critique of sophistry/poetry when he specifies the existence 
of a noble form of rhetoric (503a-b). He elaborates on this good form of rhetoric in the Phaedrus, where he 
draws sharp distinctions between form and content of discourse (235a). It becomes obvious in the Palinode 
that, according to Plato, in order for rhetoric or poetry to be good, the poet must be a philosopher, like 
Solon (270c1-2).
261. Critias' praise of Solon, whose reputation as a misotyrannos is firmly cemented at this point in time, is 
somewhat ironic, since Critias was one of the reviled Thirty Tyrants who were ousted from power by the 
Athenians in 404. In fact Critias' association with Socrates did nothing to endear him to the Athenian public
and likely contributed to the latter's condemnation and death sentence. 
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They proceed to inform Solon that the ancient story of the great deluge and the survival 
of Deucalion and Pyrrha was just the tip of the iceberg. In fact, there had been many 
deluges and recoveries before that of Deucalion and Pyrrha, but the Greeks as a race were
too young a race to remember and pass that information on. Indeed, they did not even 
remember the great deeds of their ancestors, who were responsible for repelling an 
invasion of the citizens of the lost city of Atlantis (Tim. 24d-25d).
This puts the story even further removed from the present day, while at the same 
time shoring up its credibility even more. He makes the argument that the story of 
Atlantis and the great deeds of the Athenians before either recorded or mythical history is
true because Solon said so. Solon was the source of the story of Atlantis from which 
Critias the Elder passed it down to his great-grandson, yet the story is confirmation of the
fact that Solon, the wisest of the Athenians, is ignorant of history. Solon therefore 
confirms the truth of a story which proves that he does not know the truth, an argument 
which is further muddied when we consider the reputation of the Egyptians as being 
untrustworthy and devious.262 A further consideration in Plato's "proof" of the authenticity
of this story is that he is using a historical figure (Solon) to authenticate a story that was 
widely held to be false. Posidonius, quoted by Strabo 2.3.6, compares the story of 
Atlantis to the building of the Greek wall in Homer, saying, "He who invented it 
obliterated it, like the poet in the case of the Achaean wall."
Plato then more directly and blatantly uses Solon to give weight to his theories 
and present them as infallible later in the dialogue when Critias marvels that Plato's 
discourse of the previous day on the perfect form of a city-state agrees in every particular 
262. On the Athenian perception of Egyptians as being untrustworthy, see Tarrant 2007: 66-67. 
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with the tale of Solon. Plato's own analysis and suggestion is thus given more weight 
because it has the backing of Solon, who is neither present nor alive, though again his 
authority is invoked third-hand from Critias' great-grandfather (Tim. 25e). Then, when 
Critias proposes to Socrates the order of the dialogue which is to follow, he again gives 
authority to Socrates via Solon. He explains that Timaeus is to expound on primeval man,
and that he himself will tackle modern man (27a-27b), 
...some of whom will have profited by the excellent education which you have 
given them; and then, in accordance with the tale of Solon, and with his law, we 
will bring them into court and make them citizens, as if they were those very 
Athenians whom the sacred Egyptian record has recovered from obscurity, and 
then we will speak of them as Athenians and fellow citizens. 
παρὰ σοῦ δὲ πεπαιδευµένους διαφερόντως αὐτῶν τινας, κατὰ δὲ τὸν Σόλωνος 
λόγον τε καὶ νόµον εἰσαγαγόντα αὐτοὺς ὡς εἰς δικαστὰς ἡµᾶς ποιῆσαι πολίτας 
τῆς πόλεως τῆσδε ὡς ὄντας τοὺς τότε Ἀθηναίους, οὓς ἐµήνυσεν ἀφανεῖς ὄντας ἡ 
τῶν ἱερῶν γραµµάτων φήµη, τὰ λοιπὰ δὲ ὡς περὶ πολιτῶν καὶ Ἀθηναίων ὄντων 
ἤδη ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους.
Plato uses each aspect of Solon's character and legacy to give credence both to his 
stories about the past and his political analysis of the perfect state. He then melds them 
together in a seamless fashion, progressing from mythology to history without a break. 
Solon the wiseman is Solon the poet, who is Solon the politician.263 Solon the sage 
verifies the original premise that the Greeks have incomplete knowledge and lack 
antiquity in their histories. Solon's wisdom fueled his poetry, which would have placed 
him among the great bards had he devoted his time to writing rather than politics, yet his 
poetry is the medium by which he explains his political program. Finally Solon the 
politician corroborates Plato's own platform of civic reforms because the lawgiver 
263. On connections between Solon's laws and his poetry, see Yunis (1996: 223-24), Raaflaub (1993: 
68-73), and Hansen (1989: 71-99). This attitude is also reflected in Ath. Pol. 5-12; Plut. Solon. 
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thought of them first. We see a similar treatment of Solon in Plato's Phaedrus, where he 
details the ideal characteristics of discourse and instruction (274b-277c). He differentiates
between speechwriters, poets, and politicians/lawgivers.264 His examples for each 
category are Lysias, Homer, and Solon, but he qualifies these examples by saying that 
writers such as these who fulfill the requirements of the universal techne of discourse 
ought not to be so pigeonholed by genre, but deserve the more generic title of 
philosopher.265
II. Conclusion
Even though he did not actually pass the package of reforms that led directly to 
the radical democracy, in the literature of the fourth century and later, democracy as 
constituted by Solon became equated with morality, and his stature as a poet and 
philosopher contributed to his fitness as a legislator. Further, he engaged in many 
activities that are distinctly oligarchical, yet somehow became part of his reputation as a 
democrat and/or a moderate politician whose reforms were only accidentally responsible 
for the democracy, based exclusively on self-justification from his own poetry.266 We see 
strong evidence via contradictions in our sources that an alternate tradition existed. This 
other strand of narrative suggests that Solon had far less moderate and democratically 
minded motives than history has handed down to us. Whether true or not, this tradition 
was suppressed in later literature because the triumph of democracy made Solon as 
264. Plato nevertheless explicitly models his ideal lawgiver on Solon, in particular with regards to his ten 
years of travel after implementing his law code. Ker (2000: 326) notes, “His theoria turned out instead to 
be a mode of absence from the city according to which both he and the citizens were bound to a religious 
observance of the unchangeability of the new nomoi”.
265. See further Yunis (1996: 180). 
266. On Aristotle's view of Solon as a moderate who only accidentally passed reforms that led to 
democracy, as opposed to a fully fledged democrat, see above p. 79.
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anything other than the tyrant-hating father of democracy unacceptable. 
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Chapter 4
Politics and Poetry: Solon and the "Language of Tyranny"
Chapters 2 and 3 examined remnants in our literary tradition alluding to stories 
about Solon's activities and relations with tyrants that would have appeared questionable 
to democratic partisans. Here we shall examine the same sorts of intimations that appear 
in Solon's own writing, including the very poems in which he vehemently and overtly 
denies any connection with tyranny. This chapter will demonstrate that the poetic 
language Solon uses to describe political concepts as well as his own motives suggests a 
similarity to the way contemporary tyrants in other parts of Greece solved problems of 
stasis in their own states.267 I argue that Solon's poetry was a platform for reinforcing the 
notion that he was working in the best interests of all strata of society, while at the same 
time suggesting that he alone was qualified to solve the civil crisis by means of the 
extraordinary powers that had been voted to him. At the same time, though, he had to be 
very careful to avoid the label of tyrant, lest he be tarred with the same brush as the 
would-be usurper Cylon—from whose attempted tyranny the need for a diallektes partly 
arose in the first place.268 
Many studies of archaic poetry focus on either the political developments of the 
seventh and sixth centuries that led to the so-called "rise of the polis," or comparison with
the epic poetry that in turn colored interpretations of elegy as a developing genre.269 This 
picture of the evolution of the polis went hand in hand with a perceived literary turn away
267. See Irwin (2005: 206), esp. n. 2.
268. See ch. 1, pp. 7-9.
269. On elegy as a reflection of the rise of the polis, see Nagy (1990: , Raaflaub (1993: 41-105) and (1993),
and Davies (1997: 24-48). 
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from the all-important values of arete so vital to Homeric heroes. Rather than 
descriptions of the aristeia of individual warriors seen in the Iliad, martial poets like 
Tyrtaeus exhorted the citizen hoplite soldier, who fought in a phalanx that depended on 
fellow citizens for success, to feats of bravery in battle.270 As such, Solon's political and 
didactic poetry rests uneasily in this tradition, at some times seeming to fit into the 
tradition of martial exhortation found in epic poetry, and at others falling into a somewhat
disorganized justification of the motives behind his political reforms, bespeaking a sort of
nebulous bridge between epic and archaic lyric.271 Scholars often saw Solon's main 
literary contribution as being an indication of an intermediate phase between the 
"Homeric ethos" and the more abstract, civic-minded philosophy of the fifth century.272 
As mentioned in the introduction, scholars thought that the real value of Solon's poems 
was as a source for the development of Athenian law and law codes more generally, 
rather than as a valuable literary endeavor like those of Alcaeus, Archilochus, or other 
poets.273 However, this interpretation does not take into account the political complexities 
of archaic politics, a fact that is being recognized more and more in modern 
scholarship.274 In 1964, K. J. Dover first challenged this simple picture of a literary 
parallel to the rise of the polis reflected in lyric poetry, describing ways in which poetry 
was an effective means of espousing political agendas, with special reference to 
270. See Gerber (1997: 102-07) and Adkins (1985: 67-92).
271. Fowler (1987: 30) cautions against expressions of generic sentiments and phrases being misinterpreted
as direct allusion.
272. As formulated by Jaeger (1966) and Snell (1982). 
273. Ch. 1, p. 25-26.
274. As Irwin (2005: 6) notes, "Historical developments so visible from a diachronic perspective often 
provide too crude a basis to contribute to finer interpretations of the poems themselves or their interaction 
with their contemporary context."
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Archilochus.275 
Archilochus was not alone in using poetry to make political statements. While 
Solon is unique in that both his own poetry and external writings about his life and 
reforms have survived, various contemporary tyrants also composed poetry. The writings 
of Pittacus, Periander, and Cleobulus (to name a few) are not preserved, but Diogenes 
Laertius credits these tyrant-poets with similar subject matter and many of the same 
themes as the laws and poems of Solon. Pittacus, for example, wrote poetry on prudence, 
hard work, the supremacy of law, and the need to accept one's lot in life.276 Cleobulus 
focused on marriage, education, industry versus laziness, exhortations to virtue, justice, 
household management, proper conduct for the prosperous and the poor, and the folly of 
hubris.277 Perian der wrote a 2,000-line didactic poem, part of which explicitly outlined 
proper behavior for tyrants. He said that tyrants should concentrate on making citizens 
loyal through benevolence rather than threats, noting that it was just as dangerous to be 
dispossessed by force as to retire of one's own accord, calling to mind Solon's (possibly 
involuntary) theoria. Periander further cautioned against greed, rashness, and the 
transience of wealth.278
Perhaps most interestingly, according to Diogenes, Periander admitted that 
democracy was better than tyranny, though this is probably the same sort of retroactive 
attribution of democratic tendencies that we see happening with Solon.279 West even 
275. Dover (1964: 181-212).
276. Diog. Laert. 1.78.
277. Diog. Laert. 1.89-91. Diogenes also describes the literary efforts of Cleobulus' daughter Cleobuline, 
who composed riddles in hexameter that were so well-known that Cratinus named a play after her.
278. Diog. Laert. 1.97.
279. Ibid.
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includes Pittacus and Periander in his corpus of elegiac poets.280 While we do not have a 
source telling us that Peisistratos actually wrote poetry, he is frequently credited with 
introducing the recitation of Homer to the Panathenaic games. Some sources even say 
that he inserted verses into the Iliad giving Athens a presence, if not prominence, in the 
Trojan War.281 Further, Peisistratos' son Hippias supposedly patronized the famous poets 
Anacreon and Simonides. Regardless of the truth of the matter, the persistence of these 
rumors in antiquity proves that the Athenian tyrants' interest in and active involvement 
with poetry was, at the very least, believable. The same argument applies to Hippias' 
patronage of poets, which even the skeptic Davison admits is "at worst not impossible."282
Thus we see a common thread between archaic tyrants and Solon in the way they used 
literature to fashion their own legacies. In Solon's case, it worked particularly well. The 
man we remember is the man he describes in his poetry: philosopher, quasi-martyr, and 
misotyrannos. 
There are several terms in Solon's poetry that are not typical of elegiac and lyric 
poets who did not engage in politics. Solon's use of the words κόρος (satiety or surfeit), 
δίκη (justice), γέρας (award of honor), and κλέος (fame), together with his evocation of 
wolf imagery (λύκος), adds a dimension that is arguably more appropriate when 
considered in light of contemporary or near-contemporary tyrants. By examining his 
poetry in the larger political context of archaic Greece, we will get a clearer picture of his
political program and the strategies by which he proposed to reform the Athenian 
280. West (1972).
281. For a brief and skeptical view, see Slings (2000: 74-76), with bibliography; for the contrary view, see 
Jensen (1980). Davison (1955: 1-21), while arguing against Peisistratid interpolation, gives an excellent 
summary of the ancient and modern authors' arguments for and against up until 1955.
282. Davison (1955: 11).
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constitution, and the reasons that he was so eager to avoid the label of tyrant while 
nevertheless employing the same sorts of reforms common to contemporary archaic 
tyrants.283
I. κόρος: Too Much of a Good Thing?
The word κόρος occurs in epic poetry, often translated as "satiety," or "one's fill."284 
In the seventh century, κόρος had mostly positive implications. We do not find the 
negative meaning of "greed" or "insatiability" until Solon's poetry.285 In epic, Homer and 
Hesiod always associate κόρος with a positive process that has natural limits, and halts 
when those limits are reached.286 Further, in epic as well as in other archaic poetry, the 
word always refers to the satisfaction of physical desires like food, sleep, or material 
comforts, while in Solon (and at times Theognis), acquisition of wealth has no natural 
physiological limits.287 For example, Hesiod in the Theogony (593) complains that 
women are not willing to share "cursed poverty" (οὐλοµένη πενίη) with their men, but are
quite willing to share surfeit or plenty (κόρος). He uses the verb form κορέννυµι in the 
Works and Days in the positive sense of "satisfy, fill up" when describing the pleasure of 
drinking wine while sitting in the shade, once his desire for food has been completely 
satisfied (593; κεκορηµένον ἦτορ ἐδωδῆς). He uses the same word almost identically 
elsewhere when he refers to "being filled" with grain (33), wine (368), and a meal (fr. 
283. For modern criticism about the quality of Solon's poetry, see ch. 1, pp. 25-28.
284. On uses of the word κόρος, see Anhalt (1993: 82 ff.), Balot (2001: 88-93), Mülke (2002: 114), and 
particularly Irwin (2005: 207-20). 
285. Balot (2001: 94) argues that Solon is the first to take the notion of greed out of the realm of the 
individual and place it in the context of politics. On the influence of Solon's notions of greed in later 
political thought, see Balot (2001: 89-90). 
286. E.g., Odysseus speaks of men ceasing warfare once Zeus declares that a surfeit has been reached 
(19.221-224). See Il. 13.633-639, 19.221; Od. 4.102-3. For the use of the word in Homer and Hesiod, see 
Helm (1993: 5-7).
287. Balot (2001: 90). See also Aristotle's discussion of material vs. non-material acquisitiveness (Pol. 
1256b26-1258a14.
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274.2). For Hesiod, it is not κόρος but its opposite, ἀκόρητος, that means "insatiate" or 
"not able to be satisfied." The latter occurs three times, all in the Shield of Herakles, as 
part of the phrase ἀκόρητος ἀυτῆς, "insatiate of the war-cry" (346, 433, 459).288 
Homer also uses both the noun and the verb to describe satisfaction. In the Iliad, the
verb refers to satiety of food and drink (in humans and animals; 8.379, 13.831, 17.241, 
11.562, 16.747, 19.167, 22.509), of work (11.87), of war (13.635), of being confined 
behind the walls of Troy (18.287), and of grief (22.427). The noun only occurs twice, 
referring to sleep, sex, music and dancing (13.636-637), and battle (19.221). We see the 
same uses in the Odyssey, with even more explicit indications that κόρος leads to a 
cessation of a particular activity. The verb form refers to satiety of grief (4.541, 10.449); 
food, music, and wine (8.98, 10.411, 14.28, 14.46, 14.456, 18.372); and contests 
(23.350). Menelaus gives the clearest explanation when he says, "very often as I sit here 
in our palace, I yield my heart to sorrow, and then another time, I cease; for surfeit 
(κόρος) of melancholy lamentation comes swiftly (4.101-103; πολλάκις ἐν µεγάροισι 
καθήµενος ἡµετέροισιν | ἄλλοτε µέν τε γόῳ φρένα τέρποµαι, ἄλλοτε δ᾽ αὖτε | παύοµαι: 
αἰψηρὸς δὲ κόρος κρυεροῖο γόοιο). 
The Homeric Hymns do not contain the noun κόρος, but they do give the same 
connotation to the verb form, κορέννυµι.289 In the Hymn to Demeter (174-175), the 
daughters of Celeus run to invite the disguised goddess home, "as young deer or heifers 
in springtime leap through a meadow, satisfied in their hearts with fodder" (174-175; αἳ 
δ᾽ ὥστ᾽ ἢ ἔλαφοι ἢ πόρτιες εἴαρος ὥρῃ | ἅλλοντ᾽ ἂν λειµῶνα κορεσσάµεναι φρένα 
288. See Anhalt (1993: 82-83).
289. On κόρος in the Homeric Hymns, see Helm (1993: 7).
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φορβῇ). By contrast, in the Hymn to Aphrodite, the adjective ἀκόρητοι negatively 
describes leopards as "insatiable of devouring deer" (71). The universal implication is 
that when a man reaches his κόρος of a thing, he wants no more of it. Conversely, the 
adjective ἀκόρητος is the word connoting the sort of unbridled grasping that Solon 
describes using κόρος in frs. 4, 4c, and 6.290
The first example of the word κόρος in Solon comes from fr. 4. This poem 
addresses the welfare of the polis as a whole, but is sometimes seen as "proof" that Solon 
mostly blames the wealthy for the stasis (as in Ath. Pol. 5.3). After speaking of the 
"unjust mind" of the leading citizens (ἡγεµόνων ἄδικος νόος), Solon explains how the 
hubris of the wealthy will lead to much suffering: "For they do not understand how to 
hold back their satiety, nor how to arrange the present revelry of the feast peacefully" 
(4.9-10; οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παρούσας | εὐφροσύνας κοσµεῖν δαιτὸς 
ἐν ἡσυχίηι). This is the first preserved instance where the word κόρος appears negatively, 
as something that has been pushed beyond its natural limit. Solon here blames the 
wealthy for turning something that should have been joyful (εὐφροσύνη) into a prelude to
disaster because of their greed.291
Solon continues to use the word κόρος in a negative context in fr. 4c: 
You who satisfied yourself of an excess of material goods,
having soothed your strong heart in your chest, 
moderate your over-bearing mind; for we will not
be persuaded, nor will these things turn out right for you. 
ὑµεῖς δ’ ἡσυχάσ̣αντ̣ε̣ς̣ ἐνὶ φ̣ρεσὶ καρτερὸν ἦτορ,
290. For further examples, see Anhalt (1993: 83-85).
291. See Irwin (2005: 209-11). While many commentators have noted Solon's odd negative usage, not 
many have ventured to explain its singularity. See Irwin (2005: 210, esp. n. 15), and Anhalt (1993: 79-95). 
Adkins (1985: 114) merely notes that the word here is "pejorative," with no further comment. See Mülke 
(2002: 114-15) for further bibliography. 
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  οἳ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐς κόρον [ἠ]λ̣άσατε,
ἐν µετρίοισι τί̣θ̣ε̣σ̣θ̣ε µέγαν νόον· οὔτε γὰρ ἡµεῖς
  πεισόµεθ’, οὔθ’ ὑµῖν ἄρτια τα[ῦ]τ̣’ ἔσεται.
And in fr. 6, he specifies that κόρος is the mother of ὕβρις:
Thus the people would best follow their leaders,
not given too much freedom nor bound by too much restraint.
For excess begets ὕβρις, whenever great wealth follows
men whose understanding is unfit. 
δῆµος δ’ ὧδ’ ἂν ἄριστα σὺν ἡγεµόνεσσιν ἕποιτο,
  µήτε λίην ἀνεθεὶς µήτε βιαζόµενος·
τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἕπηται
  ἀνθρώποις ὁπ̣όσοις µὴ νόος ἄρτιος ἦι.292
In these three fragments, Solon's indictments describe a slippery slope: if not even the 
leaders can restrain their κόρος, the demos, which is even less equipped in intellect to 
deal with such excess, has no hope at all of escaping disaster. 
κόρος and ὕβρις are both common words in Homer and Hesiod, but Solon is the 
first to depart from poetic tradition and associate the two in this way. Rather, in Homer, 
ὕβρις is associated with being ἀκόρητος, as in Menelaus' complaint to Zeus about the 
Trojans' fury in battle (Il. 13.633-639):
How you show favor to men filled with ὕβρις, 
to the Trojans, whose ferocity is always reckless, 
who cannot be sated of destructive war!
Of all things there is κόρος, both of sleep and of love,
of sweet song and blameless dancing, 
and of these someone would think there would be more of a desire 
than for war. But the Trojans are insatiable (ἀκόρητοι) of battle! 
οἷον δὴ ἄνδρεσσι χαρίζεαι ὑβριστῇσι
Τρωσίν, τῶν µένος αἰὲν ἀτάσθαλον, οὐδὲ δύνανται
φυλόπιδος κορέσασθαι ὁµοιΐου πτολέµοιο.
πάντων µὲν κόρος ἐστὶ καὶ ὕπνου καὶ φιλότητος
µολπῆς τε γλυκερῆς καὶ ἀµύµονος ὀρχηθµοῖο,
292. These two lines are also attributed to Theognis (Thgn. 1.153).
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τῶν πέρ τις καὶ µᾶλλον ἐέλδεται ἐξ ἔρον εἷναι
ἢ πολέµου· Τρῶες δὲ µάχης ἀκόρητοι ἔασιν.
Notice that ὕβρις is associated with recklessness (ἀτασθαλία) and lack of satiety here. 
Homer here underlines the impropriety of the Trojans' bloodlust with the verb, saying that
they are unable to get their fill (κορέσασθαι) of war, and then emphasizes the point 
further by explaining that any sane person knows when enough is enough and reaches a 
κόρος of all things. The need for moderation is the same idea that appears in Solon's 
poetry, but the use of the word κόρος is almost completely reversed.293 
The next earliest indication of κόρος in the Solonian sense is in Theognis, Solon's 
younger contemporary. Theognis uses the term six times, two of which are doublets of 
Solonian material.294 Like other poets, he uses the verb to mean "to satisfy" (e.g., 1.229, 
2.1249, 2.1269), but agrees with Solon that κόρος produces ὕβρις (1.152). He also claims 
that κόρος is destructive (1.693), even more so than hunger (1.605); he calls it a bane and 
the worst evil for mortals (1.1174-5). But while Theognis criticizes κόρος, he 
distinguishes between κόρος in general and the κόρος associated with affluence, saying 
that "there is κόρος of everything except wealth" (596; πλὴν πλούτου παντὸς χρήµατός 
ἐστι κόρος). Since nothing in the Theognidean corpus demonstrably predates Solon, the 
similar connotations of the word suggest that one or more of the authors of the 
Theognidea was familiar with Solon's poetry.295 At any rate, it is clear that Solon was not 
alone among his contemporaries in his perception about the fine line between satiety and 
insatiability. Whether the idea began with Solon or not, it seems to have come into 
293. Irwin (2005: 213).
294. Thgn. 1.153, 596, 605, 693, 1174, 1175. Of five passages in the Theognidia with double attributions 
with Solon, two deal with κόρος (Thgn. 153-4 = Solon 6.3-4; Thgn. 227-32 = Solon 13.71-76). On the 
transmission of the Theognidean corpus, see ch. 1, p. 25 n. 64.
295. See Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 55-65), with citations.
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existence around the time Solon wrote. Even if this negative notion of κόρος did not 
originate with Solon, it is no stretch to suggest that he at the very least helped promulgate
this reading.296 
After Solon, κόρος retains its negative connotations, rather than reverting to its 
Homeric and Hesiodic usages.297 Pindar nearly always uses it in a negative sense, often 
accompanied by αἰανής ("wearisome," or "heavy").298 Especially evocative of disaster is 
Pindar's description of Tantalus at Olymp. 1.56-57: "Tantalus was unable to digest his 
great good fortune, and with his insolence/arrogance (κόρος) he seized overwhelming 
destruction" (ἦν Τάνταλος οὗτος: ἀλλὰ γὰρ καταπέψαι | µέγαν ὄλβον οὐκ ἐδυνάσθη, 
κόρῳ δ᾽ ἕλεν ἄταν ὑπέροπλον). Herodotus also relates κόρος to ὕβρις in the Solonian 
sense, though his genealogy is reversed, with ὕβρις being the child of κόρος. In an oracle,
he specifies, "Heavenly Justice will quell mighty ὕβρις, son of κόρος, raging terribly, 
intending to devour all things" (8.77; δῖα δίκη σβέσσει κρατερὸν κόρον, ὕβριος υἱόν, | 
δεινὸν µαιµώοντα, δοκεῦντ᾽ ἀνὰ πάντα πίεσθαι). Thus we see that in the fifth century the 
connotation that Solon gives the word, that of insatiability, prevails over the earlier, more 
positive implications that the word generally has in epic. 
Why did this definition change so drastically from the seventh century to the sixth? 
Irwin suggests that the difference lies in the point of view of the one possessing κόρος. It 
is this class perspective that makes Solon's usage unique among archaic poets. He clearly 
296. On the use of κόρος in Theognis, see Anhalt (1993: 90-91). 
297. Tyrtaeus 11.10 and Alcman 1.64-65 seem to adhere to the Homeric usage, but they both predate Solon.
Alcman, however, makes the connection with riches by speaking of the κόρος of purple, a color symbolic 
of wealth, though without the overt and explicit connotation of greed. See Helm (1993: 5-11).
298. See Pyth. 1.82, Nem. 10.20, Isthm. 3.1; Other than Nem. 7.52-53, where the word seems to be neutral 
and imply a limit, Pindar consistently uses the word negatively, as opposed to its use in hexameter poetry. 
For a study of the word κόρος in Pindar, see Mackie (2003: 9-37). 
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sees it as a word denoting rigid social stratification, and the impropriety that he highlights
reflects a view from the lower classes, thus indicating the sort of political debate involved
in what Irwin calls "tyrannical discourse."299 In pre-Solonian usages, a positive meaning 
for κόρος is promulgated by people who possess (or should possess) the κόρος—warriors,
κόρος of battle; farmers, κόρος of work; the bereaved, κόρος of grief; etc. Solon describes
a view of κόρος from below, from those who have no claim to κόρος. From the point of 
view of the have-nots, κόρος is limited to the wealthy, who are then free to commit the 
acts of ὕβρις that Solon describes in his poetry. Those aristocrats who possess κόρος are 
in a position to direct social and political affairs as they see fit. This is a recipe for stasis 
among disaffected elements of society that is consistent with what we know of the 
political unrest that led to Solon's appointment as extraordinary archon, as well as the 
conditions under which tyranny was likely to arise.300 Solon's poetry actively encourages 
this view "from below," which is entirely appropriate within the phenomenon of 
tyranny.301 
II. βίη and δίκη: An Uneasy Alliance?
In poem 36, Solon claims to combine force and justice in carrying out his 
promises to the demos: "I joined force with justice, accomplishing these things with my 
own strength, and I delivered what I promised" (36.15-17; ταῦτα µὲν κράτει | ὁµοῦ βίην 
τε καὶ δίκην ξυναρµόσας | ἔρεξα, καὶ διῆλθον ὡς ὑπεσχόµην). Justice is not an unusual 
topic for archaic poetry; it is especially prominent in Hesiod. But Solon's view of δίκη is 
an unusually violent one. In Hesiod, force and justice are fundamentally opposed 
299. Irwin (2005: 210-11).
300. See ch. 1, pp. 40 ff.
301. Irwin (2005: 218-20).
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concepts. For example, Hesiod cautions Perses, "You, too, pay heed to justice; forget 
violence entirely" (Op. 275; καί νυ δίκης ἐπάκουε, βίης δ’ ἐπιλήθεο πάµπαν). The 
Theogony even gives the two concepts different genealogies. In this work, Βίη and 
Κράτος are the children of Styx (385), while Δίκη is the daughter of Themis and Zeus 
(902).302 
Homer also views βίη negatively, in direct opposition to δίκη. In the so-called 
"Hesiodic simile" of the Iliad, δίκη and βίη stand opposed: "Those who distribute 
crooked judgments by force in the agora and drive out justice, heedless of the vengeance 
of the gods" (16.387-388; οἳ βίῃ εἰν ἀγορῇ σκολιὰς κρίνωσι θέµιστας, | ἐκ δὲ δίκην 
ἐλάσωσι θεῶν ὄπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες). In the Odyssey, βίη is equated with ὕβρις when 
describing the injustices committed by the suitors, "whose ὕβρις and violence reach the 
iron sky" (15.329 = 17.565; τῶν ὕβρις τε βίη τε σιδήρεον οὐρανὸν ἵκει). Βίη also 
describes activities of the suitors that earn Odysseus' revenge (3.216, 11.118, 16.255, 
17.540, 23.31), and represents the behavior of the Cyclops (9.476, 12.210). Even though 
Odysseus' actions are frequently violent, they are never described as βίη; instead, he 
distributes justice. For Hesiod and Homer, βίη and δίκη are opposing concepts, never 
joined in a positive context.303 
Therefore, Solon's claim of "fitting together force with justice" (ὁµοῦ βίην τε καὶ 
δίκην ξυναρµόσας) departs from poetic precedents from which his description of δίκη 
elsewhere draws.304 However, while βίη joined with δίκη is not usually found in poetry 
302. See Irwin (2005: 222) for the presence of βίη vs. δίκη in the Theogony; see also Thgn. 346, 677, 835, 
371, and 651 for juxtaposition of βίη and ὕβρις.
303. For further analysis of these terms in Hesiod and Homer, see Irwin (2005: 221-23).
304. See also Balot (2001: 97-98) on Solon's combination of force with justice.
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prior to Solon, it is often present in narratives about tyrants, who frequently use δίκη as a 
means of winning popularity with the demos and as an effective way of gaining power.305 
Perhaps the foremost example is the story of Deioces in the first book of Herodotus 
(1.96-100).306 Deioces became king at the behest of the people because of his harsh but 
fair judgments, yet his justice remained equitable even after he gained autocratic power. 
Herodotus even tells us that Deioces gained his tyranny because of his reputation for δίκη
(1.96.1-2).307 His entire tyranny was characterized by his penchant for justice, which 
Herodotus tells us was severe, "When he had established his affairs and secured himself 
in the tyranny, he was harsh in guarding justice" (1.100.1; ἐπείτε δὲ ταῦτα διεκόσµησε 
καὶ ἐκράτυνε ἑωυτὸν τῇ τυραννίδι, ἦν τὸ δίκαιον φυλάσσων χαλεπός). While Deiocies is 
described as χαλεπός, rather than as specifically employing βίη, the point remains that, 
not unlike Odysseus, his harshness was part of his justice and was opposed to ὕβρις, 
particularly since the men with whom Deices is harsh are described as ὑβρίζοντα. His 
reputation for being χαλεπός has the same sort of opposition between βίη and ὕβρις that 
is found in the Odyssey. 
We also see a strong association of violence with justice in Herodotus' story of 
Cypselus. Cypselus was the son of Labda, the crippled daughter of a member of the 
Bacchiad family, which was the ruling clan of Corinth at the time. Her father married her 
to a non-Bacchiad, and during her pregnancy, Cypselus' eventual ascendancy as tyrant 
was foretold in a series of oracles. In the first, the Delphic priestess told his father that his
305. See Irwin (2005: 224), Salmon (1997: 32-38), and McGlew (1993: 52-86) on tyrants' associations with
justice. For tyrants' legislative activities more generally, see pp. 146-152 below.
306. For an historical treatment of Dioces, see Bichler (2000: 235-37).
307. On which see McGlew (1993: 67).
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child would be "a stone that will fall on the ruling men and bring justice to Corinth" (Hdt.
5.92.2; ὀλοοίτροχον ἐν δὲ πεσεῖται ἀνδράσι µουνάρχοισι, δικαιώσει δὲ Κόρινθον). The 
second oracle reinforces the association of Cypselus with violence directed against unjust
rulers: "An eagle has conceived in the rocks, and will give birth to a lion, mighty and 
savage, who will weaken the knees of many." (5.93; αἰετὸς ἐν πέτρῃσι κύει, τέξει δὲ 
λέοντα | καρτερὸν ὠµηστήν: πολλῶν δ᾽ ὑπὸ γούνατα λύσει). This implies that Cypselus 
would repair the city-state by punishing it, strongly associating violence with justice.308 
Pausanias describes an interesting visual representation of this concept on the so-called 
Chest of Cypselus at Olympia, on which Δίκη is actually physically beating Ἀδικία 
(5.18.2). Likewise, the oracle predicting the Orthagorid tyranny warns the Sicyonians that
they will be "ruled by a scourge" for a century.309 Plutarch more explicitly relates that 
tyranny to justice, telling us that the gods sent the Orthagorids to punish the Sicyonians 
for the crime of murdering a victor in the Pythian games (Mor. 553a).
Theognis also joins force with justice when speaking of tyrants; in fact, in his 
advice to Cyrnus, just retribution is a central feature of a tyrant's platform. In his 
formulation, the citizens are good, but their hubristic leaders are crooked and in need of 
"straightening" by a powerful leader who will step in and end corruption (38-51):
Cyrnus, this city is pregnant, and I am afraid lest it give birth to a man
who will be a straightener of our wicked ὕβρις. 
For the townsmen are still prudent, but the leaders
are inclined to fall into great wickedness. 
In no way, Cyrnus, do good men destroy the city; 
but whenever it pleases the bad sort to commit ὕβρις 
and they destroy the demos and give justice to unjust men 
for the sake of private gain and power.
308. Ibid.
309. Diod. 8.24.
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Do not expect that city to remain unshaken for very long,
not even if it now lies very much in tranquility,
whenever such things become dear to base men—
that is, the profit coming with public evil.
From this arises stasis, and the slaughter of kinsmen, and monarchs—
May this never be pleasing to the city.
Κύρνε, κύει πόλις ἥδε, δέδοικα δὲ µὴ τέκηι ἄνδρα
  εὐθυντῆρα κακῆς ὕβριος ἡµετέρης.
ἀστοὶ µὲν γὰρ ἔθ’ οἵδε σαόφρονες, ἡγεµόνες δέ 
  τετράφαται πολλὴν εἰς κακότητα πεσεῖν.
οὐδεµίαν πω, Κύρν’, ἀγαθοὶ πόλιν ὤλεσαν ἄνδρες,
  ἀλλ’ ὅταν ὑβρίζειν τοῖσι κακοῖσιν ἅδηι
δῆµόν τε φθείρουσι δίκας τ’ ἀδίκοισι διδοῦσιν
  οἰκείων κερδέων εἵνεκα καὶ κράτεος· 
ἔλπεο µὴ δηρὸν κείνην πόλιν ἀτρεµέ’ ἧσθαι,
  µηδ’ εἰ νῦν κεῖται πολλῆι ἐν ἡσυχίηι,
εὖτ’ ἂν τοῖσι κακοῖσι φίλ’ ἀνδράσι ταῦτα γένηται,
  κέρδεα δηµοσίωι σὺν κακῶι ἐρχόµενα.
ἐκ τῶν γὰρ στάσιές τε καὶ ἔµφυλοι φόνοι ἀνδρῶν· 
  µούναρχοι δὲ πόλει µήποτε τῆιδε ἅδοι.
We have here a clear statement by a contemporary of Solon that the responsibility for the 
immorality and stasis that plagues the city falls on the leaders, the hegemones, not the 
demos. Though Theognis does not use the word "tyrant" to describe the "straightener" 
(εὐθυντῆρες) of ἀδικία, it is unlikely that anyone not possessed of great personal and 
political power would have the influence or ability to implement sweeping changes to the
state, and in fact he does specify that the result of stasis is a sole ruler (µούναρχος), 
whatever title is ultimately attached.310 Thus we confirm that, in Theognis' formulation, 
tyrants/autocrats/monarchs arise as a means of bringing justice for hubristic acts, 
310. Theognis more overtly lambasts tyrants, saying, "Cyrnus, honor and fear the gods, for this keeps a 
man from doing or saying impious things; but to destroy by whatever means possible a tyrant who devours 
the people, is in no way cause for vengeance from the gods" (1179-82 ; Κύρνε, θεοὺς αἰδοῦ καὶ δείδιθι· 
τοῦτο γὰρ ἄνδρα | εἴργει µήθ’ ἕρδειν µήτε λέγειν ἀσεβῆ. | δηµοφάγον δὲ τύραννον ὅπως ἐθέλεις κατακλῖναι
| οὐ νέµεσις πρὸς θεῶν γίνεται οὐδεµία). However, the tyrant to be destroyed is a δηµοφάγον, a "devourer 
of the people," which does not preclude the possibility of good tyrants. See p. 128 below on similar 
qualification of good vs. bad tyrants in Alcaeus. On the shifting terminology describing tyrants, see 
Andrewes (1956: 20-30), Hegy (1965: 303-18), Parker (1998: 145-72), Anderson (2005: 173-210) (who 
actually suggests that tyrants required sanction from the aristocracy), and Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 428-29).
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sometimes by violent means.311
Solon actually describes himself as an εὐθυντήρ immediately after he claims that 
he has joined δίκη and βίη, saying, "I wrote laws for the base and the noble man alike, 
applying straight justice to each" (36.18-20; θεσµοὺς δ’ ὁµοίως τῶι κακῶι τε κἀγαθῶι | 
εὐθεῖαν εἰς ἕκαστον ἁρµόσας δίκην | ἔγραψα). Likewise, in poem 4, he claims that he has
"straightened crooked justice" (4.36; εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς). While δίκη was present 
in both epic and elegy, its combination with βίη would likely have evoked associations 
with tyrants in Solon's audience. Indeed, in the larger context of fr. 36, Solon claims that 
he upheld his promises to the demos, while giving the implicit suggestion that he 
accomplished all the things a tyrant would have done, even though he is careful not to use
the word "tyrant."312 He explains (36.18-22), 
I wrote laws for the base man and the good man alike
fitting straight justice to each;
but had someone else taken up the goad, 
some evil-minded man greedy for gain,
he would not have restrained the people.
θεσµοὺς δ’ ὁµοίως τῶι κακῶι τε κἀγαθῶι
εὐθεῖαν εἰς ἕκαστον ἁρµόσας δίκην
ἔγραψα. κέντρον δ’ ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ λαβών,
κακοφραδής τε καὶ φιλοκτήµων ἀνήρ,
οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆµον.
The fact that Solon calls his special powers a "goad" or "sharp object" (κέντρον), 
and seems to equate this with his δίκη in the previous line, is further suggestive of an 
association between justice and some sort of force. Irwin comments, "The language of fr. 
36 effectively describes the speaker’s actions in rhetoric that blurs the distinction between
311. Irwin (2005: 225-27).
312. Irwin (2005: 228-29).
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what he in fact did do and what was expected and desired by the demos as he portrays 
them, that is, the assumption of a tyranny" (2005: 229).
Solon was so effective at controlling his own reception as a misotyrannos that 
later commentators have tried to explain away similarities between the word choices of 
Solon and similar language associated with archaic tyrants with an appeal to generic 
language. Nagy argues that the similarities between Solon's language and the description 
of a nascent tyrant in Theognis demonstrates that there was a panhellenic and 
"universalized" language of elegy, suggesting that Solon's use of the language would 
otherwise be inappropriate because of his anti-tyrannical stance.313 Irwin argues, I think 
rightly, that rather than "accidentally" using such language, Solon deliberately exploited 
the already-prevailing association between tyrants, violence, and justice. Since tyrants 
frequently came to power by ending the arbitrary rule of aristocrats, such representations 
of harsh but fair justice made them both attractive to the lower classes and frightening to 
the elite, an appropriate combination considering the nature of the stasis at Athens.314 
III. Honor to the People: δήµωι ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας
In fr. 5, Solon reverses the usual formula by giving "honors to the people" (δήµωι 
γέρας), a distinction reserved elsewhere for gods, kings, and heroes. This section 
examines the implications of the demos being the recipient of privileges. I follow Irwin in
arguing that by inverting this formula, Solon underscores his position relative to the 
demos; namely, that because he is the one who does the giving, he implies tyrannical 
authority, since no one else in his position would have given the demos the honor and 
313. Nagy (1983: 84); cf. Rihll (1989: 283 n. 2). 
314. Irwin (2005: 225-30). 
119
consideration that he has:315
To the people I gave so much privilege as to suffice, 
neither taking away their honor nor offering them more;
and those who had power and were magnificent in their wealth,
I made sure they had nothing shameful.
I stood throwing a mighty shield around both sides,
not permitting either side to win unjustly.
δήµωι µὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας ὅσσον ἐπαρκεῖν,
  τιµῆς οὔτ’ ἀφελὼν οὔτ’ ἐπορεξάµενος·
οἳ δ’ εἶχον δύναµιν καὶ χρήµασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί,
  καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάµην µηδὲν ἀεικὲς ἔχειν·
ἔστην δ’ ἀµφιβαλὼν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀµφοτέροισι,
  νικᾶν δ’ οὐκ εἴασ’ οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως.
In this poem, Solon tells us that he gave privilege to the demos, while at the same time 
protecting the wealthy. He ends with the famous metaphor of throwing a shield around all
of the people, defending rich and poor alike from injustice. Solon's use of ἀµφιβαλὼν 
here is similar to Athena throwing her aegis around the shoulders of Achilles at Il. 
18.203-6: ἀµφὶ δ᾽ Ἀθήνη | ὤµοις ἰφθίµοισι βάλ᾽ αἰγίδα θυσσανόεσσαν. If we extend this 
allusion, Solon plays the part of Athena, while the demos is cast in the role of the hero 
Achilles, who receives honors directly from the gods. This image and phrasing goes 
against all poetic precedent; in Homer especially, γέρας is earmarked for warriors, kings, 
and immortals. γέρας, along with τιµή, refers to that which is apportioned to immortals in
the Theogony, and both the Odyssey and the Works and Days associate γέρας with honors
given to kings.316 In the Iliad, γέρας is given either to gods or heroes.317 In fact, the first 
315. As has been noted by, among others, Linforth (1919: 180), Anhalt (1993: 100-01), Balot (2001: 
87-88), Noussia (2001: 268-69), and Mülke (2002: 184-85). See also Irwin (2005: 230-37).
316. Thgn. 81.201, 393-396; Op. 126; Od. 4.197, 7.10, 7.150, 11.175, 11.184, 11.534, 15.522, 24.190, 
24.296. The word appears in a slightly different context in 20.297. Ctesippus chides the suitors that 
Odysseus-as-beggar deserves a stranger-gift, no matter his station, because he is a guest of Telemachus. 
This is a situation in which γέρας is meant for a man of low station, though of course the audience knows 
that the "beggar" is really a king. 
317. Il. 1.118, 120, 123, 133, 135, 138, 161, 163, 167, 185, 276, 356, 507; 2.240; 4.49, 323; 9.111, 344, 
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book of the Iliad is almost entirely concerned with the injury done to Achilles' τίµη when 
Agamemnon stole the γέρας given to him by rest of the Greeks, attesting to the centrality 
of this theme in the epic. Further, the demos is always the party giving, never receiving, 
the honor. The closest connection to the use of γέρας in Solon 5 is the scene in the 
Odyssey where Odysseus supplicates Arete on Scheria (7.147-150): 
Having suffered much toil, I approach your husband and your knees 
in supplication, and these guests; to whom may the gods grant blessings 
in life, and may each pass down to his children the 
possessions he holds in his halls and the honor (γέρας) that the demos has given 
him. 
σόν τε πόσιν σά τε γούναθ’ ἱκάνω πολλὰ µογήσας, 
τούσδε τε δαιτυµόνας, τοῖσιν θεοὶ ὄλβια δοῖεν,
ζωέµεναι, καὶ παισὶν ἐπιτρέψειεν ἕκαστος
κτήµατ’ ἐνὶ µεγάροισι γέρας θ’, ὅ τι δῆµος ἔδωκεν.
This is the only other time in epic that γέρας appears alongside δῆµος, and even here it is 
clear that the honors go to the nobles from the people.318 Thus the demos as the recipient 
of γέρας is a pronounced departure from epic usage. 
This association remains true in fifth-century prose as well. γέρας appears 
frequently in Herodotus, particularly as an indicator of kingly authority, describing either 
what monarchs already own or are given, or what they confer upon their noble subjects.319
367, 422; 16.54, 56, 457, 675; 18.444; 19.89; 20.182; 23.9; 24.70. The concentration of the word in book 1 
indicates the centrality of the concept in the context of honor paid to warriors. On τιµή and γέρας in Homer,
see Nagy (1979: 123-32).
318. Though this passage is the only one naming the demos as the givers, elsewhere, particularly in the 
Iliad, it is clear that it is people of lower status (e.g., the Greek army at Troy) giving γέρας to kings or 
heroes of elevated status, or nobility giving γέρας to other nobles of similar or higher status. See Irwin 
(2005: 231-32) for fuller discussion of the terms in epic. 
319. Hdt. 1.114 (the boy Cyrus plays at being a king, giving his peers the γέρας of bringing him messages); 
3.85 (Darius enlists his groom to help him win the γέρας of the Persian throne); 4.143 (Darius shows honor 
to Megabazus, the noble commander of his European army); 7.3 (Demaratus advises Xerxes that he 
deserves the γέρας of being king instead of his elder brother Artabazanes); 7.134 (the ancestral γέρας 
belonging to the descendants of Talthybius, who have the right of conducting embassies); 7.154 (the γέρας 
of the tyranny at Gela passing to Hippocrates after the death of his brother Cleandrus); and 9.27 (the 
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Herodotus also uses it often when singling out warriors for their martial prowess.320 
Thucydides uses the word only three times, about the privileges kings used to possess 
(1.13.15), about the honors that colonies owe their mother-cities (1.25.17), and in the 
Plataeans' appeal to the Spartans for mercy, citing the γέρας that the former paid to the 
latter by tending the graves of the Spartans who died on Plataean soil in the Second 
Persian War (3.58.13). The fact that prose writers of the fifth century use the term in the 
same way as Hesiod and Homer further underscores the jarring nature of Solon's use of 
the word. While there is no literary equivalent to his transferral of honor to the demos, we
do see a parallel in the program of various tyrants and political leaders, who frequently 
exploit the demos as a power base.321
Thus we see that while Solon's poetic predecessors, as well as later prose writers, 
indicate that giving honors to the demos was the inverse of the usual practice, it makes 
sense in the context of archaic tyranny and politics more generally. If a tyrant presents 
himself as a distributor of δίκη, he takes over that function from aristocratic groups who 
previously enjoyed exclusive rights to such honors. Therefore he transfers to the demos 
something typically reserved for heroes, kings, and aristocrats, a practice that has 
historically proved effective as a way of gaining tyrannical, or at least extremely wide-
sweeping power.322 Consider the tactics of Peisistratos, who was an extreme advocate of 
Athenians claim that they deserve the γέρας of leading the Greeks in battle at Plataea because of their noble
deeds, though they eventually yield this honor to the Spartans). 
320. γέρας for kings or tyrants: Hdt. 3.85.1, 4.162.2, 4.165.1, 6.56, 6.56-57.5, 7.3.3, 7.104.2; the pseudo-
tyrant Maiandrios arguably requests a form of γέρας when he asks the people for six talents and a 
priesthood of Zeus the Liberator. γέρας given by kings or tyrants: 4.143.1, 7.29.2, 1.114.2. γέρας relating to
martial prowess: 2.168.1 (of the Egyptian warrior caste), 8.125, 9.26.5, 9.27. For hereditary γέρας: 7.134.1. 
321. See below, pp. 122 ff.
322. In Solon's case, he was trying desperately to get both aristocrats and the demos on his side, and he may
have (wrongly, as it turned out) seen this as an effective way of doing so.
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the people. The people were the source of his influence, as they were the ones who voted 
him the bodyguard of club-bearers that allowed him to seize power the first time (Ath. 
Pol. 14). Cleisthenes the Athenian, while not a tyrant as such, clearly had enormous 
power in passing his sweeping democratic reforms, and he made the demos part of his 
hetaireia, or "political club," as a way to gain the upper hand over his opponent Isagoras 
(Hdt. 5.66). It is quite possible that if Cleisthenes had not passed his reforms immediately
following the downfall of a tyranny, he might have been labeled as a tyrant.323 
There are many other instances of tyrants making the demos accomplices in their 
coups d'état. Solon's poetic descriptions bring to mind historical events in which the 
demos served as the mechanism by which autocratic power was seized. In Peisistratos' 
first political takeover, he pretended to have been attacked so that the demos would give 
him a bodyguard, with the implication that his safety depended on the people voting for 
it. His second seizure of power involved a pageant orchestrated by his enemy-turned-ally 
Megacles, in which they dressed up a six-foot-tall, fantastically beautiful flower girl as 
Athena in full battle panoply, and had her escort Peisistratos into the city in a chariot, 
thereby sanctifying his reclamation of power (Hdt. 1.60). This spectacle required the 
people's complicity in a sort of willing suspension of disbelief, and an at least pretended 
acceptance of a divine basis for his power. 
With a similar penchant for drama, the Syracusan tyrant Gelon appeared in the 
assembly unclothed and unarmed after his victory over Carthage in 480, recounted his 
323. See Irwin (2005: 231-32); also consider Maeandrius' subtle use of demagogic language (particularly 
his proclamations of equality) in order to convince the people that he was not following Polycrates' 
tyrannical model. Aristagoras of Miletus, too, used rhetoric that promised equality for all in a bid to gain 
absolute power over Naxos (Hdt. 5.37). On these tactics, see also McGlew (1993: 135-36).
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services to the people, and offered himself to anyone who wanted revenge; rather than 
exacting retribution, the Syracusans declared him euergetes, soter, and basileus (Diod. 
11.26.5-6). Like Peisistratos', Gelon's performance cultivated ambiguity as to the source 
of his power. This sort of elaborately staged political theater in which the demos is the 
source of power for tyrants suggests that Solon's language reflects a political reality—the 
sort of ambiguous language describes and calls to mind real events, reflected in 
contemporary political and social discourse.324
We can make a similar argument for Solon—had his term of office not been 
sandwiched between the harsh rule of Drakon and the milder, yet openly tyrannical rule 
of Peisistratos, he may well have been remembered as a tyrant himself. Solon's claim to 
transfer γέρας to the people rather than to himself suggests that his strategy was to muddy
the waters and confuse notions of where power actually rested. By claiming to give honor
to the demos, Solon linguistically distances himself from outright autocracy, while 
contradictorily suggesting that he is the one with the ability to allot power. Irwin notes, 
"In this paradox the complicity of tyrant and community comes to the fore: demos and 
political leader are mutually dependent in establishing the basis for and means of 
articulating their own political identity and power."325
Fr. 5, however, goes on to describe trouble that Solon has averted from the elite, 
ending the poem with the famous image of him throwing a shield around both rich and 
poor, thus emphasizing his impartiality. Combined with the ambiguous relationship 
described above of the relationship between his power and the support of the demos, he 
324. Irwin (2005: 234).
325. Irwin (2005: 223-34).
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seems to be speaking from both sides of his mouth. His choice of language facilitates the 
political stratagem of saying something to please everybody, including imagery and 
wording that implies a tyrannical claim supported by the lower classes. At the same time, 
the structure is careful to balance and articulate the even-handedness of the benefits 
Solon has bestowed: the first two lines emphasize privileges obtained by the demos, with 
the second describing the maintenance of elite wealth, and ending with another emphasis 
on his impartiality. The very structure of the poem and its language uses the fact that 
different audiences hear different claims in different ways. It shrewdly employs language 
associated with epic and tyranny and seems to express benefits that please everyone, 
framed in (purposefully obscure) terms of tyrannical claims. The demos and the 
aristocracy think they are hearing language that is politically beneficial to them, but Solon
in fact leaves these questions unanswered by the abstruseness of his wording.326 
As further proof of this sort of equivocation, Plutarch and the Ath. Pol. use the 
same fragments to argue opposite points. Plutarch (Sol. 18.5) uses fr. 5 to prove that 
Solon had democratic leanings because he wanted the popular court to gain sovereignty, 
and even substitutes the word κράτος for γέρας.327 The Ath. Pol. uses the same phrase to 
prove that Solon was a neutral party. When Solon presents himself as the only one able to
give γέρας—or in Plutarch's version, κράτος—he implicitly underscores his position of 
power. The question is not only what it means to give γέρας to the demos, but what it 
means to be the person doing the giving; by acknowledging that he was the one with that 
326. See Irwin (2005: 234-35); see also Connor (1987: 219-59) and McGlew 1993 for the interdependence 
of the demos and the tyrant for establishing political identity and power. 
327. Plutarch's use of κράτος may suggest reinvention of tradition to make Solon more suitable to the more 
radically democratic contemporary atmosphere. See Irwin (2005: 236-37).
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power, Solon made a tyrannical claim. In fr. 36, Solon says that another person taking up 
such power would not have restrained the people the way he has: κέντρον δ’ ἄλλος ὡς 
ἐγὼ λαβών, | κακοφραδής τε καὶ φιλοκτήµων ἀνήρ, | οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆµον (20-22; "But 
had another man than I taken the goad, an evil-thinking and power-hungry man, he would
not have restrained the people"). The use of the word κέντρον reminds the audience that 
he had the power to use force, yet refrained because of his concern for the people. 
Therefore, not even the appearance of moderation asserted by the Ath. Pol. can 
camouflage the implication of this language, Solon possessed the powers of a tyrant.328 
IV. Tyranny: κλέος or αἰδώς?
We now turn to the three poems in which Solon explicitly denies that he desires a 
tyranny. The first of these contains possibly his most vehement defense of his political 
program (fr. 32): 
If <he says> I spared my fatherland
and did not take tyranny and implacable violence,
defiling and disgracing my reputation (κλέος),
I am not ashamed. For thus I think that I shall better
conquer all men.
εἰ δὲ γῆς <φησιν> ἐφεισάµην
πατρίδος, τυραννίδος δὲ καὶ βίης ἀµειλίχου
οὐ καθηψάµην µιάνας καὶ καταισχύνας κλέος,
οὐδὲν αἰδέοµαι· πλέον γὰρ ὧδε νικήσειν δοκέω
πάντας ἀνθρώπους.
In this poem, Solon is claiming that his past conduct was honorable, in contrast to 
aspersions cast by his critics.329 He rejects the notion he has lost honor by failing to take 
advantage of his position to grab whatever power he can.330 Most people translate the οὐ 
328. Irwin (2005: 236-37).
329. See Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 427-32) for extended commentary on this poem, with references.
330. von Erffa (1937: 62 ff.); Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 427). On Solon's definition of a new standard of 
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in line 3 as meaning that he did not befoul his κλέος by becoming a tyrant.331 Irwin 
questions whether the opposite could be true—could Solon have "disgraced his 
reputation" by not seizing a tyranny? Archilochus gives us our earliest mention of the 
word tyranny. While he claims to have no desire for a tyranny himself, he says, "I do not 
care for the affairs of wealthy Gyges, nor has jealousy ever seized me, nor do I envy the 
deeds of the gods; nor do I lust for a great tyranny: for these things are far removed from 
my eyes" (οὔ µοι τὰ Γύγεω τοῦ πολυχρύσου µέλει, | οὐδ’ εἷλέ πώ µε ζῆλος, οὐδ’ ἀγαίοµαι
| θεῶν ἔργα, µεγάλης δ’ οὐκ ἐρέω τυραννίδος· | ἀπόπροθεν γάρ ἐστιν ὀφθαλµῶν ἐµῶν), 
he actually implies that tyranny is an enviable position, since he lists it in the same 
context as deeds of gods. He merely states that he, personally, does not desire a 
tyranny.332 
Alcaeus, on the other hand, specifically indicates that glory (κῦδος) accrues from 
holding a tyranny (fr. 70.6-13):
But let that son-in-law of the Atreidae, 
consume the city as he did with Myrsilus, 
until Ares wishes to turn us to arms; 
and may we once again forget this wrath.
Let us ease off from soul-consuming discord
and battle among kin, which some Olympian
has aroused, leading the people into ruin, 
but granting to Pittacus lovely glory (κῦδος).
κῆνος δὲ παώθεις Ἀτρεΐδα[.].[
δαπτέτω πόλιν ὠς καὶ πεδὰ Μυρσί̣[λ]ω̣ [
θᾶς κ’ ἄµµε βόλλητ’ Ἄρευς ἐπιτ.ύχε..[
honor, see Mülke (2002: 332). 
331. For example, this is the reading given by West (1993: 81). Some scholars disagree, however; 
Wilamowitz (1893: 309) and Gentili & Prato (1988: 191) read the line the opposite way. See also Vox 
(1983: 310); Vox (1984: 73 and 76 ff.); Pellizer (1981: 29-30) gives an overview of scholarship on this 
issue. See also Mayer (2001: 66-67) for more recent bibliography.
332. On the semantics surrounding tyranny from the seventh through fourth centuries, see Parker (1998: 
145-72).
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τρόπην· ἐκ δὲ χόλω τῶδε λαθοίµεθ..[·
χαλάσσοµεν δὲ τὰς θυµοβόρω λύας 
ἐµφύλω τε µάχας, τάν τις Ὀλυµπίων
ἔνωρσε, δᾶµον µὲν εἰς ἀυάταν ἄγων
Φιττάκωι δὲ δίδοις κῦδος ἐπήρ[ατ]ο̣ν̣.
Alcaeus derides Pittacus for his personal politics, but his problem is that Pittacus' tyranny
is bringing ruin to the people, not the fact that he holds a tyranny; rather, he admits that 
Pittacus' tyranny brings him κῦδος. Alcaeus' treatment of Pittacus' politics suggests that 
even if one is an aristocrat who betrays his class and the demos, he can still get κῦδος for 
being a tyrant.333 
Alcaeus' estimation of the honor that a tyranny can bring a person, combined with 
Archilochus' intimation that a tyranny brings honor comparable to that of the gods, 
suggests that it could actually be detrimental to one's reputation to refuse a tyranny. Irwin 
suggests that fr. 32 is consistent with this interpretation. First, it is a fragment, and must 
not be read as an intact poem. Therefore it is unclear if the participle is indeed the 
element to be negated. The force of οὐδὲν αἰδέοµαι is also not indisputable—it can be 
read as emphatic or defiant. Most scholars read it as the former by negating the 
participles—that Solon did not defile his reputation by becoming a tyrant. Irwin suggests 
the opposite, that even though Solon did not seize a tyranny, he did not defile his 
reputation.334 In other words, Solon feels no shame because his κλέος remains intact for 
avoiding the seizure of a tyranny, even though a tyranny would have brought him honor. 
But this leaves an explanatory γὰρ (line 4) with nothing to explain. This problem is 
solved if the οὐδὲν αἰδέοµαι has a defiant tone. 
333. See Irwin (2005: 239-42); on tyranny as an enviable position, see Arch. 23.21, Simon. 584 PMG, Hdt. 
3.52.4–5, Xen. Hier. 1.9 (cf. Pind. Pyth. 1.85); and Solon 33. For attitudes toward tyranny among the 
archaic poets, see Parker (1998: 145-72) and Yerly (1992: 3-32).
334. Irwin (2005: 241-44).
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While Irwin's solution is ingenious, I favor the most common (and simplest) 
interpretation: that the participle is the negated element, and Solon declares that he did 
not defile his reputation by seizing a tyranny.335 To read the fragment Irwin's way would 
make it inconsistent with his other statements about tyranny, discussed below, which play
on the anxiety that seems to have been present in his audience.336 Even though it is fairly 
clear from the comparanda of Alcaeus and Archilochus that there was much κλέος to be 
gained from such autocratic control, we must remember that tyranny was unpopular in 
Athens in the wake of Cylon's attempted coup.337 
If, however, we allow the premise that holding a tyranny could bring much honor, 
our interpretation of fr. 32 as an explication of Solon's reluctance to despoil his reputation
by claiming a tyranny (at least in name) still makes sense when compared to the other 
fragments dealing with tyranny.338 Consider fr. 33:
This Solon is neither deep thinker nor a wise man,
for he himself refused the good fortune that the gods would give.
He casts a great net around his quarry but does not draw it in, and
he lacks both good sense and the will to use it.
If I were in power, I would take all the wealth I could,
becoming tyrant over the Athenians if only for one day,
even if my family and I were later flayed into a wineskin.
οὐκ ἔφυ Σόλων βαθύφρων οὐδὲ βουλήεις ἀνήρ·
ἐσθλὰ γὰρ θεοῦ διδόντος αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐδέξατο·
περιβαλὼν δ’ ἄγρην ἀγασθεὶς οὐκ ἐπέσπασεν µέγα
δίκτυον, θυµοῦ θ’ ἁµαρτῆι καὶ φρενῶν ἀποσφαλείς·
ἤθελον γάρ κεν κρατήσας, πλοῦτον ἄφθονον λαβὼν 
335. Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 430) contends that the οὐ negates not just the finite verb καθηψάµην, but also
the participles µιάνας and καταισχύνας, citing as comparanda Hom. Il. 5.233; Hom. Hymn Dem. 157; Tyrt. 
12.10 West; Thgn. 371; Pind. Nem. 3.15. She thinks that µιάνας, with its implication of physical 
contamination, is too strong a word for a hypothetical reproach for squandering his opportunity to seize the 
tyranny. See also Kühner & Gerth (1890: 199), Shorey (1911: 218), and Oguse (1962: 271-73).
336. Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 429-30) agrees; for Cylon, see ch. 1, pp. 7-9.
337. See ch. 1, pp. 7-9.
338. Indeed, Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 434) speculates that fr. 32 may be part of the same poem as fr. 33.
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καὶ τυραννεύσας Ἀθηνέων µοῦνον ἡµέρην µίαν,
ἀσκὸς ὕστερον δεδάρθαι κἀπιτετρίφθαι γένος.
The hypothetical speaker here characterizes Solon as a fool for not seizing "good things" 
from the gods, a vague term that implies, yet does not outright name, a tyranny (though 
the latter part of the poem makes clear that this is what is meant).339 This pre-emptive 
response to such criticism strongly implies that Solon was fully aware that many 
criticized him for not taking hold of a tyranny when the opportunity presented itself, 
which is consistent with my reading of fr. 32. For Solon to put such words in the mouth 
of an imaginary detractor demonstrates his awareness of the fact that, by not declaring 
himself tyrant, he is foregoing κλέος (or κῦδος) for which most people would risk being 
skinned alive.340 By saying that he does not want a tyranny, he is preemptively addressing
the question he knows he will be asked: "why on earth not?"341 He emphasizes that it is a 
deliberate choice on his part, that he is not refusing autocratic power because he is weak 
or foolish—quite the opposite—but because he does not want the reputation of a tyrant, 
despite the harsh criticism he knows he will receive by refusing such an honor; his 
concern here is not that he will be criticized for becoming a tyrant, but that he will be 
ridiculed for not becoming one.342 He further shows awareness of the possible 
339. See Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 433) on the vagueness (or, to use her word, the "coyness") of the 
language in the first lines of the poem.
340. "Flayed into a wineskin" was likely a proverbial expression for an especially painful death by this time
(cf. Ar. Nub. 442, where we have an exact parallel: Strepsiades offers to be flayed into a wineskin 
voluntarily if it will allow him to escape his creditors; see also Hdt. 5.25, where he tells us that this is 
Cambyses' favorite way to punish offenders). This is perhaps also meant to be evocative of Marsysas' 
arrogant challenge to Apollo and subsequent horrible punishment for his ὕβρις in claiming that he was the 
more skilled musician (cf. Hdt. 7.26). 
341. Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 433) speculates that this almost hyperbolic hypothetical detraction is 
consistent with aristocratic ideologies, since archaic tyrannies often appear to be driven by aristocrats 
seeking popular support, and thus his imaginary critic is from the upper classes. Mülke (2002: 340) agrees, 
but tyrants also often came to power with the support of the people (see pp. 122-124 above). Solon's 
consistent wooing of both the demos and the aristocracy indicates either that he had sufficient support from 
all classes of society, or at the very least makes it unclear where the main basis of his support lay.
342. For further commentary, see Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 433-43).
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consequences of tyranny: the use of ἤθελον shows that even Solon's fanciful critic is 
aware of the potentially deadly consequences of even a temporary indulgence of his 
desire for absolute power.343
The final "anti-tyranny" poem, fr. 34, runs thus: 
They came as upon plunder, and hoped for riches,
and each one thought that he would find vast wealth,
and that I, prattling smoothly, would show a harsh mind.
But they spoke frivolously then, and now they are angry with me
and all look at me in disapproval, as at an enemy.
But this is not necessary. For whatever things I said, I have done with the gods, 
but I did not act in vain, nor did it please me to [compel?] by force of tyranny
my rich fatherland to have equal lots between good and evil men.
οἱ δ’ ἐφ’ ἁρπαγῆισιν ἦλθον· ἐλπίδ’ εἶχον ἀφνεήν,
κἀδόκ[ε]ον ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ὄλβον εὑρήσειν πολύν,
καί µε κωτίλλοντα λείως τραχὺν ἐκφανεῖν νόον.
χαῦνα µὲν τότ’ ἐφράσαντο, νῦν δέ µοι χολούµενοι
λοξὸν ὀφθαλµοῖς ὁρῶσι πάντες ὥστε δήϊον.
οὐ χρεών· ἃ µὲν γὰρ εἶπα, σὺν θεοῖσιν ἤνυσα,
ἄ⸤λλ⸥α δ’ οὐ µάτην ἔερδον, οὐδέ µοι τυραννίδος
ἁ̣ν̣δάν̣ει βίηι τι[..].ε[ι]ν, οὐδὲ πιεί[ρ]ης χθονὸς
πατρίδος κακοῖσιν ἐσθλοὺς ἰσοµοιρίην ἔχειν.344
This poem has a particularly defensive tone, and is the first of the "anti-tyranny" poems 
to address the failure of a specific reform—that of the seisachtheia, or policies regarding 
land encumbrances. Lines 1 and 2 most likely refer to the disappointed aristocrats who 
had hoped to retain or increase their wealth, but instead suffered vast losses in the debt 
cancellation. He laments the universal disaffection with his reforms in lines 3-5. I read 
the first two lines as referring to the wealthy rather than the demos because, as Noussia-
Fantuzzi points out, "It is...unlikely that the people who, as Solon says, had been 
343. Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 441). On the fallacy of the arguments of Solon's critic, see Magurano (1992: 
48).
344. See Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 445-54) for commentary.
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expecting to get "great wealth" were actually the poor, since they would be more likely to
think in terms of no longer being poor, not suddenly becoming rich."345 A close parallel 
for the wealthy hoping to increase their riches by the rise of a tyrant occurs at Eur. 
Heracl. 588-591, which describes the supporters of the usurper Lysus as aristocrats who 
have become poor through squandering their riches, though they still appear to be 
wealthy. 
Additionally, since it is most unlikely that the wealthy would have wanted land 
redistribution, the second class of critics whom Solon mentions separately at the end of 
the poem must be the demos. It makes more sense if we read Solon as addressing two 
separate classes of critics, the wealthy in the opening lines of the poem and the poor in 
the closing lines, becoming more specific and speaking of the disappointment of the 
demos because of his refusal to redistribute land in the last two lines. He says that he did 
not compel land redistribution with the powers of a tyrant; rather, he used the power 
delegated to him by the people not to redistribute land. If there were enough people 
disappointed with Solon's failure to redistribute land that he felt the need to placate them 
in his poetry, this implies that it required considerable power to stop such a measure from
being pushed through by the demos, who would have been the primary beneficiaries. And
since land redistribution was a common measure taken by tyrants, he can be seen as once 
more highlighting the fact that, although he had all the powers of a tyrant, he neither 
claimed the title nor took this particular action that, which was typical of tyrants 
elsewhere.346
345. Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 446). This reading is also put forth byFerrara (1964: 120-22) and Rosivach 
(1992: 154).
346. Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 446) claims that "it is highly unlikely that the project of land redistribution 
132
V. Wolf Imagery in Solon's Poetry
We will now turn to one of Solon's most famous similes, comparing him to a wolf beset 
by dogs (fr. 36.22-27):
...For if I yielded
to whatever was pleasing to those opposed to me,
and then changed to what the other side thought,
this city would be bereaved of many men.
On account of this, defending myself from all directions,
I stood as a wolf among many hounds. 
...εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον
ἃ τοῖς ἐναντίοισιν ἥνδανεν τότε,
αὖτις δ’ ἃ τοῖσιν οὕτεροι φρασαίατο,
πολλῶν ἂν ἀνδρῶν ἥδ’ ἐχηρώθη πόλις.
τῶν οὕνεκ’ ἀλκὴν πάντοθεν ποιεόµενος
ὡς ἐν κυσὶν πολλῆισιν ἐστράφην λύκος347.
Solon here employs vivid martial imagery and epic language in his description of the 
consequences of civil stasis.348 Line 25 in particular echoes Il. 5.642, in Tlepolomus' 
speech to Sarpedon about the first sack of Troy, as well as Herodotus 6.82.1, where the 
historian describes of the streets of Argos after the Spartan sack. The culmination of this 
fragment is the famous image of Solon as a lone wolf keeping hounds at bay. Similes 
such as this are not uncommon in Homer, particularly portraying an animal under attack. 
The closest parallel to the wolf image in Solon is Il. 12.41-2: "as when a boar or a lion 
will rear around among dogs and hunting men " (ὡς δ’ ὅτ’ ἂν ἔν τε κύνεσσι καὶ ἀνδράσι 
θηρευτῇσι | κάπριος ἠὲ λέων στρέφεται). But in Homer, wolves always fight in packs, 
and they are always the ones doing the attacking.349 So why does Solon use this particular
was conceivable in the age of archaic tyrannies," but this is simply false (see ch. 5, pp. 152-163).
347. For a detailed structural analysis of this poem, see Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 455-85), Maharam (1993: 
451-62); cf van Groningen (1958: 137)
348. Cf. frs. 4, 5, and 37. 
349. On the similarity of this image with Homeric simile see Campbell (1982: 253), de Martino & Vox 
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image, and what is he trying to evoke with this "Homerically un-Homeric simile"?350 
To start, λύκος as the final word is jarring. After a suspenseful buildup, the more 
expected image would be that of a lion, and λέων would scan just as well. The lack of 
reference to the nobility and grandeur that is usually associated with lions has a dual 
effect—it distances Solon from the appropriation of epic language that is usual in 
addressing a sympotic (aristocratic) audience, while at the same time it draws from epic 
similes to create a puzzling ambiguity.351 The wolf is also associated with the sort of 
cunning (δολός), seen in the figure of Odysseus, or even in the name of his grandfather 
Autolycus, which implies a wolf's cunning, intelligence, and trickery.352 
Historically speaking, there are several suggestive linguistic associations between 
wolves and tyrants. The Peisistratids supposedly utilized a force of personal bodyguards 
called lykopodes, either because they wore shoes made from wolfskin or because they 
sported a wolf emblem on their shields.353 Peisistratos also supposedly built the Athenian 
Lykeion, a building with probable military associations, in the vicinity of a sanctuary to 
Apollo Lykeios.354 In the mythological realm, we have several associations between 
(1996: 768), Linforth (1919: 187-88), Rhodes (1993: 178), and Anhalt (1993: 126). The most prominent 
appearance of wolves in the Iliad is their comparison to the Myrmidons (16.156-166). While the wolves' 
savagery is quite vividly described, the main emphasis remains on their collectivity.
350. Irwin (2005: 245-46).
351. Kurke (2011: 150-51) notes that one might expect Solon to be the dog defending the flocks from the 
wolves, rather than the wolf being attacked. She argues that Solon's use of the wolf is a deliberate evocation
of an Aesopic fable. See below pp. 136-143.
352. Mainoldi (1984: 98) comments that even though the wolf represents an animal that can be associated 
with war, the lion is "la force guerrière, le courage dans la lutte, ce qui rend possible son identification avec
le soldat homérique, dont il constitue le modèle"; with contra Anhalt (1993: 129). Further, the usual 
Homeric wolf- pack does not present the same nobility and majesty as a single lion, much less Solon's lone 
wolf. See also Irwin (2005: 264-68).
353. This is the explanation given for the name in the scholia to Ar. Lys. 665, but the word is frequently 
amended to read leukopodes based on metrical considerations. See Bing (1977: 308-09) on the metrical 
issues, and (1977: 310-11) for the view that these were foreign (probably Argive) mercenaries.
354. Ath. Pol. 3 and the entry for the shrine in Suidas tell us that this was the residence of the Polemarch; 
for other military associations, see Ar. Peace 358 and Xen. Hell. 1.33. See Bing (1977: 312 n. 22) for 
citations on the existence and nature of the shrine. 
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wolves and autocratic rulers. The Arcadian tradition gives us the myth of Lykaon, a king 
of Arcadia, who slaughtered and dismembered one of his fifty sons. He then served the 
child to Zeus at the dinner table in order to test the god's omniscience. In punishment, 
Zeus transformed him into a wolf, which explains the etymology of his name. He also 
supposedly founded and ruled Lykosura, where he founded a cult to Zeus Lykaeus and 
began the tradition of the Lykaean games, which Pausanias tells us were older than the 
Panathenaic games.355 Also, Athamas and Danaus assumed kingship over Argos based on 
an omen of a wolf killing a bull (Paus. 2.19.3-4).356 Most specifically, Plato says that 
when a tyrant assumes power, he turns from a man into a wolf, using the legend of 
Lykaean Zeus in Arcadia as an analogy (Rep. 8.565d-566a):357 
When a man has tasted human flesh, a single morsel cut up among one or another 
sacrificial offerings, he will inevitably become a wolf...a leader of the people, who, 
once he has gained an exceedingly obedient throng, but by the usual unjust 
accusations does not refrain from the blood of his own people—he takes a man to 
court and murders him, causing the man’s life to vanish; and tasting with his unholy
tongue and mouth the murder of kin, he banishes and kills, and hints that he will 
cancel debts and redistribute land. After all this, isn’t it necessary and fated for such
a man as this either to be destroyed by his enemies or to rule as tyrant and to 
transform from a man to a wolf ?
ὡς ἄρα ὁ γευσάµενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου, ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἑνὸς 
ἐγκατατετµηµένου, ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι...ὃς ἂν δήµου προεστώς, 
λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόµενον ὄχλον, µὴ ἀπόσχηται ἐµφυλίου αἵµατος, ἀλλ᾽ ἀδίκως 
ἐπαιτιώµενος, οἷα δὴ φιλοῦσιν, εἰς δικαστήρια ἄγων µιαιφονῇ, βίον ἀνδρὸς 
ἀφανίζων, γλώττῃ τε καὶ στόµατι ἀνοσίῳ γευόµενος φόνου συγγενοῦς, καὶ 
ἀνδρηλατῇ καὶ ἀποκτεινύῃ καὶ ὑποσηµαίνῃ χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς καὶ γῆς ἀναδασµόν,
ἆρα τῷ τοιούτῳ ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ µετὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἵµαρται ἢ ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῶν 
ἐχθρῶν ἢ τυραννεῖν καὶ λύκῳ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι;
355. For variations on the legend of Lykaeon, see Hyg. Fab. 225, Paus. 8.17.6, Pseudo-Apollodorus 
3.8.1-2, and Ov. Met. 1.216-239.
356. On associations between wolves, lawgivers, and tyrants, see Detienne & Svenbro (1989: 158) and 
Nagy (1990: 272 n. 13). Irwin (2005: 250-51) gives a fuller discussion of possible connections of the names
of these mythological kings with wolves.
357. On Plato's association between tyrants, wolves, debt cancellation, and land redistribution, see further 
ch. 5, p. 157. 
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While Plato is a late source on the association between wolves and tyrants, it is possible 
that the connection is much earlier. One possible etymology of the seventh-century 
Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus is "one who wards off the wolf," and in fact archaic Sparta 
had a reputation for producing tyrant-deposers.358 We are on firmer ground with Pindar.359 
He actually compares the justice of the tyrant Hieron to that of a wolf, claiming that, 
It is impossible for a deceptive citizen to utter an effective word among good men; 
but fawning in the same way on all he weaves complete ruin. I do not share this 
man’s boldness. May I be a friend to a friend; but towards an enemy as an enemy; I 
will run him down in the manner of a wolf, at one time or another walking crooked 
paths. But the straight-speaking man does well amid any political system—under a 
tyranny, or when the impetuous people or when wise men watch over the city.
ἀδύνατα δ’ ἔπος ἐκβαλεῖν κραταιὸν ἐν ἀγαθοῖς
δόλιον ἀστόν· ὅµως µὰν σαίνων ποτὶ πάντας ἄταν πάγχυ διαπˈλέκει. 
οὔ οἱ µετέχω θράσεος. φίλον εἴη φιλεῖν·
ποτὶ δ’ ἐχθρὸν ἅτ’ ἐχθρὸς ἐὼν λύκοιο δίκαν ὑποθεύσοµαι, 
ἄλλ’ ἄλλοτε πατέων ὁδοῖς σκολιαῖς.
ἐν πάντα δὲ νόµον εὐθύγλωσσος ἀνὴρ προφέρει,
παρὰ τυραννίδι, χὠπόταν ὁ λάβρος στρατός,
χὤταν πόλιν οἱ σοφοὶ τηρέωντι (Pyth. 2.81-88). 
Justin also speaks of a tradition in which Hieron was destined to rule because a wolf stole
his writing tablet (23.4-9). Pindar's flattering association of Hieron's justice with a wolf 
has perturbed some commentators, who do not believe a wolf should be associated with 
positive characteristics like honesty, steadfastness, and even wisdom.360
When speaking of comparing animals to humans, one of our immediate 
358. On this etymology of Lycurgus, see Chantraine (1968: 650), Burkert (1979: 165-6, esp. n. 24), and 
Nagy (1990: 272).
359. Irwin (2005: 250-51).
360. See further Catenacci (1991: 7-22). This association particularly upsets Farnell (1961: 131), who 
writes, "The whole passage...remains...his worst piece of composition in which he seems to lose his head 
and to show a weakness of brain that he never shows elsewhere." See Most (1961: 115) for other 
commentators unhappy with Pindar's positive depiction of a wolf. 
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associations is of course with Aesop. Even though we cannot securely date any of his 
fables, the consistency of the attributes given to wolves suggests an early and uniform 
association of wolves with cunning. Moreover, the figure of the wolf overwhelmingly 
appears in fables with a political bent.361 When a wolf appears alone, he usually 
challenges the kingship of another creature, usually a lion, but it is more normal for 
wolves to act collectively in a context of emphasis on unity and equality of distribution of
goods or power (either of which could parallel the nature of a tyrant's authority). 
In one fable, wolves use highly political language to persuade a pack of dogs that 
they should work together and share a flock of sheep (216).362 The wolves tell the dogs 
that the two species should be equal (homoioi), but that the dogs are slaves unless they 
can be persuaded to act like the wolves and share all things in common. The dogs agree, 
only to be subsequently torn apart by the wolves. The moral of the story is "that those 
betraying their fatherland earn this sort of payment" (Ὅτι οἱ τὰς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδας 
προδιδόντες τοιούτους µισθοὺς λαµβάνουσι). This language of slavery versus freedom, 
and the claim for everyone to hold things in common, recalls the policy of land 
redistribution (to be discussed in ch. 5). The attempt to get dogs and wolves to work 
together recalls rhetoric of leaders like Peisistratos and Cleisthenes, who made the demos 
their hetairiai, or bosom companions and brokered deals between the poor and the rich.363
Another fable pitting dogs against a collective of wolves features the two species at 
war (215). The dog general blames the deliberations of the council for delaying battle and
claims that the wolves' homoia gives them an advantage over the dogs, suggesting the 
361. On connections between beast fables and public debate on political issues, see Kurke (2011: 142-58).
362. All fable numbers are from Chambry 1926.
363. See Irwin (2005: 252-53).
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existence of stasis within the canine community. Another tells how wolves convinced 
sheep that their guard dogs were a source of disunity, and tricked the sheep into sending 
into sending them away (217). At this point the sheep of course get eaten by the wolves, 
described in politically charged language that evokes civil stasis. Another wolf employs 
eulogos, "fair speech," to persuade a lamb to allow himself to be eaten without putting up
a fight (221). In a further fable, a wolf claims that he was guarding a cache of barley for a
horse, since he enjoyed the sound of the horse's teeth chewing the barley even though the 
wolf himself did not eat grain (225). The suspicious horse replies, "If wolves could eat 
barley, you would not prefer your ears to your belly" (εἰ λύκοι κριθῶν τροφῇ χρῆσθαι 
ἠδύναντο, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τὰ ὦτα τῆς γαστρὸς προέκρινας). The horse thus exposes the 
wolf's false flattery, and calls into question his unlikely justification for appropriating the 
horse's rightful fodder—after all, who really enjoys the sound of chewing? This 
description of an illegitimate reason for taking control of someone else's possessions 
resonates with Aristotle's description of the way tyrants use demagogic language to come 
to power.364 
The fable that most closely connects Solon with wolves involves a wolf-lawgiver, 
and emphasizes the wolf's political platform of unity and equality of property (228): 
Having become a general over the other wolves, a wolf was establishing laws for 
everyone, so that he would place in the middle whatever each took in the hunt and 
give to each an equal share, so that they would not resort to eating each other out of
need. But an ass approached and, shaking his mane, said, “It is a fine sentiment that
comes from a wolf’s mind, but how is it that you put yesterday’s hunt in your lair? 
Come put this in the middle and apportion it.” But upon being challenged the [wolf]
dissolved the laws.
364. Pol. 1305b, 1310b. Cf. Herodotus' description of Deioces (1.96-98), and Aristotle's more general 
theory of the methodology of tyrants (Pol. 1310b2-3); see also Irwin (2005: 254).
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Λύκος τῶν λοιπῶν στρατηγήσας λύκων νόµους ἔταξε πᾶσιν, ἵνα ὅ τι ἂν ἕκαστος 
κυνηγήσῃ πάντα εἰς µέσον ἄξῃ καὶ µερίδα ἴσην ἑκάστῳ δώσῃ, ὅπως µὴ οἱ λοιποὶ 
ἐνδεεῖς ὄντες ἀλλήλους κατεσθίωσιν. Ὅνος δὲ παρελθὼν τὴν χαίτην σείσας ἔφη: 
Ἐκ φρενὸς λύκου καλὴ γνώµη. ἀλλὰ πῶς σὺ τὴν χθεσινὲν ἄγραν τῇ κοίτῃ 
ἐναπέθου; Ἅγε ταύτην εἰς µέσον ἀποµερίσας. Ὁ δὲ ἐλεγχθεὶς τοὺς νόµους 
ἀνέλυσεν. 
The importance lies in the emphasis on sharing everything equally, of putting 
"everything in the middle" (πάντα εἰς µέσον), which recalls Solon's philosophy of the 
mean. The idea of giving of equal parts to all is often associated with wolves, in scientific
writings as well as anecdotal or philosophical ones.365 The cannibalism that the lawgiver-
wolf's actions are meant to prevent sounds very much like language associated with stasis
and civil war, which also describes the sort of aristocratic infighting that leads to 
tyranny.366 In this story, the criticism of the wolf's methods comes from a donkey, a 
different species entirely. The wolf-lawgiver remains part of the group of wolves, yet 
holds a unique position of power over them. Thus there are two versions of the wolf, with
opposing political implications: the positive collective instinct vs. the cunning, selfish 
nature of the wolf/tyrant/lawgiver.367 
This fable has close parallels with the story of Maeandrius in Herodotus (3.142-3). 
After the death of Polycrates of Samos, Maeandrius wanted to be "most just" 
(δικαιότατος). So he built an altar to Zeus the Liberator, denounced Polycrates as an 
illegitimate ruler, and claimed that he, Maeandrius, would only give himself moderate 
rewards (τοσάδε γέρεα), placing power εἰς µέσον, as was just (δικαιῶς). He claimed only 
365. For instance, Timotheos of Gaza wrote a treatise on animals, describing how wolf-packs evenly divide
their kills among themselves, on which see Haupt (1869: 8) and Buxton (1986: 62). See also Detienne & 
Svenbro (1989: 155) on the democratic tendencies of wolves. For "fabulous" stories of the isonomia of 
wolves, see schol. Ody. 14.161 and Anth. Pal. 9.252.
366. Cf. Thgn. 39–52, Solon 4.22, Alc. 70.7, 129.23–4, and Thgn. 1181.
367. Irwin (2005: 255-56).
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a small amount of money and a hereditary priesthood of Zeus the Liberator on the 
grounds that he gave freedom to the Samians. A nobleman called Telesarchus called him 
to account by pointing out that no man can be δικαιότατος and elevate himself at the 
same time. Maeandrius then realized that he could not renounce the tyranny without 
someone else seizing it, and so proceeded to deceive and imprison his enemies. Irwin 
points out the feebleness of Maendrius' basis for his power—that he wanted to be the 
most just of men (δικαιοτάτῳ ἀνδρῶν βουλοµένω)—and suggests that this formulation 
reflects Maeandrius' justification of his assumption of the tyranny, which resembles the 
platform of δίκη so common in tyrants' rise to power. It is also perhaps significant that the
next person to assume the tyranny was Maeandrius' brother Lycaretus, whose name 
suggests another link between wolves and tyrants.368 The similarity of detail between the 
wolvish fables and Maeandrius led Detienne, Svenbro, and Nagy to connect the image of 
the wolf as a lawgiver with both a tyrant and justice.369 The wolf made laws; Maeandrius 
wanted to be δικαιότατος; both figures placed things εἰς µέσον, yet attempted to retain 
something for themselves (meat, a priesthood). They were both denounced by outside 
figures (the donkey, Telesarchus), and finally they removed all pretense—the wolf 
dissolved his laws, while Maeandrius openly ruled as tyrant. The strategy for both rulers/
lawgivers was the same—to give while keeping.
Solon's repeated emphasis on the middle, the mean, and equal protection for all, 
while at the same time focusing attention on his exceptional position are consistent with 
characteristics of the wolf, the lawgiver, and the tyrant. We must be cautious in using the 
368. Irwin (2005: 256-57).
369. Detienne & Svenbro (1989: 158) and Nagy (1990: 272 n. 13).
140
Aesopica as evidence for this association, since it is of uncertain date, but it is far more 
likely that Solon used existing imagery than it is that the Aesopica, a much larger body of
literature, was influenced by a passing and highly ambiguous reference in a single poem; 
it is therefore difficult to imagine Solon evoking such imagery if these connections did 
not already exist.370 Without the commentary on the dissolution of the laws at the end of 
the fable, the career of Solon echoes the story of the wolf even more strongly.371 While 
Solon does not dissolve his laws, he removes himself from their jurisdiction when he 
leaves Athens for his so-called theoria.372 This interpretation is also suggested by 
Plutarch's report of a joke of Aesop's: "But this drinking cup does not appear to be shared 
by the people," he said, "For it has sat by Solon alone for a long time" (Sept. Sap. Conv. 
155f; ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοῦτ’, ἔφη, τὸ ποτήριον δηµοτικόν ἐστι· Σόλωνι γὰρ ἔκπαλαι παράκειται 
µόνῳ).
If we accept these associations of a wolf with tyrants, we must ask what benefit 
Solon gains from evoking this connection. He implies that he actually was a tyrant in the 
sense that he provided all of the things that a tyrant was expected to provide by the demos
who had given him power, but does not say so outright, bringing to mind his joining of 
δίκη and βίη. Also, the wolfish associations of cooperation and equality of distribution fit
well with my analysis of fr. 36, wherein I claim that Solon insinuates that his measures 
are close to those of a tyrant, while at the same time avoiding use of the term. However, 
Solon in his poem is not merely a wolf—he is a wolf struggling to keep hostile dogs at 
370. In the Theognidea, for example, we also see the phrase εἰς µέσον in the context of equal distribution 
(677-678). See also Irwin (2005: 258-60).
371. Unless, of course, the parallel is that the unhappiness of the factions about which Solon frequently 
complains, was already leading to the dissolution of his laws. 
372. On inconsistencies in the story of Solon's theoria, see ch. 2, pp. 65-66.
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bay, which presents himself from the perspective of his political enemies. The fact that 
they are many suggests that he is acknowledging how widespread criticism of his 
program is, yet his use of Homeric simile deprecates this group as launching an 
unjustified attack on a single (heroic) wild beast, who ought to recognize that their 
interests have, in fact, been looked after by Solon the wolf. This imagery also serves to 
scold members of the demos who criticized him for not making his reforms more radical. 
The message is that in essence he is a wolf (tyrant?), which is proven by the fact that he is
being attacked by hunting dogs. Yet he cleverly leaves open the alternate interpretation—
that he is not a wolf (tyrant?); rather, this is merely what his critics among the elite say 
about him, which also shapes his future reception.373 
Evoking the wolf simile at the end of fr. 36 creates an odd dichotomy—it portrays 
him as both Homeric and un-Homeric, as tyrant and not-quite-tyrant. The strategy of 
playing both sides resembles the tactics inherent in a lot of tyrannies and tyrannical 
rhetoric, but Solon does it so well that his seeming rejection of tyranny earned him a 
universal place in posterity as a misotyrannos. His espousal of the famous "middle 
ground" can thus be seen in a different light, as a manipulation of the viewpoints of two 
opposing factions. This suggests that the middle was constantly shifting, and that tyrants 
could well have been operating from a stance that placed them in this territory.374 
McGlew writes, 
As much as [Solon] wanted to avoid the dangers of tyranny, he also wanted to 
exploit its political strength...Solon took on this very persona, canceling old laws 
and imposing new ones no less autocratically than Pittacus or any tyrant...More 
important still, when Solon's laws and politeia were no longer dependent on him, 
373. Irwin (2005: 259-61)
374. Irwin (2005: 261).
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they retained some of the more important aspects of the tyrant's power: his demand 
for unquestioned obedience, his authority, and his exclusive hold on political 
matters, [and] demanded fully as much as any tyrant."375
VI. Conclusion
Solon managed to broad reforms so broad as to require the authority of a tyrant, 
while avoiding the κλέος (whether good or bad) of being one. Yet his poetry deliberately 
makes clear that he had (or could have had) such powers. Because he was granted the 
authority to make such sweeping changes, his position was nearly indistinguishable from 
that of tyrants elsewhere in the Greek world. The very fact that he was in a position to 
refuse a tyranny indicates that he had vast personal power and widespread support among
the population of Athens. Yet Athens' singular association of violence with tyranny 
required avoidance of any appearance of tyranny, in a way that was not necessary in other
poleis, despite the clear stability and benefits that tyrants could bring.376 
Solon's concept of κόρος, his joining of δίκη with βίη, and his position as one who
gives gives honors to the people invert what we expect of these words and concepts from 
other contexts, all of which fit much better in the realm of tyrannical discourse than in 
traditional epic or elegy. He further associates himself with tyrants with his evocation of 
himself as a wolf, an animal frequently featured in politically-slanted fables, as well as 
semantic and conceptual associations with rulers and tyrants. Solon cleverly claimed the 
accomplishments and κλέος of a tyrant, while at the same time being careful to deny the 
title. His exploitation of language associated with tyranny and simultaneous rejection of 
the concept worked—no one remembers him as a tyrant, despite the clear affinities 
375. McGlew (1993: 111). 
376. See ch. 5, pp. 150-152.
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between his activities (and the language he uses to describe them) and those of tyrants. 
In order to ensure his reputation as an anti-tyrant and a moderate, Solon had a 
delicate line to walk. He had to maintain a favorable relationship with the demos and 
preserve a positive relationship with the aristocracy, while at the same time obliquely 
acknowledging the autocratic nature of his position. Solon constructed his poems in such 
a way that all classes of people would interpret them as sympathetic to their particular 
concerns. He attempted to court those on both sides of the conflict, while suggesting that 
the best solution was to continue to look to him for guidance.377 The feat of binding the 
Athenians to uphold his legislation even after he left Athens further suggests that he 
possessed the sort of power that only a tyrant could command.378
377. For further discussion of contradictory interpretations of Solon's sympathies, see ch. 3, pp. 89-90.
378. Ath. Pol. 11.1 and Plut. Sol. 25.5 state that Solon's laws were established for 100 years; Herodotus, 
perhaps more realistically, puts the limit at ten years (1.29.1). On the length of time, see Manfredini & 
Piccirilli (1977: 254-55). See also ch. 1, p. 22 n. 52.
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Chapter 5
Benevolent Tyranny?
In chapter 3, we explored contradictory statements in the ancient sources about 
Solon's reputation as a champion of the demos. Because the political climate of the fifth 
and fourth centuries equated democracy with a fierce enmity towards tyrants, a more 
populist reading of the Solonian constitution prevailed, the result of which was Solon's 
firm association with the origins of democracy. Since much of what we know or assume 
about the motivations for Solon's activities derives ultimately from his own repeated and 
vehement denials of a desire for a tyranny, our testimony is skewed and must be used 
much more cautiously than it has been over the last two and a half millennia. Because our
evidence is so biased, we must accept that whatever his actual goals, motivations and 
intentions may have been, they are lost to history. What we can do is examine what he 
actually did in in the context of archaic politics and compare his strategies with those of 
figures of similar stature in other poleis. 
The first part of this chapter will examine evidence that tyrants were popular in 
many parts of Greece. Many tyrants actually had the reputations, like Solon, of being 
lawgivers and passing legislation for the benefit of the citizens, and for implementing 
civic renewal projects which revitalized flagging economies and forged civic identity 
among their citizens—all things that Solon was trying to do for Athens. We shall see that 
whether Solon was aiming to be a tyrant outright, or merely trying to use methods of 
tyrants who had been successful at solving civil crises elsewhere, his contemporaries 
would not necessarily have considered this the act of self-serving treachery that sources 
from democratic Athens would have us believe.
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The next part will examine Solon's legislation on debt cancellation, the abolition 
of debt-slavery, and the recall of exiles, demonstrating that all of these measures were 
common features of contemporary archaic tyrannies. Finally, we will explore the seldom-
mentioned evidence for Solon's association with tyrants in the military sphere. Whether 
or not Solon was trying to become a tyrant in the overt manner of other statesmen of his 
era, his reforms greatly resembled the political maneuverings of tyrants elsewhere in the 
Greek world. After all, revoking the existing law code of Drakon and imposing a new 
one, despite near-universal opposition, is an action that would require the sort of social 
and personal influence that only a tyrant was likely to command.379 
I. Tyrants as Legislators
Despite most tyrants' reputation for operating outside the law, many based their 
claims to power on existing legal institutions rather than by instituting new ones (as 
Solon tried to do).380 Any transition to an entirely new governing apparatus would 
inevitably cause more turmoil than an alteration of existing power structures, which goes 
a long way towards explaining Solon's difficulty at stabilizing the warring factions.381 In 
several cases tyrants even seem to have been responsible for setting up legal codes and 
(re)establishing the rule of law. But because tyrants are so frequently depicted as power-
379. See McGlew (1993: 111).
380. Anderson (2005: 173-222) argues that tyrants merely operated within established oligarchies as 
influential individuals, rather than out-and-out establishing any sort of new regime. Solon also praises the 
rule of law in fr. 4. 
381. For tyrants taking over existing power structures rather than creating new ones, see Snodgrass (1993: 
34). Salmon (1997: 60-61) partially agrees, but qualifies Snodgrass' argument by identifying a substantial 
subset of tyrants who created entirely new systems. Snodgrass (1980: 96) comments, "tyranny has no 
specific constitutional framework...but was simply superimposed on whatever constitution the state in 
question already had." Anderson (2005: 173) argues that there was very little difference between turannoi 
and more orthodox aristocratic leaders, and that the former merely sought to dominate, rather than 
overthrow, established oligarchies: "A turannis [in the sixth century] was not yet a species of political 
regime, illegitimate or otherwise. Rather, it was mainstream oligarchic leadership in its most amplified 
form, conventional de facto authority writ large."
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hungry scofflaws in our ancient sources, modern scholars also tend to gloss over reports 
of tyrants as legislators.382 However, we find ample evidence that tyrants could and did 
make laws that lasted far beyond their tenure as autocrats.383 
For example, Herodotus tells us that Peisistratos ruled according to the thesmia 
(1.59.6). Thucydides concurs, saying that even under his sons the city used the pre-
existing laws (6.54.6). Peisistratos himself seems to have adhered to these laws, even 
appearing before the Areopagus when charged with murder (Ath. Pol. 16.8; Arist. Pol. 
1315b21-22). Cleisthenes of Sicyon rewarded a judge who, refusing to flatter him, 
awarded a victory crown to another (Arist. Pol. 1315b11).384 Pheidon is credited with 
reforming Argive weights and measures (Hdt. 6.127.3). Aristotle also ascribes the 
establishment of laws to Pittacus of Lesbos (an elected tyrant), including the principle 
that the punishment for any crime would be greater if committed while intoxicated (Pol. 
2.1274b18-23). Diogenes Laertius (1.79) tells us that Pittacus also wrote a prose work, 
On Laws, "for the use of citizens," which suggests that the demos had access to some sort
of law code, much like Solon's publicly displayed axones. Cypselus also seems to have 
made a concerted effort to correct injustices perpetrated by his Bacchiad relatives before 
he came to power by recalling their exiles and restoring their citizenship (FGH 90 F 
57.7). Less explicitly, the oracle to Cypselus at Delphi said that he would "bring justice to
Corinth" (Hdt. 5.92.2; δικαιώσει δὲ Κόρινθον). This suggests that he also established, or 
at least enforced laws; as Salmon surmises, it is difficult to distribute justice without first 
382. For the tradition of "bad" tyrants, see above discussion on pp. 12-14; see also Osborne (2009: 193-96) 
and McGlew (1993: 14-51).
383. Contra Stein-Hölkeskamp (2009: 113).
384. On tyrants as lawmakers, see Salmon (1997: 32-38) and McGlew (1993: 87-123).
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reforming the system of justice.385 At any rate, it is generally agreed that the Corinthian 
tribes, a long-lasting feature of the polis, were introduced by tyrants, though arguments 
about the details of the organization remain.386 
Emphasis on justice also would have been a useful platform for establishing a 
rapport with the common people, who were less likely to have recourse for offenses 
committed against them. A would-be tyrant with a reputation for fairness would have an 
advantage not only in establishing his power, but in exercising it.387 This principle is 
especially clear in Herodotus' account of Deioces' use of his countrymen's respect for his 
reputation as a just judge to become king of the Medes.388 In fact, Herodotus specifically 
tells us that Deioces' voluntary resignation caused the Medes to fall into lawlessness 
(Hdt. 1.96-101).389 
At Sicyon, the Orthagorids also had a reputation for being law-abiding. Aristotle 
credits their long-lived dynasty to their subservience to the laws and concern for the 
welfare of their citizens, going so far as to call them slaves to the law (Pol. 
5.1315b-16).390 Likewise, one of Peisistratos' most celebrated measures was the 
establishment of traveling judges to ensure that even citizens of outlying regions of Attica
had access to legal recourse (Ath. Pol. 16.5).391 Periander may have been responsible for 
sumptuary legislation, which is a possible source for the stories about him burning the 
385. Salmon (1997: 64).
386. See Salmon (1997: 64, n. 16 &17) for citations.
387. McGlew (1993: 81).
388. Hartog (1988: 324)) argues that in Herodotus' view, the Deioces episode proves that the people of Asia
were incapable of embracing liberty and living without some sort of ruler. 
389. On the concept of justice in archaic politics, see Almeida 2003; for the concept of justice in Solon's 
poetry and in tyranny, see 113-119.
390. See Salmon (1984: 206 n. 80) for further discussion. 
391. Ibid.
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clothes of wealthy women (Hdt. 5.92.1-4). He restricted the ownership of slaves, and 
supposedly implemented a council designed to prevent individuals from spending beyond
their means, which remained a Corinthian law in the fourth century.392 The tribal system 
instituted by Cleisthenes of Sicyon, like that at Corinth, remained in place after the fall of
his regime. Likewise the board of eight probouloi at Corinth, closely associated with the 
tribal system there, were central to the Corinthian government for centuries after the fall 
of the tyranny. Inscriptional evidence suggests that the tribal reorganization happened 
between the foundation of Syracuse in 733 and the end of the tyranny in 580, since the 
three ethnic Dorian tribes are already attested for Corcyra Melaina, which suggests that 
they were already in existence by the time the Corinthians colonized Syracuse.393 
Nicolaus of Damascus (FGrH 90 F 60.2) says that on the fall of the tyranny the demos 
established a group of eight probouloi and a council of eight men from each tribe, though 
Salmon contends that this was based on the invalid assumption that since the constitution 
was used in post-Cypselid Corinth, it was only introduced after the fall of the tyranny.394 
The Suidas mentions a synoecism in Corinth, in which the Corinthians split into eight 
tribes and divided the city into eight parts (headword πάντα ὀκτώ).395 This body of eight 
probouloi was one of the longest-lasting features of the Corinthian polis, even giving rise 
to the proverb "πάντα ὀκτώ," "eight of everything," and indeed, classical Corinth was 
unusually stable.396 
392. Ibid.
393. S.I.G. 3 I, 141. For the view that the probouloi were in fact a Bacchiad institution, see Schaeffer 
(1957: 1222) and Roebuck (1972: 114-15). 
394. Salmon (1984: 205-06). Because the text is corrupt, another reading suggests that the tribes may have 
already been in existence (see Will (1955: 609 ff.)
395. See also Hall (1997: 58-59).
396. Ibid. 
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Despite this plethora of evidence that tyrants were effective lawmakers, ancient 
authors tend to depict even advantageous legal measures as evidence of tyrants' 
corruption, in much the same way that they lambast tyrants' other contributions to society
based on later negative stereotypes.397 For instance, Herodotus (5.67-68) claims that the 
(Sicyonian) Cleisthenic tribal reorganization was instituted in order to favor the tyrant's 
own tribe at the expense of the Dorian population. The Ath. Pol. (16.5) claims that 
Peisistratos' judicial measures were intended to consolidate his tax program and keep the 
Attic farmers away from the city. As McGlew notes, however, these interpretations are 
probably a confusion of motive and result based on contemporary ideas of justice and 
centralization.398
Tyrants also tended to be responsible for large-scale public works projects.399 
Aristotle mentions the pyramids in Egypt, various monumental statues of the Cypselids, 
the Olympieion of the Peisistratids, and Polycrates' temples on Samos as examples of 
ways that various tyrants kept their subjects employed (Pol. 5.1313b18-25). He says that 
tyrants implemented such ambitious projects to keep the people too occupied and poor to 
plot sedition. While perhaps true that such programs would have kept people too busy to 
orchestrate a revolution, surely the prestige to the city, employment for the poor, and 
economic growth spurred by such enterprises would have benefitted the poor rather than 
producing widespread dissatisfaction.400 
Many of the monumental temples and buildings at Corinth and Isthmia are 
397. As discussed above on p. 17.
398. McGlew (1993: 78-79).
399. For tyrants fostering civic consciousness and growth through cults, building programs, festivals, etc., 
see Kolb (1977: 99-138) and 1981, Stahl 1987, Salmon (1997: 32-38), Shapiro 1989, Mannville 1990, and 
Raaflaub (2003: 59-94).
400. Ibid.
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attributed to Cypselus, and Periander may have been responsible for the temple of Apollo
at Corinth and that of Poseidon at Isthmia, which was the site of one of the four major 
Panhellenic games.401 Periander also excavated an artificial harbor at Lechaeum and 
constructed the famous diolkos, one of the most important sources of Corinth's fabled 
wealth.402 Thucydides also comments on the Peisistratid tyrants' part in embellishing 
Athens, specifically, the construction of the Temple of Olympian Zeus and the 
Enneakrounos in the Agora (Thuc. 2.15.5). Peisistratos is also said to have made major 
building contributions to the sanctuary of Demeter and Kore at Eleusis.403 At Sicyon, 
while we have no explicit evidence of monumental buildings, Cleisthenes' extensive 
dedications at Delphi after his victory in the First Sacred War indicate the existence of 
skilled Sicyonian craftsmen, who quite plausibly practiced their skills on projects in their 
own city.404 Polycrates supposedly constructed a harbor mole and a tunnel for water, 
which demonstrated his concern for merchant vessels, defense, and water supply, all vital 
elements of a growing city and bound up with the self-identity of a polis.405 
Because political life revolved around the tyrant, who frequently encouraged the 
centralization of political institutions, this focus often continued long after his death. This
indicates not only that tyrants instigated systems that were long-lasting, but that they 
were responsible for institutions intimately bound up with civic consciousness.406 These 
401. For the Temple of Poseidon at Isthmia, see Broneer 1971. For discussion of the dating of the 
construction of the temples, see Salmon (1984: 59-62); for the excavation of the temples, see Salmon 
(1984: 228). 
402. See Salmon (1984: 220-21) on the fortifications; (1984: 133-35) on the harbor; and (1984: 136-39) on 
the diolkos.
403. On Peisistratos and Eleusis, see Boardman (1975: 4-5), with citations on the history of excavation of 
the Telesterion in particular.
404. As Salmon (1997: 66-67) points out. On the Sicyonian treasury and dedications at Delphi, see 
Themelis 1991.
405. See Salmon (1997: 66-67). 
406. Herodotus 5.68.2 tells us that the system lasted for sixty years after his death, which Salmon (1997: 
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projects and political reforms emphasize the concern Archaic tyrants had for civic 
identity, and fostered a sense of pride for the citizens in their polis.407 Our later sources, 
however, emphasize the bare fact that they were tyrants to the exclusion of anything they 
did that lasted beyond their fall. The fact that so many contemporaneous tyrants were 
responsible for revitalizing and stabilizing their cities makes the idea of Solon refusing 
power because tyranny was dishonorable in and of itself strange and inconsistent. 
II. Tyrants, Debt Cancellation, and Land Redistribution
 Whatever the origins of the civil strife at Athens, ancient and modern 
commentators concur that the political and social situation by the end of the seventh 
century had reached such a state of crisis that all parties agreed that something had to be 
done. Ancient sources agree that Solon's position as an impoverished aristocrat made him
attractive to the poorer elements of society, to whose economic situation he was 
sympathetic, as well as the elite, who saw him as one of their own.408 The seisachtheia 
allegedly abolished all debt and ended debt-slavery, a reform supposedly undertaken as a 
measure to relieve the suffering of the poor, and which is usally pointed to as evidence of 
his deep concern for impoverished farmers.409 But rather than providing the aimed-for 
66) notes is more than a generation.
407. See also Salmon (1997: 67-68) on the lasting effects of the foreign policy of the tyrants at Corinth, 
Argos, and Sicyon, though he doubts the significance of Peisistratid interest in the Hellespont because it 
predates the Athenian tyranny (Hdt. 5.95.2). 
408. On Solon's aristocratic pedigree and reduced finances, see Plut. Sol. 1-3; on his attractiveness as a 
candidate to both parties on the basis of his mixed social and economic circumstances, see Plut. Sol. 14 and
Ath. Pol. 5. For further discussion, see McGlew (1993: 97) and Goušchin (1999: 16-17), who both accept 
that Solon's confusing socio-economic position made each faction regard him as a potential supporter. 
Given Plutarch's description of Solon's father's bad investments and his own spendthrift tendencies, 
however, one wonders why the Athenians were so eager to entrust someone so lacking in financial savvy in 
his own affairs with solving an economic crisis of state-wide proportions.
409. See, for example, Woodhouse (1938: 173) and Owens (2010: 107-14). For more detail on the 
complaints of the rich and the poor, see McGlew (1993: 97-99).
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stability, this measure caused chaos: no one was satisfied.410 The wealthy were unhappy 
because the cancellation of debt meant a loss of money for lenders, while the poor were 
unhappy because Solon only cancelled debts, without redistributing land. Solon's 
justification for these measures was that he was trying to do what was best for everyone, 
as we see in this attempt at damage control (fr. 5): 
To the people I gave so much privilege as to suffice, 
neither taking away their honor nor offering them more,
And those who had power and were magnificent in their wealth,
I made sure they had nothing shameful.
I stood throwing a mighty shield around both sides,
Not permitting either side to win unjustly.
δήµωι µὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας ὅσσον ἐπαρκεῖν,
  τιµῆς οὔτ’ ἀφελὼν οὔτ’ ἐπορεξάµενος·
οἳ δ’ εἶχον δύναµιν καὶ χρήµασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί,
  καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάµην µηδὲν ἀεικὲς ἔχειν·
ἔστην δ’ ἀµφιβαλὼν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀµφοτέροισι,
  νικᾶν δ’ οὐκ εἴασ’ οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως.411
This cancellation of debt is often explained as a non-partisan attempt at leveling 
the socio-economic playing field and cooling the strife between the haves and the have-
nots.412 But as Solon himself acknowledges, this did not involve as many benefits as the 
poor expected. Further, it entailed considerable financial and social hardship for the rich. 
After all, having "nothing shameful" (µηδὲν ἀεικὲς ἔχειν) is a far cry from having the 
social or financial benefits they had previously enjoyed, despite Solon's attempt to 
portray his actions as even-handed. Our sources all tout the goal of this measure as an 
attempt at avoiding class warfare in a manner that paved the way for the later democracy;
however, it was not usually democracies that enacted such measures.413 Tyrants and 
410. Ibid.
411. See ch. 4, pp. 119-126 for linguistic analysis of this fragment.
412. See n. 409 above.
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monarchs in particular frequently resorted to similar maneuvers, making it is implausible 
in the extreme that someone hearing of a state-wide cancellation of debt would classify 
the author of the movement as a µεσότης or a misotyrannos.414 
Before, during, and after Solon's time, debt cancellation had always correlated 
closely with both tyranny and land redistribution, making it is unlikely that potential 
beneficiaries of this sort of agrarian reform would have dissociated these measures from 
either tyranny or each other.415 The pattern of tyrants and monarchs canceling debts and 
redistributing land long predates the Greek "Age of Tyranny" of the seventh and sixth 
centuries. It is first recorded as a practice of the Babylonian kings. Hammurabi cancelled 
debts on several occasions, in 1780, 1771, and 1762 B.C., as did his grandson, 
Ammisaduqa in 1646.416 Both issued a misharum ("justice") that dissolved the debts of 
farmers, shepherds, and the "collectors of animal carcasses." Diodorus also tells us of 
Boccoris, a late eighth century Egyptian pharaoh who cancelled debts and banned debt-
slavery (1.79). 
Nehemiah, governor of Judah and Solon's contemporary, also gained popularity 
by forgiving debts and redistributing land in the wake of the destruction of the temple in 
413. See pp. 37-40 for the "democratic" reforms of Solon as described in our ancient sources. 
414. Harding (1974: 283-85) discusses examples on the correllations between tyrants, debt cancellation, 
and land redistribution. He also traces the ways in which accounts of Solon's reforms became politically 
volatile because of class warfare in the fourth century, with political conservatives wanting to erase such 
precedents because they resembled those of tyrants too closely. Rosivach (1992: 154) also notes that 
Isocrates associates debt cancellation and land redistribution as being complementary measures that are 
frequently used by tyrants. 
415. In Harding's discussion on the correlation between tyranny and land redistribution, he specifically says
that Solon deliberately avoided conflict by limiting his actions to debt cancellation (1974: 285)."Fourth-
century political theorists saw a close connection between these demands and stasis, out of which arose 
tyranny. The connection was not lost on Solon in the sixth century, who refused to redistribute land for that 
very reason"; but see below p. 160.
416. 5:36-41, ANET 3; SD 5, respectively. 
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Jerusalem in 586 B.C., when the Persian king Artaxerxes sent him to rebuild the walls.417 
Though Nehemiah governed Judah as a satrap to the Persians, he had a considerable 
degree of autonomy, especially considering the harsh reforms he instituted upon finding 
that his laws had fallen into disuse after a trip to Susa to report to the Great King. The 
forgiveness of debt was a measure meant to prevent discontent for those under his rule, 
demonstrating that, even in the ancient Near East and Palestine, people associated debt 
forgiveness with autocracy. Greeks on the mainland would most likely have been familiar
with such eastern practices through trade and contacts with Ionian Greeks.418
Attestations are less secure for this period in Greece proper, but we do find 
several instances that suggest that land redistribution and/or debt cancellation was 
happening in tyrannies (or, in the case of Sparta, monarchies/oligarchies) prior to or 
contemporaneous with Solon. For instance, we find it evidenced in Sparta at the time of 
Tyrtaeus, when the Spartan kleroi were distributed after the conquest of Messenia in the 
seventh century.419 In eighth-century Corinth, the Bacchiad Pheidon allegedly passed 
legislation to the effect that each citizen should have his own plot of land, and it seems 
that Cypselus continued this policy in the seventh century.420 This also may have been the
case with Theagenes in Megara in the sixth century, though this is less secure.421 Even if 
417. Nehemiah 10:31; see also Hudson (1993: 4-6). This is also evocative of the traditional Israelite 
practice of forgiving debts for neighboring peoples every seven years under the traditional Hebrew jubilee.
418. For contacts with the East and colonization during the early Iron Age, see Morgan 2009 and Thomas 
2009 in Raaflaub & Van Wees 2009; for specific contacts between Greece and Persia in the seventh and 
sixth centuries, see Wiesehöfer (2009: 162-86).
419. On redistribution of land by archaic Greek tyrants as a general policy, including in Sparta and Corinth,
see Austin & Vidal-Naquet (1977: 70-71). On kleroi and equality of shares of land and slaves in Sparta, see 
Tyrt. fr. 1 (ref. in Arist. Pol. 1306b-1307a2), fr. 5; Plut. Agis 5; Her. Pont. de reb publ. 2.7; and Plut. Mor. 
238e. 
420. Arist. Pol. 1265b-12-16; see Salmon (1984: 154-55) and Will (1955: 477-81).
421. Though we know that there were similar problems with discontent from inequality of wealth, it is not 
certain whether Theagenes actually redistributed land. It is more likely that, rather than a widespread 
redistribution to all of the citizenry, Theagenes confiscated estates from his enemies and used them to either
155
the practice was not widespread in Greece itself, it would not have been unknown, and 
would have been associated with tyranny or oligarchy. 
We see similar patterns in contemporary Greek colonies in the East and West. In 
Syracuse in 405-4, Dionysus I also engaged in remission of taxes for the populace and 
redistribution of land and houses in equal portions. Somehow his own friends received 
"more equal" shares, which reminds us of the stories about Solon informing his friends in
advance of the seisachtheia, thus allowing them to seize the best properties ahead of the 
reform.422 It continued in the machinations of Herakleides in Syracuse in his struggle with
Dion for supremacy after the ousting of Dionysius from power in the mid-fourth century. 
Dion and Herakleides both appealed to the demos for support, but the people supported 
Herakleides on the strength of his platform of redistributing land. Dion, having gained the
support of the aristocracy for the position of strategos autokrator, was opposed by the 
demos, who preferred Herakleides because he was "more a man of the people than Dion 
and more under the control of the multitude" (Plut. Dion 48.2; δηµοτικώτερόν γε πάντως 
εἶναι τοῦ Δίωνος καὶ µᾶλλον ὑπὸ χεῖρα τοῖς πολλοῖς). Herakleides then gained support in 
large part by claiming that he was trying to protect the demos from tyranny, while at the 
same time plotting to restore the tyrant Dionysius the Younger to power (Plut. Dion 
48.3-4). Herakleides then stirred up support from the people by claiming that Dion, by 
refusing to redistribute land, was aiming to make himself tyrant. The chronological and 
geographical differences between the Sicilian tyrants of Classical and Hellenistic Sicily 
reward supporters or pay for public works projects such as the aqueduct. On political problems stemming 
from disparities of wealth in Megara, see Thgn. 53-6. On clashes between rich and poor and possible 
confiscation of wealthy estates, see Oost (1973: 187-8, esp. n. 12, 191) and Highbarger (1927: 125).
422. On accusations of Solon's double-dealing, see ch. 3, p. 81. On Dionysius I, see Diod. 15.7.4-5 and 
Justin 21.1-2; see also Harding (1974: 285). On parallels between mainland Greek, Sicilian, and 
Carthaginian tyrannies with respect to policies of land redistribution, see Jackman (2006: 43-45).
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and Archaic mainland Greece mean that we must be careful not to draw too firm a 
parallel between Solon and Dion's situations. It is striking, however, that our sources 
claim that Solon's refusal to redistribute land indicated that he did not want a tyranny, 
while Dion's refusal of the same thing indicated that he did. 
Klearchos in Herakleia Pontika, a contemporary of Dion and Herakleides, 
apparently consciously imitated Dionysius I when he abolished debts and redistributed 
the lands of the rich at the behest of the people, before Spartan forces deposed him (Diod.
15.81.5; Justin 16.4-5). In the Hellenistic period, Polyaenus tells us of Apollodorus in 
Kassandreia in 278, who, upon his seizure of power, allotted plots of land in Pallene to 
the people, all the while denouncing tyranny as the most dreadful evil to befall a state. In 
fact, we hear that before he seized power, Apollodorus cultivated a great reputation as a 
champion of the people and as a tyrant-hater, even helping depose the tyrant Lachares 
from Kassandreia (Polyaen., Strat. 6.7.1-2). Debt cancellation and tyrants go hand in 
hand even in the Roman period. Marius, for instance, forgave the debts of Sulpicius in 
exchange for his support in the senate to pass the legislation that led to his de facto 
dictatorship (Plut. Sulla 8.2). Forgiveness of debts was also one of the tactics used by 
Catiline to garner support for his attempted coup in 63 B.C. (Sall. Cat. 21.2; Cic. Cat. 
2.8). 
The trend of associating debt cancellation, land redistribution, and tyranny 
continued into the Classical and Hellenistic periods. In Plato's Republic, written after 
more than a century of democracy, Socrates details how a tyrant arises. In his 
formulation, the people with the least band together and raise up a champion, who then 
becomes a tyrant by promising land distributions and debt cancellation, thereby 
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transforming himself from a man into a wolf (565d-566a).423 We also see it happening in 
poleis not ruled by tyrants but with non-democratic constitutions—Agis, Cleomenes, and 
Nabis redistributed land in Sparta in the mid-late third century. This is especially 
remarkable considering Isocrates' earlier assertion in the Panathenaicus (ca. 340 B.C.), in
which he holds up Sparta as an ideal constitution, for the reason that no Lacedaimonian 
tyrant had seized power by abolition of debts or redistribution of lands, both of which 
which he terms irreparable ills (12.259; τῶν ἀνηκέστων κακῶν).424 Plato concurs that the 
fact that the Spartans had avoided cancellation of debts and land redistribution was a 
good thing, and goes further in saying that the man who tried to gain power by doing so 
was destined to be hated by everyone for his measures (Laws 3.684d-e and 5.736c).425 We
see, therefore, that even in cases where tyrants are not behind land redistribution and debt
cancellation, democracy seldom comes into play. Those who engage in this practice are 
tyrants, aristocrats, kings, and oligarchs, but never democrats or even moderates; Solon's 
actions canceling debt, whether or not they were accompanied by land redistribution, 
cannot be seen as an attempt at instituting some sort of proto-democracy.
After Thrasybulus ousted the Thirty Tyrants and restored democracy in 403 B.C., 
the demos actually seems to have taken a decided stand against measures like debt 
cancellation at the same time that they begin associating Solon with democracy in very 
public ways. We see further evidence that debt cancellation was almost exclusively 
423. See also Harding (1974: 285). Solon in fr. 36, line 27 actually describes himself as a wolf beset by 
hounds. On Solon's wolf metaphor, see further ch. 4, pp. 133-143.
424. On redistribution of land in ancient Greece in general, see Asheri 1966. On revolutionary societal 
movements, see Von Pohlmann 1925. On social revolution in the Hellenistic period, see Fuks (1966: 
437-48). On the activities of Spartans redistributing land and canceling debt, see Plutarch Agis 5-10 and 
Cleomenes 17. 
425. Even though we have seen that Agis and Cleomenes did in fact cancel debt and redistribute land.
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associated with tyrants in many of the rhetorical speeches of the fourth century, despite 
appeals in those very same speeches to Solon as the moderate democrat par excellénce. 
Andocides in On the Mysteries asserts that the democracy was best upheld by affirming 
the validity of decisions in private suits, "to avoid canceling debts and reopening of such 
lawsuits, and to ensure the enforcement of private contracts" (1.88; ὅπως µήτε χρεῶν 
ἀποκοπαὶ εἶεν µήτε δίκαι ἀνάδικοι γίγνοιντο, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰδίων συµβολαίων αἱ πράξεις 
εἶεν). It seems that in the fourth century the majority of people in Athens opposed any 
measures that would affect their properties or financial securities, and Androtion even 
denied that Solon could have enacted such a measure on the grounds that it was too 
radical.426 According to A.H.M. Jones, Athens in the fourth century was mainly a middle 
class, conservative form of democracy that eschewed such measures.427 
Demosthenes, too, automatically associated tyranny with land redistribution and 
debt cancellation. He quotes an oath of the Heliasts in Against Timocrates that lists these 
two measures among the offenses that constitute subversion of democracy. He also 
includes restoring exiles as a crime against democracy, something for which Solon was 
also much lauded (Tim. 149):428 
I will not vote for tyranny or oligarchy. If anyone tries to subvert the Athenian 
demos or make any speech or any proposal against it, I will not obey. I will not 
allow private debts to be cancelled, nor lands nor houses of Athenian citizens to 
be redistributed. I will not recall exiles or anyone condemned to death...).429
426. Plut. Sol. 15.2 = FGrHist 324 F 34. It is therefore understandable that Androtion tried to explain away 
Solon's cancellation of debts as devaluation of currency, a much less radical reform. It is more likely, as 
Harding (1974: 288-89) suggests, that Androtion was struggling to understand sixth-century politics in 
terms of fourth-century economic and social conditions, which would have held debt cancellation in 
suspicion.
427. See Jones (1986: 75-96) for a discussion on how the Athenians of the fourth century explicitly avoided
mentions of debt cancellation or land reallocation. 
428. For further discussion of the restoration of exiles as a tactic of tyrants, see p. 167.
429. See Solon fr. 36 on the criticism he incurred for recalling those sold into slavery abroad or exiled, 
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καὶ τύραννον οὐ ψηφιοῦµαι εἶναι οὐδ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίαν: οὐδ᾽ ἐάν τις καταλύῃ τὸν 
δῆµον τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἢ λέγῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίζῃ παρὰ ταῦτα, οὐ πείσοµαι: οὐδὲ τῶν 
χρεῶν τῶν ἰδίων ἀποκοπὰς οὐδὲ γῆς ἀναδασµὸν τῆς Ἀθηναίων οὐδ᾽ οἰκιῶν: οὐδὲ 
τοὺς φεύγοντας κατάξω, οὐδὲ ὧν θάνατος κατέγνωσται... 
Before, during, and after Solon's time, debt cancellation and land redistribution 
were both associated with tyranny. Even if we allow that only canceling debt is more 
"moderate" than also re-alloting land, debt cancellation in and of itself could in no way be
considered a conservative move. Therefore it is unlikely that debt abolition would have 
associated Solon with the middle ground of which he speaks so often in his poetry, 
whether or not he redistributed land along with the cancellation of debt. The immediate 
association would be with that of a tyrant or would-be tyrant, despite the fact that Solon 
is usually seen as moderate because he resisted the re-allotment of lands.430 Solon 
denounced tyranny in his poetry while at the same time using tactics to enact reforms that
were characteristic of tyrants not only in Greece proper, but in the entire Mediterranean 
world, in all periods of history. 
a. Further Sources of Discontent
If debt cancellation is usually associated with land redistribution elsewhere, why 
did Solon not use his extraordinary powers to re-allot land when he abolished the horoi, 
which would have gone a long way towards solving his problems with the demos? 
Plutarch implies that Solon's refusal to redistribute land was the main reason that the 
lower classes were unhappy with him: "He pleased neither party, however; he vexed the 
rich because he took away their securities for debt, and the poor even more, because he 
some of whom no longer spoke Greek, and his justification that he was only trying to act for the good of 
all. 
430. Holladay (1977: 46) suggests that the demand for Solon to become a tyrant rested in part on the clout 
this position would have given him in allowing him to redistribute land.
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did not redistribute land as they had hoped, nor did he made all men equal and alike in 
their livelihoods..." (Sol. 16.1; ἤρεσε δ᾽ οὐδετέροις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐλύπησε καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους 
ἀνελὼν τὰ συµβόλαια, καὶ µᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς πένητας, ὅτι γῆς ἀναδασµὸν οὐκ ἐποίησεν 
ἐλπίσασιν αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ παντάπασιν...ὁµαλοὺς τοῖς βίοις καὶ ἴσους κατέστησεν). I suggest 
that the reason Solon did not re-allot land along with abolishing debts was a failed 
attempt to placate both the aristocracy and the demos simultaneously. His frequent 
assertions that he had the best interests of both parties in mind suggest that he was 
extremely concerned with keeping all strata of society happy. He thought that 
cancellation of debts would satisfy the poor, and the retention of their lands would satisfy
the rich.431 After all, the aristocracy were bound to be angry about being unable to recoup 
their loans, without their land being confiscated and given to the very people who had 
defaulted on their debts as well. 
It is also possible that the institution of the new property classes, rather than 
granting a wide swath of the population greater political rights, actually disenfranchised 
some aristocrats from holding office. Many scholars dismiss this as an impossibility.432 
However, van Wees' brilliant analysis of the economic situation of the different Solonian 
classes suggests that the zeugitai were not, as most people believe, some sort of middle 
class who were newly enfranchised by Solon's new property divisions, but rather were 
among the elite, leisured landowners.433 This would have produced (or maintained) a 
wide gap between the rich and poor, and in fact could have bumped some wealthier 
431. On the demand for Solon to redistribute land and to become a tyrant, see Ath. Pol. 6.4, 11.2, and esp. 
12.3. Fr. 34 of Solon's poetry justifies his protection of both rich and poor, which could be a reference to his
attempt to satisfy both parties by refusing to redistribute kleroi. See further Hopper (1961: 195-96) on the 
long-term effects of loss of land by the demos under the regime of Peisistratos. 
432. E.g. Hopper (1961: 195 n. 73) and Holladay (1977: 40-56), among others. 
433. van Wees (2006: 351-89).
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citizens down a rung and disenfranchised some whose riches were not based in 
agriculture.434 He maintains that Solon's property classes did not serve to enfranchise a 
class of "middling farmers," but confined political rights and obligations to an even 
narrower and more rigidly defined elite.435 In fact the Ath. Pol. suggests this very thing, 
and places lenders made poor by the debt cancellation as eventual supporters of 
Peisistratos (13.5).436 It is plausible that someone whose capital was tied up in the land 
would, when faced with such a wide-ranging debt forgiveness, find themselves without 
the resources they had counted on to maintain their place in the political power structure. 
This would make it even harder for Solon to retain any sort of support among the upper 
classes if, on top of losses from uncollected debts, he had also taken away land. But this 
concession was not enough, and his strategy of placating the wealthy by allowing them to
retain their land failed. 
On the other hand, while debt cancellation was doubtless a boon to those 
indebted, it would not help much if they immediately had to borrow in order to farm land 
that was insufficient to support themselves and their families. After all, cancellation of 
debts and the abolition of debt-slavery did not abrogate the need for loans.437 This may 
434. On wealthy thetes and those whose non-agricultural wealth would have disqualified them from Solon's
highest property classes, see van Wees (2006: 373-74). On the wealth census being measured by the barley 
standard, see van Wees (2006: 359), after de Ste Croix (2004: 33-40), whose analysis stems mainly from 
Plut. Sol. 23.3 and and Isaeus 10.10. 
435. For discussion of the relative wealth of the zeugitai, see van Wees (2006: 351-67). McGlew (1993: 
105) also argues that debt cancellation was not a measure to put the rich and poor on more equal footing, 
but to preserve the division between the upper and lower classes. See also Eder (2005: 240-41), who argues
that the very act of codifying laws was meant to ensure aristocratic predominance, partly because the 
aristocrats themselves would be the ones enforcing the laws. In his view, a legal basis for existing property 
arrangements would also render any demand for debt cancellation or redistribution of land ineffective.
436. Hopper (1961: 195 n. 73) takes this at face value, while Holladay (1977: 40-56) asserts that the 
cancellation of debts "cannot in itself have caused poverty even if it is supposed that those whose debts 
were cancelled were also, incidentally, poor" (41), but gives no reason for this claim. 
437. As McGlew (1993: 99) also notes. Cf. Ober (1989: 62).
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have provided a reason for the widespread demand, particularly among the lower classes, 
that Solon become tyrant; only a tyrant would have the clout necessary to strip the 
aristocratic landowners of their property and redistribute it to the poor farmers. 
Additionally, this measure served to cement the power in the hands of this (now 
narrower) elite, which in fact did primarily direct political affairs even after the rise of 
democracy. Therefore the supposed political advantages to the demos provided by the 
seisachtheia were qualified, since the elite now had a legal and economic basis for their 
control of affairs.438 Thus did this tactic of canceling debts for the poor without 
redistributing land, intended to retain the support of all classes, backfire, and the careful 
societal balance that Solon was trying to maintain crumbled.439 
III. Potentially Negative Consequences of Abolishing Debt-Slavery
While it may seem counterintuitive, debt-bondage was perhaps not as terrible an 
institution as we in the modern world assume. It is likely that many of those sold into 
slavery were not sent abroad, but remained to farm the same land. The only difference 
was that they were now toiling for masters instead of themselves, with the additional 
benefit that they were now working enough land to provide sustenance for themselves 
and their families. Those who were manumitted often continued to work for their former 
masters because they had proven their value and had already been employed using their 
expertise. It is not unreasonable to assume that the reverse happened—that free men who 
were enslaved retained positions on the farms they now worked for their owners. The 
downside of no longer being able to offer oneself as collateral is that, if one does not 
438. Eder (2005: 240-41), who points out that at this period a person's political influence depended on his 
economic station. 
439. See also Holladay (1977: 45).
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retain enough land to farm, or does not have the means to obtain enough seed to plant the 
land one does own, there is nothing to offer as collateral, except perhaps the farm itself. 
This would put the poor farmer right back where he started—with encumbrances on the 
land.440 Further, loans would be impossible to get not only because farmers had nothing to
trade as surety, but because aristocrats who had lost substantial sums to the debt 
cancellation would now refuse to loan money (or more likely seed) if there was no 
collateral to be had and no assurances that another financial measure as devastating as 
debt cancellation would not pass.441 
Another ramification of this reform is that aristocrats may no longer have had 
labor to work their land, whether it had been obtained through loan default or was part of 
their ancestral plot. If a significant part of their former labor force was now free to work 
their own land, even those former debt-slaves who remained with their masters as free 
laborers may not have been enough to manage their farms efficiently. If the number of 
indentured workers dropped and tillable land lay fallow because of lack of labor, this 
would not only be bad for the owners who would lose profits on crops that could not be 
farmed, but would breed extreme resentment among those who did not possess enough 
land to make a living. Holladay argues that it is unlikely that large numbers of people lost
their farms around the same time as Solon's reforms, or that the majority of the people 
who did lose their farms were unable to find a different means of livelihood. In his view 
440. See Finley (1981: 63-64) on the use of land as collateral in the fifth and fourth centuries.
441. Cf. Ar. Clouds (1187 ff.), where a law of Solon's is represented as an underhanded way of getting out 
of debt. The situation in the play is so ludicrous that it would have been obvious to any audience members 
that the scheme to get out of debt was nothing but a scam, which may have been a reference to the 
disastrous consequences of the real Solon's debt cancellation scheme. This allusion could be an 
acknowledgment of sorts that Solon's much-lauded reforms were in fact detrimental to the economy and did
little to help the political situation, whatever the current rhetoric regarding Solon as a political reformer 
may have been.
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farmers would be dispossessed of their land for various reasons and over an extended 
period of time: "First one, then another, of the marginal farmers would meet with disaster 
according to their varying circumstances. It would be a trickle, not a flood."442 However, 
the widespread anger suggests that the opposite was true. If farmers were only gradually 
stripped of their lands, surely the demos' negative reaction to Solon's measures would not 
have been so immediate or so violent. 
If, as suggested in chapter 1, there was an uptick in trade and commerce at this 
period, it is not unreasonable to suppose that many of the dispossessed farmers who came
to the city to seek alternate work found themselves engaged in some sort of commercial 
venture, whether as merchants or traders.443 This make sense in light of Solon's 
encouragement of skilled workers from abroad to come and settle in Athens and of his 
requirements that parents ensure that their children had a skill; yet the other side of this 
encouragement of immigration could be that there were more people than jobs, especially
given evidence of a growing urban population in this period.444 We find an increased 
amount of Attic pottery being exported abroad dating to the sixth century.445 Pottery 
workshops did not need large numbers of people to operate, so it is difficult to equate an 
increase of pottery as indicative of an increase in employment opportunities. Athens was 
not known for seapower at this time, and the lack of evidence for Athenian shipping in 
this period suggests that Athenian goods were exported by merchants from other cities, 
442. Holladay (1977: 46).
443. On the likelihood of an economic revolution occurring in Archaic Athens, see ch. 1, 40-46 and 
Appendix II, p. 205. See Plut. Sol. 22 on the increased population of the city at this time. 
444. See Appendix II, p. 208 n. 542.
445. After 600 we see increased amounts of Attic pottery in export markets, though this only became 
widespread in the mid-sixth century. On the output of various known pottery workshops in the period 
between 600-675 B.C., see Holladay (1977: 47-49) and Webster (1972: 2).
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which would also have decreased the number of jobs to be had from the shipping industry
and exacerbated the situation of unemployed farmers.446 
Solon's legislation on olioculture suggests that lack of exports was in fact a 
pressing issue, and may indicate a shift from cereal farming to olive production.447 Since 
olive trees take around a decade to produce a mature crop, only farmers who could afford 
to plant olives while still maintaining land for growing grain would be able to produce 
more lucrative olives.448 The reduced grain crop for smallholders wanting to make the 
switch to olive growing may have been insufficient to support them and their families. It 
may well have been the case that poorer farmers who wanted to make the switch, but who
did not have enough land to survive the wait for olive crops to mature would have been 
among the most vehement supporters of land redistribution. Without re-allocation of 
farming lots and no collateral to obtain a loan, these men would fall back into debt and 
lose their farms.449 If there was indeed a widespread movement toward olive cultivation, 
this would reduce the number of agricultural laborers, since olioculture requires less 
manpower throughout most of the year than grain growing. This would have increased 
the movement of unemployed agricultural laborers toward the city, contributing to a rise 
in the population of urban poor who had been dispossessed of their land and now lacked a
way to make a living, all as a (surely unintentional) result of Solon's abolishment of debt-
slavery.
446. Holladay (1977: 40-56).
447. On the possibility of a widespread switch to olive production, see Appendix II, p. 209.
448. On the cultivation of the olive, see Hanson (1995: 74-77) and Foxhall (2007: 97-130).
449. See further Holladay (1977: 48-49).
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IV. Recall of Exiles
One of the other things that Solon mentions in his poetry is that he recalled exiles 
and debt-slaves, some of whom, in his words, no longer spoke the Attic tongue.450 Solon 
(fr. 36) mentions that he not only freed the debt-slaves in Athens, but brought home those 
who had been sold abroad. But it is inconceivable that foreign masters would have 
voluntarily freed slaves on the basis of an un-enforceable decree from far-off Attica. 
Surely Solon would have had to purchase any slaves sold abroad in order to bring them 
home, and given that the Athenian economy was in a shambles, who would have paid to 
redeem the debtors? The aristocrats who had sold them abroad in the first place certainly 
would not have volunteered to bring them home, and the poor, including family members
of the enslaved, would not have had the means (and could no longer get loans to do so).451
Therefore this freeing of slaves and recall of exiles could have been nothing more than a 
public declaration that was more ideological than effective, a poetic addendum to his 
policy of debt-cancellation and abolishment of debt-slavery in general.452 Westermann 
takes the poems at face value and concludes from them that there was a booming export 
market for slaves in Greece in the seventh and sixth centuries, of which Attic debt-slaves 
were a large part. He suggests that the widespread use of debt-slaves indicates that 
agriculture in Attica became somewhat dependent on slave labor at this time, but 
Snodgrass, in his analysis of the export of slaves from Archaic Attica, speculates that sea-
transport was limited to heavier goods like stone and metal. As he says, "the fact remains 
450. See for example Wallace (2007: 51).
451. Oliva (1988: 51) also questions whether Solon would have been able to redeem debt-slaves sold 
abroad, either financially or logistically. 
452. Westermann (1955: 3-4) and Snodgrass (1983: 18).
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that slaves could walk, and might therefore, unlike inanimate cargoes, be more 
economically moved overland in many cases." If true, this indicates that there were fewer
debtors sold outside of Greece than Solon's poetry would lead us to believe, indicating 
further that this measure was mainly rhetorical.
We do not hear anything of the recall of exiled members of the aristocracy, so we 
can only speculate on whether the amnesty included members of elite families. Recalling 
exiles from the upper classes (most probably members of the Alcmaeonid clan after the 
Cylon debacle), could have eroded his support among the aristocratic factions remaining 
in Athens. The people responsible for exiling members of the elite in the first place would
be unhappy that their enemies had been recalled. If Solon was counting on the support of 
the exiles and their clients, whom he recalled to offset any unrest this measure sparked at 
home, it is possible that he miscalculated badly. If he was hoping for the support of exiled
aristocrats and their clients, this would have backfired if not enough of them returned to 
make up for the unpopularity among those who had exiled them in the first place. If the 
hoped-for exiles did not return, or did return but proved too weak politically to provide 
significant backing, or the other parties simply proved stronger, this would cause 
problems for Solon. Even the simple fact that people would have known that he was 
trying to recall members of influential families could have been fodder for discontent. 
This could also have been a possible retrojection based on blanket recalls of exiles and 
those who had been ostracized, which we see numerous times in the fifth and fourth 
centuries.453 Without more explicit information from our sources, of course, this 
453. E.g., the recall of the 700 families exiled by Cleomenes in 507 (Hdt. 5.73); the recall of all those 
ostracized and exiled in advance of the Persian invasion in 480 (Plut. Arist. 8); the recall of Cimon from 
ostracism in 451 to broker a treaty with the Spartans (Plut. Cim. 17.2-6 and Per. 10.3); and Alexander the 
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discussion of the possible negative effects of recalling aristocratic exiles must remain 
conjecture.
V. Solon's Military Activities
Aristotle tells us that one of the most effective tools of tyrants in the Archaic 
period was their use of private military forces or bodyguards to assist in their seizure of 
power (Pol. 1311a8f).454 Beyond references to encouraging the Athenians to renew 
hostilities with Megara in the Salamis poems (Sol. frs. 1-3), this is not a typical feature in 
our reports of Solon's activities.455 It is only in our later sources that we hear details about 
Solon's military activities beyond Salamis, many of which are typical of (or actually 
involve) tyrants.456 In his chapter on Solon, Diogenes Laertius begins by attributing to 
Solon a glorious military career, even calling his part in the capture of Salamis his 
greatest achievement (1.46). Plutarch (Sol. 8) describes Solon's ruse to renew the war 
with Salamis and his subsequent trickery, which reportedly involved feigning madness to 
get around a law forbidding anyone from urging a renewal of hostilities. Plutarch says 
that following this bit of skulduggery, the Athenians appointed Solon as their military 
commander by vote of the assembly, which seems also to have been the case with 
Peisistratos.457 Solon's charade seems to have involved a complicity with the people, since
Great's recall of all Greek exiles in 324 (Diod. 18.8).
454. Cf. Diod. 11.86, in which Tyndarides attempted to set up a tyranny by first redistributing lands, and 
then setting up a personal bodyguard. 
455. For the possibility that this war was actually waged against an independent Eleusis, see Welwei (1992:
66, 144).
456. Of course late sources like Diogenes must be used cautiously, but as Osborne (1997: 39-40) notes, the 
sort of biographical tradition in which Diogenes writes is already traceable in Herodotus and Aristotle. 
Osborne further advises caution in privileging epigraphic over literary sources on archaic law because of 
the confused, inconsistent, and atypical nature of the laws that get inscribed. For arguments that archaic law
was ad hoc and not part of a unified code, including even Solon's reforms, see Hölkeskamp (1992: 91-92); 
see Osborne (1997: 39-43) for objections, passim. 
457. If this is accurate, it is possible that the Megarian War was the first for which military commanders 
were elected, potentially making Solon the first elected general of the Athenians—a high military honor 
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it is scarcely possible that they would have allotted command to someone they thought 
was mad. Solon and Peisistratos colluded to lure Salamis' allies, the Megarians, to Cape 
Colias to kidnap high-born Athenian women as hostages, but Solon and Peisistratos 
dressed beardless youths in women's clothing and had them cavort on the seashore in the 
manner of women sacrificing to Demeter.458 When the Megarians landed on the beach 
and tried to seize them, the young men slaughtered the would-be kidnappers. 
 We hear little of Solon's military career beyond brief mentions in any of our 
sources; his active part in the campaign against Salamis is normally overshadowed by the
wisdom of his clever ruse, described in such detail in Plutarch and Diogenes.459 The latter 
tells us more about his military activities than anyone else, also mentioning a campaign to
capture the Thracian Chersonnese. Besides expansion of Athenian influence to Salamis 
and the Black Sea region, Solon also supposedly founded a city on Cyprus.460 Indeed, 
Diogenes tells us that he founded Soli directly after he fled Athens to escape the tyrant 
Peisistratos.461 Diogenes also tells us that he passed laws curtailing the rewards of athletes
to further honor those slain in battle; with the result that many strove harder to acquit 
indeed, and one indicative of a degree of organization among the demos not often credited for this time. 
Goušchin (1999: 18-19) argues that it was mainly the hoplites who supported Solon's renewal of hostilities 
and elected him strategos, as does Hopper (1961: 206 n. 169). On the election of generals by hoplites, see 
Develin (1989: 4). Herodotus also called Peisistratos a stategos (1.59.4), and the Ath. Pol. mentions his 
leading role in the Megarian War.
458. This is one of many suspicious doublets in which Solon and Peisistratos are either linked or credited 
with the same actions (see Podlecki (1987: 3-10) and Irwin (2005: 263-80). It has been speculated that the 
source of this conflation has been the fact that there were actually two campaigns and two captures of 
Salamis, one led by Solon around 600 B.C. and the second led by Peisistratos in the 560s. For this 
possibility, see Podlecki (1984: 123).
459. In fact, a completeley anachronistic inscription was even placed on a statue of Solon describing his 
legislative activities as having taken place after the Battle of Salamis in 480, crushing the Persian might. Of
course Solon's campaign against the Megarians over Salamis was more than a century before the battle with
the Persians over the same island in 480 (Anth. Pal. 7.86, cited in Plut. Sol. 62). 
460. Colonization of new cities is something with which tyrants are elsewhere associated. For example, 
Herodotus tells us that Peisistratos installed Miltiades as a tyrant in the Chersonnese and Lygdamis as ruler 
of Naxos (1.64). 
461. Diog. 1.46. On Solon's colonizing activities, see Irwin (1998: 177-83).
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themselves in war.462 Diogenes asserts that it was because of these military feats that the 
people looked up to him and wanted him to rule as a tyrant (1.49). These military tactics 
in fact do have much in common with the expansionist policies of several of the archaic 
tyrants, which gained them popularity with the people.463 
Peisistratos was not the only tyrant with whom we hear that Solon worked in a 
military capacity. Diogenes includes a letter of Solon on how to remain in power. He says
that if Periander wanted to be free of reproach he should resign power, but if he wanted to
keep control he should get rid of all conspirators by making his personal mercenary force 
stronger than that of the citizens' (1.64).464 Solon is elsewhere associated with tyrants 
making war. Pausanias describes the maxims written in the fore-temple at Delphi, by 
Thales, Bias, Pittacus, Cleobulus, Solon, and Chilon (10.24).465 All of these men were on 
one or another of the lists of seven sages, and Pittacus and Cleobulus were actually 
tyrants.466 Immediately following, Pausanias describes how the sages advised the 
Amphictyons to appoint Cleisthenes, the tyrant of Sicyon, as general in their war against 
the Cirrhaeans. Cleisthenes then brought Solon over as advisor on the conduct of the war,
462. This might be the ghost of a tradition, preserved nowhere else, of Solon's support of a private military, 
like that of Peisistratos and his Argive and/or Thracian mercenaries. It may also dovetail with the 
discussions connecting Solon's creation of the hippeis with military, though of course this is conjecture. On 
the possibility of Peisistratos employing a private military, see Lavelle (1992: 5-23), Singor (2000: 107-29),
and Viviers (1987: 193-95).
463. For instance, consider Polycrates' thalassocracy based on Samos and Peisistratos' activities in Sigeion, 
as well as on Naxos, Skyros, Lemnos, and possibly other parts of the Black Sea.
464. This of course also suggests a military bent more closely aligned with activities of tyrants than other 
sources. Cf. Herodotus 1.64, where Solon describes Peisistratos' army of epikouroi, or foreign mercenaries. 
See Frost (1984: 283-84), where he examines and dismisses the idea that Solon's four property classes were
a way of mobilizing a citizen army.
465. See ch. 2, p. 73.
466. Cleobulus is in places merely a wise man, but Clement of Alexandria calls him "king of the Lindians" 
(Stromata 4.19), while Plutarch explicitly calls him a tyrant (de E ap. Delph. 3). Contra Diogenes Laertius, 
who quotes a letter from Cleobulus to Solon offering him refuge from tyranny, claiming that Lindus is a 
democracy (Plut. Sol. 1.93). This is an excellent parallel case wherein a sage has explicit alternate 
reputations as democrat and tyrant. 
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and Pausanias then gives us a list of Solon's stratagems against the Cirrhaeans, including 
diverting their water supply during a siege and poisoning their wells with hellebore. This 
indicates that an alternate tradition where Solon was not averse to associating with and 
even advising tyrants remained even into late antiquity, despite centuries of doctoring and
almost universal suppression of stories that show Solon in a rather ruthless light. The 
descriptions in Pausanias and Diogenes show us that the way Solon conducted military 
affairs overlaps with, and is at times identical to, the way that tyrants waged war. When 
combined with Solon's "tyrannical" agrarian reforms, we see a pattern that Solon was 
operating within a political and social system that used the methods of tyrants in war and 
peace, whether or not he claimed the title.
VI. Conclusion
Tyrants in Solon's day were not necessarily vilified in the way that they were in 
democratic Athens. Tyrants in many cases were elected, or had the same sort of 
widespread support with which Solon seems to have started out, and despite the 
tyrannical stereotypes that attached to later rulers, there is a long history of such men not 
only operating within existing legal systems, but actively creating new ones and shoring 
up old laws. Tyrants frequently revitalized flagging economies with public works projects
and employment opportunities, and their regimes often arose from the same sort of civil 
stasis that propelled Solon to power. So Solon's repeated assertions that tyranny was 
dishonorable require closer explanation. 
Solon had a limited number of models when designing a solution for the 
internecine strife that was plaguing Athens. The aristocratic and oligarchic governments 
had obviously not worked in Athens' case, but elsewhere, tyranny had. Solon tried to have
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it both ways: he wanted to stabilize the state by using measures that had been successful 
elsewhere, but he could not seem to be grasping for a tyranny. His methods, though, were
just that: tyrannical. He had to have the power of a tyrant to enact the seisachtheia, which
involved cancellation of debt—something only seen in connection with tyrants before, 
during, and after Solon's time. But his refusal to redistribute land, along with the abolition
of debt-bondage, backfired. Poor citizens no longer able to acquire enough seed to farm 
their lands because they lacked collateral and/or because the wealthy were reluctant to 
take the risk of another debt cancellation, no longer had any means of livelihood, which 
was surely an unintended consequence. What is more, fourth century citizens eager to 
avoid a return to tyranny specifically forbade all of these provisions. Solon, by 
mimicking the policies of other poleis, showed himself willing to use models of reform 
that were indisputably borrowed from neighboring tyrannies—though without the 
accompanying label.
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Concluding Remarks: An Accidental Democrat?
The goal of this dissertation has been to re-assess our conception of a man with a 
singular place in Athenian history. Since antiquity, the vision of Solon as the "father of 
democracy" has gone unquestioned by most modern scholars. But once we recognize the 
fallacy of relying on the poetry of someone with a vested interest in avoiding association 
with tyranny, and re-examine both his own work and later writings about him, we find 
that the record is rife with contradiction, in many places within the same source. Many of 
the stories about Solon's actions required a profusion of sometimes ingenious excuses, 
and at times creative commentary that stretched credibility to the breaking point. Because
each of his apologists referred to Solon's own poetry to explain away stories that did not 
sit well with fourth-and-fifth century Athenians, we can infer that there was much in the 
tradition that many democratic partisans of the fifth and fourth centuries felt was 
uncomfortably close to tyranny, regardless of the effectiveness of tyrannies elsewhere in 
solving political, social, and economic problems. 
By the fifth century, Solon's legacy had become so malleable that it was possible 
to dress any uncomfortable elements in the accoutrements of myth and legend. This made
it easier, in the political, down-with-tyranny climate of democracy, to cast Solon as a 
protodemocrat and use him as a figure of appeal for questions of government and even 
ethics, while at the same time condemning the very reforms with which he purportedly 
founded the current government. This vision was helped along by his own (at least 
verbal) stance against tyranny, which was easy for the Athenians of the classical period to
believe—in essence, he told them what they wanted to hear, and it suited their purposes 
to believe him. It is entirely possible that Solon did, as he said, wish to help all classes of 
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society by doing as he thought best for them. He may really have tried to be "a mighty 
shield," protecting each faction from the other. So what does this tell us about Solon? 
In order to enact the sort of sweeping economic and social reforms that he 
attempted required the sort of power and political support only possible for someone with
the stature of a tyrant. It is certainly possible that Solon actually had the even-handed 
concern for the welfare of all of the citizens that he claims in his poetry. But the very 
language he uses calls to mind stories and characteristics of tyrants and places him more 
in the context of archaic politics writ large than the genre of sympotic elegy, in which his 
poetry has garnered so much censure. The fact remains that the methods he used were 
those of successful tyrants elsewhere in the Greek world. As we have seen, tyranny was 
often regarded as a viable and desirable solution by citizens of all classes desperate for 
political and social stability. So why did Solon so diligently avoid the label of tyrant? We 
return once more to Athens' pre-Peisistratid experience with tyranny.467 
Solon was very anxious to stabilize the socio-economic situation in Athens, but 
the difference between him and "official" tyrants was that he was equally anxious not to 
wear the label of tyrant. Despite the fact that tyrants often were very effective at quelling 
civil stasis and implementing reforms that benefitted their poleis, Athens' singular 
experience with the attempted tyranny of Cylon, followed by the infighting and 
unsuccessful law code of Drakon, made tyranny especially unattractive to Athenians. 
Cylon's attempt at tyranny resulted in sacrilegious slaughter that disgraced one of the 
most prominent families in Athens, and was followed by not only continuation, but 
escalation, of civil strife. The Athenians therefore had every reason to associate tyranny 
467. See ch. 1, pp. 7-9.
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with violence, rather than with positive effects on the city like those instigated by the 
likes of Periander, Polycrates, and Pheidon. Cylon irreparably damaged not only his own 
κλέος, but that of several leading aristocratic families, and arguably Athens itself.468 
Another indicator of the association of violence with the sort of political upheaval 
associated with tyranny comes from fr. 37: 
As for the demos, it is necessary to chastise them openly; 
I say that they have things now that they have never seen 
even in their dreams. 
And those who are greater and stronger 
might praise me and make me their friend, 
for another would not have 
restrained or checked the demos 
until he had churned the milk and skimmed the cream, 
but I stood as a boundary stone (ὅρος) between two armies. 
δήµωι µὲν εἰ χρὴ διαφάδην ὀνειδίσαι,
ἃ̣ νῦν ἔχουσιν οὔποτ’ ὀφθα̣λ̣µοῖσιν ἂν
εὕδοντες εἶδον ...
ὅσοι δὲ µείζους καὶ βίην̣ ἀµείνονες,
αἰνοῖεν ἄν µε καὶ φίλον ποιοίατο.
οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆµον, οὐδ’ ἐπαύσατο
πρὶν ἀνταράξας πῖαρ ἐξεῖλεν γάλα·
ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐν µεταιχµίωι
ὅρος κατέστην. 
The image of churning milk and skimming cream (i.e., forcibly removing the best part) is
quite a violent one, as is the evocation of the demos and the aristocracy as armies.469 
Solon would have caused turmoil similar to that instigiated by Cylon if he had attempted 
to claim the title. The "cream" obviously refers to the aristocrats, who were in the class 
that was typically targeted by tyrannical takeovers in other poleis. This fragment strongly 
suggests that tyranny was associated with violence in Athens in a way that it was not 
468. This connection is further supported by Solon's direct association of violence and tyranny in line 2 of 
fr. 32, discussed in ch. 4, p. 126.
469. See Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 487-96) for commentary. 
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elsewhere. Therefore Solon's methods had to be couched in terms that would not recall 
the violence and chaos associated with the Athenians' only experience of tyranny, even as
he designed his constitution with elements similar to or identical with those of successful 
tyrants in other parts of Greece. 
Yet within the political framework of archaic Greece writ large, tyranny was often
seen as a positive phenomenon and the most effective way of stabilizing dangerous 
political and social conflict. Despite his frequent assertions to the contrary, Solon's 
methods to quell the civil stasis were borrowed from contemporary tyrants elsewhere in 
Greece who had successfully stabilized their own poleis. Because of the danger of being 
viewed as a tyrant by his contemporaries, Solon made very sure to control his own 
reception by stressing his rejection of tyranny in his poetry, which formed the basis for 
history's memory of his as the father of democracy and a proponent of moderation and 
"the mean." In democratic fifth-century Athens, a political climate that encouraged the 
vilification of tyranny in general and the Peisistratid tyrants in particular, the fragments of
Solon's poems that tended to be preserved were those that seemed most sympathetic to 
democracy, and were taken at face value by later commentators who uncritically accepted
Solon's own assertions about his program and motivations. 
Solon certainly knew the history and benefits of various tyrannies outside of 
Athens, which meant that he very plausibly could have wanted to use the methods of 
tyrants while denying the reality of his actions. In fact, Aristotle comments that an 
effective way of gaining a tyranny is by pretending not to be a tyrant.470 Further, a tyrant 
could seize power by promulgating the fiction that he was in fact a moderate, and that 
470. Arist. Pol. 1314b, 1315b.
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tyranny was the last thing he was aiming for, as Aristotle clearly lays out: 
...ὅτι δεῖ µὴ τυραννικὸν ἀλλ᾽ οἰκονόµον καὶ βασιλικὸν εἶναι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς 
ἀρχοµένοις καὶ µὴ σφετεριστὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἐπίτροπον, καὶ τὰς µετριότητας τοῦ βίου 
διώκειν, µὴ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς µὲν γνωρίµους καθοµιλεῖν, τοὺς δὲ 
πολλοὺς δηµαγωγεῖν. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον οὐ µόνον τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καλλίω 
καὶ ζηλωτοτέραν τῷ βελτιόνων ἄρχειν καὶ µὴ τεταπεινωµένων µηδὲ µισούµενον 
καὶ φοβούµενον διατελεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι πολυχρονιωτέραν, ἔτι δ᾽ 
αὐτὸν διακεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἦθος ἤτοι καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ ἡµίχρηστον ὄντα, καὶ 
µὴ πονηρὸν ἀλλ᾽ ἡµιπόνηρον (Pol. 1315b).
...that it is necessary to appear to the subjects to be not tyrannical but a steward 
and a kingly, and not an appropriator of wealth but a trustee, and to pursue the 
moderate things of life and not its excesses, and also to win the favor of the 
notable citizens and to be a leader of the demos. For the result of these methods 
must be that not only the tyrant's rule will be better and more enviable because he 
will rule better men and not ones who have been lowered, nor will he be 
continually hated and feared, but also that his rule will endure longer, and also 
that he himself in his personal character will be well disposed towards excellence,
or at least half-virtuous, and not base but only half-base.471
Aristotle could be quoting from Solon's poetry. Solon, whether sincere or not, 
claims to be a moderate, and to be working in the best interests of the common people 
and of the elite. His virtue and personal integrity are universally stressed by our sources 
as well, which are all things that Aristotle deems effective tactics for establishing a 
tyranny. Consider Aristides, an arguably similar case in the mid-fifth century. He was 
universally famed for his integrity, yet was the architect of the policy of collecting phoros
(tribute) from the "allies" of the Delian League, which allowed the rise of the oppressive 
Athenian empire, and which sparked the revolts that contributed to the downfall of 
Athens in the Peloponnesian War.472 Solon followed tyrants in his laws regulating weights
and measures, his sumptuary legislation, institutions of government, debt cancellation, 
471. Cf. 1314b. 
472. The most famous story of Aristides' honesty occurs in Plutarch, in which he tells us that Aristides' 
wrote his own name on the ostrakon of an illiterate man who did not know it was Aristides to whom he was
speaking (Arist. 5-6). On his arrangement for tribute payments, see Plut. Arist. 24.
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recall of exiles, and probably many other areas for which we lack evidence. He criticizes 
the elite (fr. 4), but refuses to use violence against them, which was the key to success for
tyrants everywhere else.473 Even though his attempts at reform failed, the reputation of 
being an enemy to tyranny endured in his own writings and in those of others, regardless 
of the truth of his methods. While making definitive claims about Solon's intentions goes 
beyond the evidence, it is clear that in order to enact the sort of reforms he attempted 
required him to be a tyrant in all but name. 
Solon may or may not have had the hunger for power associated with tyrants by 
later generations; he may simply have wished to employ techniques that had worked in 
other poleis in similar crises. Solon's particular wish to avoid the label because of Athens'
experience with Cylon, combined with the tendency to condemn tyranny uncritically after
the rise of democracy, cemented literary characterizations of Solon as a misotyrannos. 
Stripping the literary evidence of the philosophical moralizing and democratic overtones 
that have accreted over the millennia gives us a reading that is at least as plausible as the 
more common interpretation of Solon as protodemocratic reformer, and in many cases 
actually makes more sense. Because his reforms were sandwiched between Drakon's 
harsh control of the state and the open tyranny of Peisistratos, and because some of his 
reforms did indeed provide the foundation for Cleisthenes' expansion of political power 
to even the poor citizens, he was remembered as a sort of anti-tyranny crusader, that is, 
everything that Drakon and Peisistratos were not. 
In this dissertation, I have demonstrated that by asking different questions and 
473. See Salmon (1997: 68-69), and Lewis (2009: 26-27) on various methods for successful takeovers by 
tyrants, with references. 
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looking at the evidence in new ways, we find different answers, without straining or 
violating our sources. What we end up with is a picture of a man who was a product of 
his times and his particular situation. Solon's reforms may have been unsuccessful, but 
because of what he says about himself in his poetry, he assured that his legacy was 
exactly what he wanted it to be—that of a tyrant-hating, persecuted political visionary 
whose attempted to cure the ills of the state backfired because of the stubbornness of a 
citizenry too stiff-necked to recognize measures put in place for their own good. 
While the scholarship on the crisis of the sixth century is vast, the value of this 
project is that it recognizes and attempts to correct a methodological flaw that has 
plagued much of the scholarship on Solon for the last two-and-a-half millenia. In no way 
do I wish to minimize the importance or the value of previous excellent work on Solon 
and archaic tyranny, without which I could not have completed this project. Many 
scholars before me have noted inconsistencies in the ancient literature about Solon.474 But
they frequently fail to follow up on these observations by examining the larger context of 
archaic politics in which Solon operated, and do not question characterizations of Solon 
that ultimately derive from himself. By doing so, I have created a different picture not 
only of Solon's activities, methods, and motives, but complicated the picture of the "Age 
of Tyrants" in general and the constitutional history of Athens in particular. 
Much work remains to be done. While I have examined what happened to the 
figure of Solon in literature and in the popular imagination, the next step is to explore 
why such a change took place. I intend for this dissertation to serve as a starting point for 
future inquiries not only into the methods and reception of Peisistratos, but into the 
474. Adcock (1912: 1-16) and 1927, while two of the earliest, remain two of the best.
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changing sociopolitical climate associated with the rise of democracy after the 
tyrannicide and the reforms of Cleisthenes. We have seen the ways in which Solon's 
persona changed from that of failed constitutional reformer in the sixth century to the 
philosopher, poet, sage, nomothetes, misotyrannos, and protodemocrat that emerge as 
early as Herodotus. I propose to explain this phenomenon in terms of the oral tradition 
associated with the rise of democracy, in terms of a shift in cultural mores in the last 
decade or so of the fifth century.475 
The need for stability after the turbulence and civic upheaval caused partly by 
young hotheads like Alcibiades, the prime mover of the disastrous Sicilian Expedition 
that resulted in the loss of the Peloponnesian War, sparked a desire to return to the patrios
politeia, or "ancestral constitution," a well-documented and widespread phenomenon. It 
is only then that Solon took his place in the constitutional history of Athens as the 
founder of democracy, and so filled this niche and became the focus of much of the 
rhetoric surrounding the need for a return to the "good old days" of the Athenian 
forefathers. Solon thus became a generic and ubiquitous figure, whom authors from the 
fourth century on cited to verify whatever argument they happened to be making, and 
who has come down to us as inextricably tied to the rise of democracy. 
475. I intend to build partly on the valuable work of Shear 2011, who explores evidence for this 
phenomenon in particular from an archaeological standpoint. Irwin remains one of the only scholars to 
associate Solon with deliberate attempts at tyrannical power, focusing on his poetry (2005 and 2006), and 
whose work greatly influenced ch. 4 of this work.
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Appendix I
Peisistratos: Cleaning up after Solon?
Because we derive most of our traditions from Solon's poetry, we can say with 
some certainty that Solon played an active part in controlling his own reception. 
Conversely, we have no contemporaneous sources for the Peisistratids—we must rely 
exclusively on accounts that were written down long after the fall of the tyranny, when 
the political climate made defense of tyranny impractical if not impossible. Our sources 
report that Solon made valiant efforts to prevent the tyranny, and he is even depicted as 
being a tyrant-hater in all of his actions and attitudes—though as we have seen, this 
tradition contains many contradictions and even confusion about which activities and 
reforms were made by him and which by Peisistratos. We read that Peisistratos stabilized 
the turbulent political situation largely by retaining Solon's constitution and methods for 
ordering society. The looming question is, if Solon and Peisistratos had so many 
associations in the traditions, and were even in some cases indistinguishable, why did 
Solon fail and Peisistratos succeed? If Peisistratos used Solon's laws, why was he able to 
make them work while Solon was forced to leave town? Much of what follows is 
speculation, though I believe it is a plausible alternative interpretation of the situation in 
post-Solonian Athens, and does not violate our evidence, particularly give the biases 
against tyranny that we know affected the objectivity of our sources about Peisistratos.
I argue that Peisistratos recognized that Solon's attempts to conciliate both 
wealthy and poor at the same time was the major reason for his downfall, and saw that it 
was much easier to mend fences once he was firmly in power than to walk such a fine 
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line at the beginning.476 Contemporary tyrants tended to come to power with the support 
of one class or the other, but most often with the support of the demos against an 
oppressive aristocracy—as indeed was the case (at least initially) with Peisistratos.477 
Peisistatos' genius was that he managed to retain the support of the demos and conciliate 
the aristocracy after the fact. His initial enmity with Lycurgus and Megacles and their 
respective partisans, while fierce before and during his first two takeovers, seems to have 
melted away after he took power for the third time. As the saying goes, it is easier to ask 
forgiveness than permission. Peisistratos first secured power via support of the demos, 
and only then concentrated on winning over the nobility. Solon's mistake was that he tried
to retain the support of everyone from the beginning. Thus Peisistratos was able to come 
to power using the very laws that were (supposedly) designed to prevent tyranny. He 
changed the implementation of the laws just enough so that they were effective, but not 
so much that their rhetorically valuable continuity with Solon was compromised.
One of the main sources of animosity against Solon was the dissatisfaction of the 
demos with his agrarian reforms. The demos wanted a redistribution of land, which Solon
refused to do for fear of alienating the upper classes, who had already suffered significant
losses with the cancellation of debt. We have seen that both redistribution of land and 
debt cancellation were normally associated with tyrants from pre-through-post classical 
times, and that Solon's halfway measures were unsuccessful. By contrast, we read that 
one of Peisistratos' most popular reforms was his support of the common people and the 
476. See ch. 5, pp. 160-163.
477. See Salmon (1997: 68-69) and Lewis (2009: 26-27) on various methods for successful takeovers by 
tyrants, with references, and Holladay (1977: 44-45) on Peisistratos' attempts to conciliate the aristocracy 
only after he had firmly established his power with the help of the demos. 
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farmers. For instance, we have an anecdote of a time when the tyrant, while traveling the 
countryside in disguise, spoke with a man who criticized Peisistratos' tax laws without 
knowing it was the tyrant to whom he spoke. Peisistratos appreciated the man's frankness 
and exempted him from paying taxes (Ath. Pol. 16). The Ath. Pol. (16.2-5) also tells us 
that Peisistratos
advanced money to the bankrupt to further their work so they could make a 
living as farmers. He did this for two reasons: he did not want them in the city, but
scattered in the country, and if they had enough to live on, and were busy with 
their own affairs, they would neither want nor have time to interfere with state 
matters. The working of the land increased his revenues, for he took a ten per cent
tax from the yield. He also had the same motive for establishing the magistrates of
the demes and for travelling around the country often, inspecting and settling 
disputes, so that the people would not have to come into the city and neglect their 
work.
καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀπόροις προεδάνειζε χρήµατα πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, ὥστε 
διατρέφεσθαι γεωργοῦντας. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐποίει δυοῖν χάριν, ἵνα µήτε ἐν τῷ ἄστει 
διατρίβωσιν, ἀλλὰ διεσπαρµένοι κατὰ τὴν χώραν, καὶ ὅπως εὐποροῦντες τῶν 
µετρίων καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις ὄντες, µήτ᾽ ἐπιθυµῶσι µήτε σχολάζωσιν ἐπιµελεῖσθαι
τῶν κοινῶν. ἅµα δὲ συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς προσόδους γίγνεσθαι µείζους, 
ἐξεργαζοµένης τῆς χώρας. ἐπράττετο γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γιγνοµένων δεκάτην. διὸ 
καὶ τοὺς κατὰ δήµους κατεσκεύασε δικαστάς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐξῄει πολλάκις εἰς τὴν 
χώραν, ἐπισκοπῶν καὶ διαλύων τοὺς διαφεροµένους, ὅπως µὴ καταβαίνοντες εἰς 
τὸ ἄστυ παραµελῶσι τῶν ἔργων.
 It would not make sense for Peisistratos to take these measures unless they were 
meant to address very specific problems—that is, problems caused by Solon's agrarian 
legislation. Not only did Peisistratos visit farms and relieve at least one poor farmer from 
his tax burden, his tithe of one-tenth from the produce of farmers likely provided the 
original revenue for these bailout loans, which would have pleased (or at least appeased) 
poor farmers, since a tax of one-tenth would be much less of a burden to supply than the 
former rate of one-sixth that the hektemoroi had to pay. It would also have appeased the 
aristocrats because they would not have to shoulder the burden of the demos' debt the 
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way they had during the seisachtheia, with their loss of capital from the abolition of 
debt.478 Given that we hear nothing of such loans under Peisistratos' sons or in our fifth 
century sources, it is seems that this loan policy was of limited duration, which would be 
consistent with the period of time that it would take a small farmer either to revive a 
fallow farm or to change to a more remunerative cash crop, either of which options would
help stimulate a flagging economy.479 Later commentators would not have preserved 
these details unless they had proved significant, most likely by addressing something that 
had become a major problem. 
The fact that Peisistratos advanced money to bankrupt people and encouraged 
them to farm strongly suggests that these people could get money no other way—they 
could no longer offer themselves as surety for loans and were thereby destitute until 
Peisistratos stepped in and bailed them out with support for farming. The fact that he was 
targeting unemployed members of the demos to pursue agriculture because he did not 
want them in the city suggests overcrowding, as would be expected of people fleeing the 
countryside in hopes of a more lucrative urban existence. He did not want them to meddle
in affairs, which could also mean that he wanted his political rivals to have less 
manpower on which to draw to avoid the sort of armed factional strife that surrounded his
478. Even though Aristotle writes of Peisistratos' enmity to the rich (Pol. 5.1305a 22-24), this is unlikely to 
be as cut-and-dry as our later sources would have it, considering the various alliances between Peisistratos, 
Lycurgus, and Megacles. Even though this affiliation dissolved when Megacles learned of Peisistratos' 
mistreatment of his daughter, it shows that rival aristocratic clans were willing to ally with Peisistratos. The
archon lists give us even more concrete evidence that the Peisistratids retained prominent members of 
various aristocratic clans in high office, though some scholars, like Goušchin (1999: 18), take Aristotle's 
statement about Peisistratos' unremitting enmity of the rich at face value. Peisistratos further gained credit 
with the demos because of his military successes at Nisaea (Hdt. 1.59.4, Ath. Pol. 14.1), which earned him 
the title of demotidotatos. On the archon list, see ch. 1, p. 9 n. 11.
479. See Holladay (1977: 50). These measures seem to have ceased before the end of the tyranny, at which 
point we hear nothing further of either such a tax or of agricultural crises among the population of rural 
Attica. This would seem to indicate the success of Peisistratos' program. 
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own final seizure of power. His travels around the countryside made it unnecessary for 
people to take time off of work to settle disputes, and would also have had the effect of 
discouraging idle and unemployed country dwellers from loitering in Athens proper to get
justice.
Hence we see Peisistratos using a variation on Solon's legislation more 
successfully than Solon did—he managed to avert an agrarian crisis without 
redistributing land, something Solon failed to do. Moreover, he conciliated the wealthy 
while helping the poor. Rather than a sweeping debt cancellation, he instituted the tithe. 
This was probably not popular among the wealthy, but was a better alternative than 
another blanket debt cancellation or the confiscation and redistribution of their estates, 
both of which were more typical moves of tyrants.480 Solon, by making wealth rather than
birth the determining factor in political power, paved the way for Peisistratos' agricultural
program, and this allowed him to maintain the status quo, make as few enemies as 
possible, and preserve a reputation for ruling according to the "old ways."481 
If, as I have argued, the seisachtheia resulted in a large part of the population 
having no means of livelihood, as in all times of economic strife throughout history there 
would have been an influx of people from the countryside to urban centers looking for 
alternate means of supporting themselves. Given the aristocratic infighting that we know 
was taking place at this time, it is not unlikely that some of the people from rural Attica 
who came to Athens looking for work were employed as (perhaps armed) servants. We 
480. We have no evidence of land redistribution by Peisistratos, and given the already discussed 
connections between tyrants and land redistribution, it stretches belief that all trace of such an action would
have disappeared, especially in the tyrant-hostile society of fifth-and fourth-century Athens and later, with 
their associations of land distribution with tyranny. 
481. Holladay (1977: 50-51) discusses the relationship of Peisistratos with the wealthier classes, and the 
delicate balance he struck while looking after the interests of the rich and the poor.
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have several mentions of bodyguards for aristocrats, and even more oblique mentions of 
"supporters" or "partisans," where the nature of the association with their party leader is 
unclear, but could plausibly be that of armed supporter or hired thug. Scholars have long 
debated the identity of these supporters, but an answer may lie in the high poverty rates 
that would have set in after the seisachtheia's unsuccessful attempts to prevent this very 
thing. 
For example, Peisistratos' first seizure of power ca. 561/0 involved his bodyguard 
of κορυνηφόροι, or "club-bearers," which was a substantial enough force to allow him to 
seize and hold the acropolis, and eventually take control of the entire city (Hdt. 1.59). 
Peisistratos supposedly collected partisans (συλλέξας στασιώτας) to champion his cause. 
He wounded himself, went to the agora, and claimed that he had been attacked on his 
way out of town. As he was a popular war hero, the people gave him a bodyguard of 
club-bearers instead of the more expected spearmen: "Deceived, the Athenians gave him 
a guard of chosen citizens, whom Peisistratos made club-bearers instead of spear-bearers:
for the guard that followed him carried wooden clubs" (Hdt. 1.59.5; ὁ δὲ δῆµος ὁ τῶν 
Ἀθηναίων ἐξαπατηθεὶς ἔδωκέ οἱ τῶν ἀστῶν καταλέξας ἄνδρας τούτους οἳ δορυφόροι µὲν
οὐκ ἐγένοντο Πεισιστράτου, κορυνηφόροι δέ: ξύλων γὰρ κορύνας ἔχοντες εἵποντό οἱ 
ὄπισθε).482 These club-bearers helped Peisistratos seize the acropolis and thus control the 
entire city, after which he ruled well according to the established constitution: 
482. Plutarch adds the dramatic details that the assembly voted him fifty men, a motion formally opposed 
by Solon, whose prophetic warnings about the danger of tyranny were shouted down (Sol. 30.1-3). 
Goušchin (1999: 21) (with references) argues that Herodotus is mistaken, and that Peisistratos' supporters 
were doryphoroi, "spearmen." Plato (Rep. 566b) also makes it clear that tyrants often established 
themselves using bodyguards of doryphoroi. Boardman (1975: 1-12) suggests that the club-bearers were a 
symbolic, rather than a literal force, and that they modeled their choice of weapon on that of Herakles, 
whom he argued was a prominent figure in Peisistratid propaganda; see also Boardman (1984: 239-47) and 
1989, in which he answers critics of his interpretation. 
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"Peisistratos ruled the Athenians, not at all disturbing the magistracies or changing the 
laws, but governing the city according to its established constitution and arranging all 
things fairly and well" (Hdt. 1.59.6; ἔνθα δὴ ὁ Πεισίστρατος ἦρχε Ἀθηναίων, οὔτε τιµὰς 
τὰς ἐούσας συνταράξας οὔτε θέσµια µεταλλάξας, ἐπί τε τοῖσι κατεστεῶσι ἔνεµε τὴν πόλιν
κοσµέων καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ).483 Aristotle specifies that Solon did not dissolve existing 
institutions, and kept select laws like that of Drakon on homicide (Pol. 1273b 42-74a). 
Peisistratos also seems to have taken care not to upset existing laws, as this is emphasized
in our sources.484 Plutarch goes so far as to report that Peisistratos deliberately cultivated 
Solon, treating him with respect and having him as a guest in his home, and eventually 
winning him over as an advisor who approved many of his laws (Plut. Sol. 31.2-3). He 
then tells the story of Peisistratos appearing before the Areopagus to answer a charge of 
murder.485 This evokes another connection with Solon, the supposed creator of the 
Areopagus.486 It was not until his rivals, Megacles and Lycurgus, combined their 
483. Plutarch elaborates on the nature of the political parties. He differs from Herodotus in saying that the 
city was divided into factions before Solon's reforms, which caused the tensions leading to the crisis. He 
classes the hillmen as extreme democrats, the plainsmen as extreme oligarchs, and the shore party as 
moderate and mixed, and as preventing either of the other two groups from gaining absolute control (Sol. 
13.1). He says that after Solon left the city, the citizens slipped back into the same factions, with Lycurgus 
leading the plainsmen, Megacles the Alcmaeonid leading the shore men, and Peisistratos leading the hill 
men, who mostly consisted of thetes, and were bitter enemies of the rich (29.1). Cf. Ath. Pol. 13.4, which 
outlines the same divisions. Herodotus calls the parties οἱ ἐκ τοῦ πεδίου, πάραλοι, and υπεράκριωι (1.59.3);
and the Ath. Pol. calls them πεδιακοὶ, παράλιοι, and διάκριοι (13.1). For a fuller account of the use of these 
terms, see Hopper (1961: 189 ff.)
484. Ath. Pol. 7.1, Hdt. 1.59.6, Thuc. 6.54.6, and Plut. Sol. 31.2-3.
485. See Podlecki (1987: 8).
486. As reported by Plutarch—who, however, is not completely convinced (Sol. 19.1-5). Another (though 
admittedly much more speculative and tenuous) link is the length of time of exiles. After his legislation 
Solon is supposed to have left Athens for ten years of self-imposed exile, a story which becomes integral in 
the seven sages tradition wherein Solon wanders the world in a sight-seeing tour (theoria). I simply note, 
after Podlecki (1987: 8), that ten years is the precise length of Peisistratos' second exile, after which he 
returned for a final time and finally seized the tyranny permanently. Also consider that ten years is the 
length of time Odysseus wandered the world en route from Troy to Ithaca, and the length of time that an 
ostracized person was banned from Attica in the fifth century and later. 
188
resources and followers (ὁµοφρονήσαντες) that they were able to drive Peisistratos out 
(Hdt. 1.60).487 
The identity of the club-bearers has long caused scholars puzzlement; perhaps 
they were part of the element of unemployed in the city, who would have flocked to 
Peisistratos if he promised them the sort of financial and social support that he in fact 
delivered after his power was firmly established. We can find parallels in the bodyguards 
of other tyrants as well—later sources tell us that Cleisthenes of Sicyon also had club-
bearers, and Megacles of Mytilene actually defeated the ruling Penthilid clan, who were 
unjustly bludgeoning opponents to their power.488 
Aristotle says that demagogues, which he elsewhere closely associates with 
tyrants (Pol. 1305a6, 1308a19, 1310b12), gained power by pretending to speak on behalf 
of the demos. Solon tried to have it both ways; Peisistratos tried twice to use his 
connections with the aristocracy to secure power and failed, but on his third attempt he 
realized that he must use force and overthrow the aristocrats. After he was established in 
power, he made overtures to the elite and managed to achieve the sort of balance that 
487. On these factions, see Hdt. 1.59.3. He outlines three competing parties: the men of the coast, led by 
Megacles the Alcmaeonid, the men of the plain, led by Lycurgus, and those of the hills, led by Peisistratos. 
Many scholars assume that these were merely personal followers of various aristocrats who were vying for 
power, with the goal being reward for individual partisans, rather than any political stakes. See Holladay 
(1977: 43), Sealey (1960: 155 ff.), and Hopper (1961: 189 ff.). Holladay (1977: 43-45) also discusses the 
likelihood of support for each party clustering around the ancestral lands of the leaders, as it is likely that 
they would have the most solid support in the area of their own estates in the form of kinsmen, neighbors, 
dependents, and employees, especially when considering control of cult centers and religious influence, as 
when Peisistratos taking care to build new centralized religious cults in the city, and Cleisthenes' attention 
to the boundaries in his new scheme of demes, though he stresses that political support need not have been 
purely along geographic lines. He does note that the people in the city of Athens were a very valuable 
voting bloc to control, since they could attend the assembly often and easily, adding a political following to 
an already existing personal one; see also Lewis (1963: 22-40)). If, as I argue, there was an influx of 
dispossessed farmers to the city, this would have increased any candidate who promised support of the 
poorer elements of society increased influence.
488. On Cleisthenes' club-bearers, see Poll. 3.83, 7.68; on Megacles, see Arist. Pol. 1311b26-28. See also 
McGlew (1993: 78) on association of retribution and justice with the establishment of tyrannical rule. 
189
Solon had failed to create by trying to introduce equanimity in the first place.
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History of Scholarship on the Seisachtheia
From the late 19th century through about the 1960s, scholarship on the 
seisachtheia largely revolved around the question of whether Attic land in the archaic 
period was alienable or inalienable. Not many scholars still believe that land was 
inalienable, but the issue was integral to early studies of the agrarian problem, so I will 
outline it in considerable detail here. Very broadly, we can assign the theories on the 
stasis that led to the warring factions between the demos and the elite to two major axes. 
Some scholars focus on the problem of debt-bondage, stemming from aristocratic abuses 
brought on by the booming economy of the Archaic Age, which led to the debt crisis.489 
Others believe that the basic problem was one of status struggles between the elite and an
emerging "middle class" of wealthy farmer, coinciding with a rise in overseas trading and
a new commercial class.490 These theories are variously put in context of overpopulation/
demographic instability, agrarian crises, chattel slavery versus some form of 
sharecropping, and sweeping redistributions of land. 
I. Inalienable Land and Debt-Based Hektemorage
For scholars who believe that the root of the stasis was a debt crisis stemming 
from sweeping changes in the Archaic economy, one of the most contentious areas of 
debate has historically been whether or not (particularly arable) land was inalienable or 
489. For evidence of the rise of commerce and overseas trade in the Archaic period, cf. Hesiod W&D 
615-640 on the proper season to sail and embark on trading missions. For the suggestion that the rise in 
overseas trade would have allowed the peasants to take up commerce, were it not for their reduction to 
serfdom from debt, see von Fritz & Kapp (1950: 154). See Rhodes (1993: 89-97) on the puzzling 
distinction between metaphysical and actual debt-bondage. He argues that Aristotle (though less clearly 
than Plutarch; Sol. 13.4-5) distinguishes between two types of bondage: one that is the metaphorical 
enslavement of the earth, marked by the horoi, and the other as genuine chattel slavery in which the slave 
could be sold abroad at his owner's whim. 
490. Ibid.
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whether ownership of land could change. In the view of scholars who believe that land 
was inalienable, the situation was roughly as follows: first, the land was divided into 
public and private lots. The public land generally could not be farmed because of poor 
soil or topography, and therefore was used mainly for grazing livestock, while private 
land was mostly given to farming. The hektemoroi were probably small landowners who 
remained on their land if they defaulted on debts, but then worked it for the profit of their
lenders. Hektemoroi then transferred their land to their aristocratic lenders to satisfy their 
un-payable debt, but land being inalienable, were retained as laborers in spite of 
"officially" owning the land. Aristocrats eventually took over all of the arable land at the 
expense of poor farmers who had previously depended on it, and the hektemoroi became 
the equivalent of hereditary serfs working for aristocratic proprietors.491 Andrewes argues
that the rate of one-sixth is too low to suggest either a repayment rate for borrowing or 
sharecropping, though parallels for similar rates elsewhere in the ancient world do 
exist.492 He elaborates, "It is hard enough to see why any rich man should lend to the poor
for so slight a return, and still harder to see why so many should have adopted an 
identical rate that their debtors acquired this specific designation" (1982: 379). 
Woodhouse, speculating on how tenants who pay a quota rather than a quantity could get 
in arrears in payment in the first place, says (1938: 33),
...the actual yield in a particular year [may have been] so poor, or the proportion 
itself so excessive, that in lean years, after deduction of the quota, the balance was
insufficient to tide the tenant over to his next harvest, while providing also seed-
corn for his next sowing. An extraordinary run of bad seasons may thus...have 
491. Cassola (1964: 26-34) surveys scholarship from the mid-nineteenth century through 1964. Solon fr. 
4.12 refers to the aristocrats seizing public possessions, which suggests that they took over occupied land 
that had previously been available for the use of all. See further Wallace (2007: 49-51).
492. See below p. 204 n. 529.
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compelled all the landlords in Attica, through sheer humanity, or enlightened self-
interest, to forego exaction of their quotas, and to carry forward the amount as a 
debt, which then by accumulation ultimately swallowed up the entire produce of 
the various farms, and left the tenants of them eternally in arrears.493
The low rates of return may provide an explanation for why the hektemoroi were 
unable to get out of debt. If there was such poverty that the tenant could not afford a 
higher rate of repayment, creditors, recognizing that one cannot squeeze blood from a 
stone, would have been forced to accept a rate that was manageable. But if the original 
amount of the loan were high enough, a repayment rate of one-sixth would take many 
years to pay off, especially if there was need for a second loan during a bad year. In this 
scenario, the small farmer may have found himself forced into the situation that caused 
the crisis. If a borrower defaulted on his debt, a greedy lender would acquire both a 
valuable slave and the usufruct of the new debt-slave's land. If the system were so rigged,
an aristocratic creditor may have seen this as an investment worth a low initial yield. It is 
also possible that low rates were legislated by some sort of usury laws in Drakon's law 
code, if we can believe Hesychius that Solon did away with Drakon's laws on debt.494
There are parallels for this in the biblical story of Joseph in Egypt.495 
Another reason why aristocrats would make such loans is that it was more 
advantageous for them to loan out excess seed to destitute farmers than to have it rot in 
storehouses, where it would benefit no one. Unused grain would yield no profits at all, 
while grain lent out at even low rates could produce enough to make a loan worthwhile. 
By loaning out excess seed, aristocrats were also ensuring their ability to feed themselves
493. Woodhouse perhaps bases his reconstruction too heavily on enclosure and common pasture laws from 
the 16th-19th centuries. 
494. Sol. 24.3; for speculation on the nature of Drakon's debt laws see Hammond (1961: 90).
495. See below p. 204 n. 529.
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and their families, since their own land was as vulnerable as anyone else's to bad weather 
and crop failure. This leaves Woodhouse's problem of proportions. Loaning out a certain 
amount of seed does not guarantee a return of anything close to the same amount. For 
example, if one lent enough seed to sow five hundred hectares, in a bad year, a return on 
the entire estate may only yield the equivalent of one hundred hectares. We do not know 
what proportion a farmer was then obligated to pay—another reason debt-slavery would 
have been so widespread is that perhaps the one-sixth payment was not out of the crop 
yield, but out of the original amount of the loan. Even good years are unlikely to yield as 
much grain as was sown, especially when considering the poor soil of Attica. Loans 
would be difficult to repay even in good years, and the debtor would be pretty much 
guaranteed to default and become a hektemoros or a permanent serf or debt-slave. 
Because we know so little about the technicalities of land ownership in archaic 
Attica, it is impossible to know for certain whether land was fungible, though most 
scholars since the 1960s have moved away from the idea that land in Attica was ever 
inalienable. Since the pre-monetary economy so heavily depended on peasant farming, 
though, many deem it unlikely that land could be sold, but rather that it was passed along 
from father to son as a birthright.496 Woodhouse provides the clearest and most detailed 
treatment of the idea that the hektemoroi were to be understood in the context of the 
inalienability of land in Attica.497 In Woodhouse's view, hektemorage was merely an 
496. As Woodhouse (1938: 81) phrases it, selling the family estate was simply "not done," though he does 
not address the fact that selling one's actual family apparently was (Plut. Sol. 13). See also Westermann 
(1955: 4) on the sale of family members into slavery. 
497. Woodhouse (1938: 74-87). Most other modern treatments of scholars who begin with the basic 
premise of the inalienability of land put forth some version of Woodhouse's view, many of which are very 
little altered, even if they do not cite Woodhouse's study—for example French (1956: 11-25). For this 
reason I will go into some detail about Woodhouse's scheme. Other scholars adopting Woodhouse's views, 
with or without modification, include Lewis (1941: 144-56), Fine (1951: 167-208), and Hammond (1961: 
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alternative to debt-bondage, fundamentally based on the premise that land was 
inalienable. He asks why any peasant farmer would embrace the possibility of becoming 
a slave (or at best a serf) if the option of selling his plot of land was open to him.498 
French elaborates, "When there is no obvious alternative livelihood to farming, land is 
more or less beyond price; hence it is quite possible that in early Attica there was a 
traditional taboo on the sale of land..." (1963: 242). There is also a mention in Aristotle 
(Pol. 1319a) that in the "old days" many cities forbade the sale of the first lands allotted 
to colonial settlers, and in Pol. 1266b he refers to the breakdown of an analogous law at 
Leukas, which had mandated that the original lots remain undivided. However Aristotle 
was also convinced that without stringent population control similar systems could not 
survive long (Pol. 1266b 11-12). 
Such comparisons with laws in colonies or cleruchies must of course be used with
extreme caution when speculating about the system of land distribution on the mainland. 
Hammond cites Thucydides to support his argument that land was, in fact, inalienable: 
"Their trouble and discontent at abandoning their houses and the hereditary temples of 
the ancestral constitution was deep, and at having to change their habits and bid farewell 
to what each regarded as his native polis" (2.16.2; ἐβαρύνοντο δὲ καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔφερον 
οἰκίας τε καταλείποντες καὶ ἱερὰ ἃ διὰ παντὸς ἦν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον πολιτείας
πάτρια δίαιτάν τε µέλλοντες µεταβάλλειν καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλιν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀπολείπων 
ἕκαστος).499 French points out that this does not necessarily prove the inalienability of 
land; rather, it merely points to a stability in inheritance patterns.500 He also refers to the 
76-98). For a summary of these positions see Rhodes (1993: 93-97). 
498. Woodhouse (1938: 76).
499. Hammond (1961: 86).
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fact that Plutarch, in his examination of fourth-century sources, was unaware of land 
being inalienable in the fifth century, as he mentions Themistocles' sale of a certain estate
in Them. 18.5.501 
a. Private vs. Public Land
Woodhouse makes a distinction between arable land, which was allocated to 
farmers and passed down through generations, and non-arable or common land, such as 
pastures on mountain slopes that could be used by anyone for grazing livestock but not 
farming.502 Since there was no institutionalized variant of serfdom, as with the helots in 
ancient Sparta, he sees each farmer as in possession of an ancestral piece of property, but 
in addition to this he had access to public land. This land could wind up under the control
of the wealthier landed aristocrats by a system of division of estate rights or individual 
contractual agreements whereby the peasant used the public land on behalf of an 
aristocratic lender. This would not have prohibited transferring limited rights short of 
complete change of ownership, and thus would public land come under aristocratic 
control. This would be binding not only on the maker of the contract but on all of his 
heirs without violating the principle of the inalienability of land.503 
b. Economic Restructuring
The root problem, in Woodhouse's view, is that a new sort of commerce-based 
economy was gradually rising in Attica in the seventh and sixth centuries, replacing the 
500. French 1963: 244. 
501. French (1963: 243-44). 
502. Woodhouse (1938: 74-87) and Asheri (1963: 6-14).
503. Woodhouse's scheme resembles practices found in British common law regarding the division of 
rights in real estate. See further Almeida (2003: 31). For land inheritance, especially in cases where there 
are no male heirs, see Rhodes (1993: 163).
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old one based on subsistence and small-estate farming.504 This new emphasis on trade and
introduction of various luxuries instilled in aristocratic estate owners the desire to 
accumulate more and more productive land in order to take a greater role in trade for 
commercial profit. As the aristocratic interests in commercial profit grew, the small 
freeholder found it harder and harder to meet basic subsistence requirements from his 
land because of factors like agricultural failure due to drought, soil conditions, etc. This 
would put small farmers in the position of needing to borrow from wealthier aristocratic 
landowners in order to meet their basic needs for survival. Since there was at this time no 
currency-based system of trade, the small farmer could not borrow money for long-term 
improvements such as better agricultural tools or technology to boost crop yields, but 
only borrowed to avoid starvation. In other words, the poor needed money for 
subsistence, while the rich desired money to invest capital to control more land.505
i.  Ownership vs. Possession
Woodhouse also draws distinction between ownership and possession. He sees the
aristocrats as first beginning to appropriate common land to their private ownership, 
pushing out the smaller landowner who likely used it to pasture livestock. The elite were 
then poised to take advantage of small farmers in crisis, by purchasing the right of 
possession rather than out-and-out ownership via a sort of subsistence loan, which 
accrued an interest of one-sixth of the yearly produce. Because of the inalienability 
principle, though, the owner or his heirs had the right to repurchase the land at any time. 
504. According to Thucydides, economic growth was the main factor in the rise of tyranny: "As Greece 
became more powerful and acquired more wealth than it had previously, tyrannies were established in 
nearly every city” (1.13.1; δυνατωτέρας δὲ γιγνοµένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῶν χρηµάτων τὴν κτῆσιν ἔτι 
µᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ποιουµένης τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσταντο).
505. Woodhouse (1938: 147). For a succinct summary, see Almeida (2003: 31).
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Thus no technical transference of ownership took place, and further, the aristocrats were 
required to lease the possessory right of the land to the original owner at a rent of one-
sixth of the annual yield of the land; these transactions were recorded on the famous 
horoi that dotted the sixth-century countryside.506 The owner therefore had a right to 
tenancy which could not be circumvented by an aristocratic lender. This effectively made 
the owner a tenant until he or his heirs could pay off the debt, a scenario that, realistically,
was unlikely. The aristocratic lender therefore was able to invest capital for a return of 
one-sixth of the produce of the land, with a loan that was secured by his ownership of 
possessory right of the land, and most importantly, he acquired free labor by the owner of
the land, who had essentially become a lifelong tenant on his own property. 
ii.  From Hektemoros to Debt-Slave
So how did this scenario lead to hektemorage and debt-bondage? So far, as long 
as the sixth-part interest payment never fell into arrears the tenant was not in danger of 
enslavement. But if he did get behind on payments, his interest would accumulate to the 
point where he would either face debt-slavery or hektemorage, in which he would stay in 
possession of his land, but rather than pay one-sixth part, only keep one-sixth part as a 
sort of subsistence dole, turning over the lion's share to his landlord. The hektemoroi 
would have become so completely dependent on the aristocracy for whom they labored 
that their status was de facto, if not de iure, permanent, because of the impossibility of 
paying off the obligations of both the original debt and the accumulated arrears. The 
heketemoroi were tantamount to, but not technically slaves. Thus the terminology in our 
506. Woodhouse (1938: 147).
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sources describing their status in terms of slavery was appropriate, if not literal.507 Thus 
the landlord, rather than garnering a portion of whatever the tenant produced on his own 
initiative, now had the power to dictate the use of the land; i.e., he could demand that the 
land be turned over from farming to the production of olives and grapes, which was a 
more profitable trade commodity but less useful when trying to keep one's family from 
starvation.508 In this way Woodhouse envisions the hektemoroi as separate from those in 
regular debt-bondage, which was merely an alternative option that the debtor could 
choose in place of becoming a hektemoros.509 Woodhouse thus sees the seisachtheia as 
destroying the hektemorage by prohibiting loans with the person of the debtor as 
collateral and the return of the right of possession to the actual, technical owners of the 
land.510
c. Inalienable Land and Class-Based Hektemorage
Hammond begins from the same premises as Woodhouse—first, that land was 
inalienable and passed down from father to son as an inheritance, and that debt was the 
source of the hektemorage. However he deals much more extensively with the issue of 
citizenship. Woodhouse clung to the premise that, in the absence of a formal serf system, 
the system of debt and debt-bondage was one of advantage and obligation, a private 
507. For this argument, with ancient references, see Woodhouse (1938: 44-49). 
508. Woodhouse (1938: 155).
509. Ibid. Woodhouse sees a great discrepancy between the amount of the loan and the actual value of the 
possessory right of the land, as well as a discrepancy between the sixth-part rent's given and received 
values. This stacking of the deck in favor of the aristocrats, he contends, is indicative that Athens at this 
time was an extreme oligarchy, which fits in well with the assertions in the Ath. Pol. that all of the land was
in the hands of a few.
510. Woodhouse allows that a possible objection to his scheme is the argument that this was a form of 
redistribution of land that Solon denied. He claims that this works because no technical redistribution of 
land occurred because the small farmer retained absolute ownership, even if he had lost possession, a 
situation that was visibly attested by the horoi stones, which would have displayed the original price of the 
loan (the price required for redemption of the land), and therefore would be proof that the right of 
redemption existed.
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relationship between individuals rather than one enforced by a central authority. 
Hammond, on the other hand, sees hektemorage as a legal system that formally 
discriminated based on race and class.511 He takes the Athenian claim of autochthony and 
applies it to the political situation of the seventh and sixth centuries. In his view, 
preservation of the ownership of land was tied to the preservation of the racial purity of 
the descendants of the original inhabitants of Attica, formalized by organization into 
tribes and phratries dating from the fall of Mycenae and the so-called Dorian invasion.512 
In his view, the post-migration "newcomers" were either adopted into a familial 
genos (γεννῆται ὁµογάλακτες), which entitled them to a kleros of land which could not be
sold, or admitted as a separate group that existed within the phratry system but did not 
qualify as a genos (ὀργεῶνες).513 While the former were naturalized citizens, the latter 
remained a separate group.514 The ὀργεῶνες were relegated to the non-arable, or marginal 
land, which could in fact be bought and sold. If one of the ὁµογάλακτες defaulted on his 
loans, his creditor was entitled to one-sixth of his lot, which remained otherwise 
inalienable. However, the ὀργεῶνες were liable to be sold as slaves to recoup the value of
the loans.515 Broadly speaking, Hammond's view may be broken down into three parts. 
511. Hammond (1961: 76-98).
512. Contra Donlan (1997: 21-25), who does not see a complex system of tribal organization or power 
structures in the Dark or early Archaic Ages, but rather a social system that arose out of a collection of free 
farmers.
513. These words are found in Philochorus (FrGrHist 3b328 35a line 9, 35b line 12; Pollux 3.23.2, 3.52.6, 
6.156.5, 8.111.6; Hesychius entry omicron 740 line 1, all discussing different types of familial descent. 
Pollux seems to regard the terms ὁµογάλακτες and ὀργεῶνες as synonyms, as does Miller (1953: 47).
514. On the γεννῆται ὁµογάλακτες and Archaic social structure more generally, see Roussel (1976: , 
Bourriot (1976: , and Andrewes (1961: 1-15).
515. Hammond (1961: 90). Hignett (1952) takes Philochorus' reference to these two groups as evidence for 
a blocking of an attempt to exclude the ὀργεῶνες from power in the time of Solon or Cleisthenes. Andrewes
(1961: 1-2), however, rejects this standard interpretation, characterizing the two groups in the context of the
composition of phratries, and suggests instead that the  ὀργεῶνες were a smaller group of relatively wealthy
non-aristocrats who had achieved independence by the time of Solon. Bourriot (1976:  also believes that to 
characterize all social groups of the archaic period were dominated by nobles oversimplifies what was 
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First, that there were two classes of citizen at the end of the seventh century, the γεννῆται 
ὁµογάλακτες and the ὀργεῶνες; second, that the former owned inalienable land while the 
latter owned non-arable and therefore alienable land, and that the previous laws on debt 
(presumably those of Drakon) condemned ὀργεῶνες to slavery for non-payment of debt 
while the γεννῆται ὁµογάλακτες facing default became hektemoroi. In this case, the land 
remained the property of the hektemoroi but was perpetually encumbered. Hammond 
bases his argument of such a two-tiered society largely on his perception that Plutarch 
distinguishes hektemorage from debt-bondage in Plutarch: "All the common people were 
in debt to the rich. For they either tilled their lands for them, paying them a sixth of the 
increase (whence they were called Hectemoiroi and Thetes), or else they pledged their 
persons for debts and could be seized by their creditors, some becoming slaves at home, 
and others being sold into foreign countries" (Sol. 13.2; ἅπας µὲν γὰρ ὁ δῆµος ἦν 
ὑπόχρεως τῶν πλουσίων. ἢ γὰρ ἐγεώργουν ἐκείνοις ἕκτα τῶν γινοµένων τελοῦντες, 
ἑκτηµόριοι προσαγορευόµενοι καὶ θῆτες, ἢ χρέα λαµβάνοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς σώµασιν ἀγώγιµοι
τοῖς δανείζουσιν ἦσαν, οἱ µὲν αὐτοῦ δουλεύοντες, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν ξένην πιπρασκόµενοι). In 
doing this he dismisses Ath. Pol. 2.2, which implies that hektemoroi were also subject to 
seizure for default on rent as a fourth-century interpolation.516 
d. Alienable Land and Debt-Based Hektemorage
There is a third group of modern scholars arguing from the standpoint that land in 
the sixth century was in fact alienable, and that the aristocrats were appropriating public 
land.517 The crisis under these circumstances would arise when a debtor forfeited 
surely a sociopolitical situation far more complex than is usually assumed.
516. Hammond (1961: 90). 
517. For example Starr (1977: 183); see also Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010: 32-33); cf. Wilamowitz (1893: 
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ownership of his land, and if not sold abroad, remained in Attica to work the land for its 
new owner, retaining one-sixth of the produce for subsistence, which reduced them to a 
status resembling a serf.518 This loss of land made the hektemoroi more or less politically 
powerless. The middle-class farmer, although wealthier than the average peasant, was in 
danger of becoming a hektemoros. They would be more likely to ally with the lower tier 
of the aristocracy, who encouraged redistribution of land, which would have benefited 
their ambitions to gain more influence among the elite. Some see the issue as one of 
rising competition between the old-guard aristocracy and a rising middle-class of 
moderately wealthy farmers. Hanson identifies this class of middling farmer with the 
zeugitai.519 Foxhall identifies the top two tiers of Solon's new property classes with an 
extremely powerful elite, while Hignett sees that less powerful aristocratic families 
joining forces in support of Solon, since Plutarch tells us that Solon had support from 
both the farming community and some of the more elite members of society.520 Starr 
contends that the more powerful aristocrats were aware of the rising power of a hoplite 
class, which he placed in the social echelon of a small-hold agrarian class.521 Sealey on 
the other hand, argues that the crisis stemmed from warring aristocratic factions who 
relied on their dependent hektemoroi for political leverage.522 Holladay doubts the 
existence of many wealthy non-aristocrats, but Solon's reform does not make much sense 
if there were not a significant number of wealthy non-elite.523 Since the hektemoroi had 
1.56-59) and de Sanctis (1975: 247-52).
518. See Hignett (1952: 87).
519. Hanson (1995: 111).
520. Foxhall (1997: 131); Hignett (1952: 88).
521. Starr (1977: 178).
522. Sealey (1976: 114).
523. Holladay (1977: 47).
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already lost their land, however, Solon's abolishment of it did not involve redistribution. 
Rihll sees the hektemoroi as workers of the public land, but asserts that they 
leased it directly from the polis at an established rent of one-sixth of the produce, and 
worked it various ways as dictated by the needs of the time.524 She supposes that Drakon 
is the one who created the hektemorage as part of his law code in an attempt to address 
conflicting claims to and unregulated use of common land, by regulating the demand for 
this land by a lease program with the one-sixth part as rent payment to the polis itself, 
which was secured on the lessee's person.525 This became a catch-22 from which escape 
became difficult, since rent paid from a yearly harvest was necessarily one year behind, 
and the tenant was in a way indentured to the state during the term of his tenancy. 
The conflict arose because this was a technical violation of the criminal law code, 
since the tenant was disenfranchised for the year of his lease. She believes that the horoi 
were markers of the tenant's disenfranchisement, as opposed to Woodhouse, who saw the 
horoi as proof that the tenants retained technical ownership of the land. The essence of 
the crisis that Solon was called upon to solve stemmed from the aristocratic use of this 
system as a way to mask their appropriation of public land and to dispose of enemies 
under the aegis of the laws pertaining to debt-slavery. Thus Solon's cancellation of debts 
and abolishment of the hektemorage eliminated this aristocratically perpetrated abuse of 
the system. The recall of exiles eliminated the rampant disenfranchisement and returned 
debtors to full citizenship status (Plut. Sol. 19.3). Solon's claim to have freed enslaved 
Athenians merely meant that he had returned the citizen rights of the former public 
524. Rihll (1991: 101-27). Gallant (1982: 111-24), on the other hand, classes the hektemoroi as a hereditary 
group who worked the public land that was controlled by aristocrats.
525. Rihll (1991: 116-17). 
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tenants, and that he formally gave the public land to those who had been leasing it at the 
time of the seisachtheia. This did not qualify as redistribution because Solon was not 
confiscating private land, but merely privatizing land that had formerly been public.526 
e. Alienable Land and Class-Based Hektemorage
A fourth group of scholars, who see the hektemorage as a status relationship, is 
best exemplified by Finley's exegesis on the nature of land and credit.527 In Finley's view, 
the basic problem stemmed from the creation sometime in the distant past of a population
bound into servitude to an upper land-owning class.528 The situation was a long 
established and permanent one that was based on personal susbjugation.529 The 
permanence inherent in their situation warranted their description as slaves in our literary 
sources. Because such a class had no means of ever repaying a loan, the effect of rich 
lenders was to create a permanent class of what amounted to indentured servants, who 
were needed to work the land.530 Finley distinguishes between the hektemorage and the 
debt-bondsmen by claiming that the former slipped into the latter status if they defaulted 
on their ancestral obligations to pay the one-sixth part to his landlord.531 Because there 
was such dramatic inequality among different elements of the citizenry, the social 
discontent had reached a breaking point by the time Solon was appointed to his special 
archonship in 594. 
526. Rihll (1991: 121).
527. Finley (1981: 150-66).
528. Finley (1981: 153) includes any sort of dependent relationship excluding a wage-labor one, including 
chattel slavery or helotage/serfdom, which he classes as being "between free men and slaves." 
529. Forrest (1966: 149) notes a strong parallel in the Old Testament, in Genesis 47, where Joseph 
purchased land for the Pharoah during a famine and distributed it to the starving peasantry in exchange for 
one-fifth of the produce of their land; i.e., a weaker class that voluntarily placed itself under obligation to 
the wealthy and powerful, a situation which then became hereditary. Finley (1981: 268 n. 28) also discusses
this parallel.
530. Finley (1981: 155).
531. Finley (1981: 29 n. 29, 159).
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f. Economic Revolution
We have another strand of argument stemming from the idea of a stable agrarian 
economy threatened by some sort of economic revolution. This revolution various takes 
the form of increased trade and commercial activity, the development of a monetary 
system, or in general a shift toward a more commercial economy.532 Evidence for this is 
seen in the increased presence of Attic black-figure pottery in the Black Sea region as 
well as Sicily at the end of the seventh century. One might also point to Athens' interest in
control of Sigeion and Athens' war for control of Salamis.533 Others see such trade and 
commercial activities as more gradual, and not a direct or dramatic threat to the 
traditional agrarian way of life, citing a paucity of evidence for a large-scale 
conversion.534 
i.  Aristocratic Desire for Luxury Goods
Even those who advocate a model of economic revolution come into conflict over
the precise relationship of this new economic model to the Solonian crisis. Some see an 
increased desire for import luxury goods among the aristocrats as sparking a more 
oppressive relationship with the hektemoroi, citing an increase in locally produced 
pottery, specifically from the Dipylon workshop, and more extravagant funerary 
practices.535 There also seems to be an increased demand for eastern imports, as 
532. See ch. 1, p. 42 n. 125.
533. On the presence of Black-Figure pottery abroad, see Bailey (1940: 62). For grain and oil export in the 
early sixth century, see Forrest (1966: 154). Also consider Plutarch Sol. 2.1 and 3.1, on Solon's own trade 
activities. 
534. Such as Starr (1977: 94), who argues that the small total number of artisans and traders is not 
sufficient evidence to claim widespread economic overhaul. He also argues against the evidence for an 
overseas grain trade in the seventh century (1977: 69) and speculates that at the time of Solon more than 80
percent of the population of all of Greece relied on an agrarian way of life. See also Forrest (1966: 155) on 
the lack of correlation between the period's distribution of pottery and a dramatic change in the basis of the 
economy.
535. On the increased production of religious figurines and funerary statuary, see Starr (1977: 38, 81-2).
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evidenced by the increase in the amount of Orientalizing pottery, as well literary evidence
for symposia, which represents a fairly idle and luxurious lifestyle.536 
The demand for trade goods and rise in conspicuous consumption required a 
control of more land to gain material to trade for these goods; therefore the large 
landowner pressed as much surplus production from farming as possible. Because the soil
of Attica is naturally poor, more and more land was required to produce these goods, and 
when their own estates did not meet the demand, they instituted practices (the 
hektemorage) that allowed them to control the small holders. Snodgrass suggests that 
wealthy landowners needed this new land because they did not themselves engage in 
trade. With regard to increasing commerce, they may have purchased or financed ships 
but employed agents from lower classes to actually engage in the sordid business of 
trade, though he speculates that the main export commodity in the Archaic period was 
marble and metal ores.537
ii.  Aristocrats vs. Rising Middle Class
Others focus not on the hektemoroi, but on tensions between the traditional landed
aristocracy and a rising class of middling farmers, based on increased wealth from new 
536. Starr (1977: 46).
537. Snodgrass (1983: 16-18). For this attitude of the superiority of farming as the only appropriate pursuit 
for aristocrats in the Archaic Age, see Hes. W&D 630-635 on seafaring being a last resort for the 
impoverished; 641 for the undesirability of seafaring, and 665-670 on the dangers inherent in sailing. For 
examples of this attitude remaining in the fifth and fourth centuries, see Hdt. 2.166-167 on how all Greeks 
looked down on traders and artisans, Xen. Oec. 3.5 on the variations in success of small vs. large farmers, 
5.9 on the upper class pastimes which wealthy farmers pursued, 5.17 on how trade cannot exist without 
agriculture, 11.14-18 and 15.6-9 on Ischomachus' main duty being managing, rather than working, his farm,
20.19 on the vast difference in fortune between managers and workers on farms, and 19.23-25 on the 
wealthy landowners coveting more land to increase profit. See Xen. Lac. 7.1-5, where he actually equates 
trade with slavery, a fate the Spartans avoided by devoting themselves to the land under Lycurgus' Great 
Rhetra. In the third century, Athenaeus (12.526d-e; commenting on the fifth-century Theopompus' 
Deipnosophistae) connects trading with alcoholism and whoremongering. For references to this attitude 
remaining in Roman times, see Meijer & van Nifj (1992: 15-20).
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markets for their agricultural produce, which led to a competition between the rising 
middle class and the inveterate aristocracy for political power that had previously been 
reserved exclusively for the upper echelons of society.538 Many scholars cite this as a 
catalyst for the depletion of fertility of the land from overproduction to meet the growing 
demand for both food and agricultural trade goods, which paved the way for the 
conditions of the hektemorage that Solon faced.
g. Intra-Elite Conflict
Still others primarily blame Aristocratic infighting for the Solonian crisis, based 
on seeming connection between Solon's reforms and the Cylonian conspiracy in 621. The
great aristocratic clans competed with one another for influence, often by brutal means, 
with the turmoil of Cylon's attempted coup and the subsequent expulsion of the 
Alcmaeonidae from Athens being evidence of the violent extremes to which such 
infighting could go.539 In this view, the problem was more conflict among the elite, which
was so severe that they may even have been willing to risk loss of power and influence 
by appointing Solon as and extraordinary archon.540
h. Agricultural Disaster
Others believe that as more and more public land formerly used for grazing 
livestock was appropriated for farming, a fertility crisis arose from the absence of crop 
538. See Almeida (2003: 51-53), with citations. 
539. See Ath. Pol. 2-3; Plut. Sol. 12.1-5, though these connections to the Solonian reforms are at best 
implicit. There is no doubt that there was significant aristocratic infighting, but even if our sources 
accurately portray this as part of the problem, it in no way precludes a perhaps large element of social 
unrest stemming from conflict between lower classes and elite. On the bitter conflicts between various elite 
families in the Archaic period, see Sealey (1976: 99, 114), Hignett (1952: 87), Osborne (2009: 223), Starr 
(1977: 135), and Anderson (2005: 173-222).
540. For this view see especially Sealey (1976: 97-98). See also Almeida (2003: 247-51) for a discussion of
theories of regional conflict in Archaic Greece. 
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rotations and more advanced manuring techniques, which would have made the excess 
crop barely enough to feed all of the additional workers.541 French in particular attributes 
soil depletion to general overuse of farmland because of a) increasing need for food to 
feed the population and b) and insatiable appetite for agricultural trade goods by the 
aristocrats.542 This was aggravated by a general population growth at the end of the Dark 
Ages, which required more intensive cultivation of already poor soil. This required more 
of the public lands, formerly used for grazing, to be appropriated for agriculture. Gallant 
also places the hektemoroi on private land, and argues that the owners of large estates in 
the eighth and seventh centuries were gradually encroaching on public land, which 
required more labor, a need which was met by the institution of the hektemorage. 
However, increasing population in the Archaic period led to increased requirements of 
food, which Athenians attempted to meet by cultivating more and more of the public 
land.543 The lack of crop rotation and application of advanced manuring techniques 
aggravated the problem of decreasing soil fertility. The capital required for augmenting 
farming activity could only be provided by the wealthy land owners, but they required 
labor to meet these new needs. In exchange for working part-time on the nobles' estates, 
541. E.g., Woodhouse (1938: 61-2, 75), and especially French (1956: 11). By contrast, scholars who argue 
that the problems of the hektemorage were more those of status relationships than poverty argue that more 
sophisticated farming methods came into use at this time. See Gallant (1982: 115), Hansen (1989: 175-76), 
as well as Starr (1977: 159).
542. French (1956: 11-25) passim. On such economic realities causing the social crisis of the late seventh 
and early sixth century, see Woodhouse (1938) and Hopper (1967: 143).
543. Foxhall's survey data (1997: 123, 127) shows no evidence of increased occupancy or use of land, and 
so she contends that there was no intensification of agriculture during this period. But see Forsdyke (2006: 
345-47), who discusses different types of agricultural intensification that may not show up in modern 
archaeological survey techniques. She argues that an intensification of land use near larger settlements, 
combined with an increased usage of marginal land, would not be inconsistent with either the historical 
circumstances described in our literature or what we know from survey archaeology about the late seventh 
and early sixth centuries. See Forsdyke (2006: 334-50) on ways that intensified agriculture may not show 
up in the archaeological record. 
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the hektemoroi received one-sixth of the produce in addition to the yield from their own 
farms.544 This goes against the majority, who believe that the hektemoroi paid, not 
received, the one-sixth portion.545 The laborers were dissatisfied with their obligations to 
a wealthier class, which formed the crux of the crisis that Solon was appointed to solve.546
He is unique in not tying the hektemorage to the problem of debt, which leaves his vision 
of the nature of the seisachtheia unclear, nor does he address the ways in which Solon 
would have allocated public land after doing away with the hektemorage. 
i. Agricultural Sophistication
Other scholars reject the notion of soil depletion altogether.547 Instead, they 
believe that the Attic farmers were in fact using sophisticated farming methods like crop 
rotation, pruning and grafting, animal husbandry, and modern fertilizing techniques 
which increased yield not only on the traditional, original kleroi, but on less arable public 
land.548 Rather, they see the hektemorage as a problem of competing social strata. General
economic expansion created a rising middle class which began to compete with the 
traditional nobility for social influence and political enfranchisement. Because of these 
sophisticated new techniques, a rise of a "middle-class" farmer who, because of the new 
farming techniques, was able to produce profitable crops like olives and grapes, and even 
own slaves to help with the intensive cultivation of the land. Laertes in the Odyssey, for 
example, is described as practicing intensive cultivation of a variety of crops, some for 
544. Gallant (1982: 123).
545. See Andrewes (1982: 379-80) for arguments against any payment of five-sixths, under any 
circumstances.
546. Gallant (1982: 124).
547. Foxhall (1997: 123-27).
548. See Gallant (1982: 115), Hanson (1995: 47-90, 127-78), and Starr (1977: 124, 159). 
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subsistence and some for profit.549 Laertes' situation also much resembles that of Hesiod's 
farmer, who seems to possess enough surplus to re-invest in his land for more profitable 
crops as well as engage in commercial trading ventures.550 The social crisis was thus more
a result of feuding between this new class of middling farmer for larger shares in political
power.551 The hektemoroi were members of this middle class who failed in their attempts 
to gain power in government, and Solon's reforms leveled the playing field by 
distributing power to a wider swath of the citizenry.
j. Solon's Reforms: Cui Bono?
There is also debate as to the effectiveness of Solon's reforms, which varies 
according to individual scholars' views on the reasons for the crisis and the motivation for
the reforms. For scholars who believe that the hektemorage was debt-based, Solon's 
reforms were conservative measures meant to preserve the stability of the existing order, 
striking a balance between import policies and the need to stimulate domestic production 
of grain. Of the factions mentioned in the Ath. Pol. and Plutarch, the plainsmen benefited 
from policies meant to boost domestic production, while the men of the coast benefited 
from expanded import policies, and the men of the hills benefited from the stimulation of 
domestic craft industries. The seisachtheia thus removed a portion of the farming 
population from the already depleted soil and added displaced hektemoroi to the largely 
landless party of the Hillmen. On this view, Solon was trying to preserve the status quo as
much as possible while making only those changes necessary to avert disaster.552 Those 
549. Hanson (1995: 45-71).
550. Hanson (1995: 91-127).
551. See Starr (1977: 128) for comparanda of political enfranchisement of middling farmers in other 
societies.
552. See French (1957: 241-44). Also see Foxhall (1997: 117-19) for the view that the landless did not 
qualify for any of Solon's property class qualifications, even the lowest class of thetes, normally assumed to
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who see the nature of the conflict as rising tensions between a middling class of farmer 
and the landed aristocracy, Solon's measures were nothing more than a legal recognition 
of the status already gained by the small farmer.553 For those who see elite feuding as the 
main cause of the crisis, Solon's reforms did not do much of anything to change the 
dominance of the elite class; rather, this reputation was given to Solon retroactively by 
his fourth-century hagiographers.554 A more radical view of Solon's reforms sees them as 
focusing on the development of Athens' economy. In this view the seisachtheia was a 
radical measure intended to obliterate a debt-based hektemorage and put Athens on a 
more even footing with her new trading partners in different parts of the Aegean, 
economically speaking.555 
include anyone who produced less than 200 medimnoi per annum, including non-property owners. This 
would have meant that Solon's reforms were far less sweeping and radical, keeping a fairly narrow elite in 
charge of government and preventing the landless from even voting in assembly or participating in the 
juries that the Ath. Pol. hails as Solon's most democratic reform. Foxhall instead identifies the landless 
thetes with the demos of Solon's poems; see also van Wees (2006: 351-89) for the view that those wealth 
was not agricultural did not qualify for any of the property classes. 
553. See Hanson (1995: 121-24). Raaflaub (1997: 31-66) also contends that the rise of the hoplite farmer 
was a long and gradual process. 
554. Osborne (2009: 224) and Foxhall (1997: 121). On fourth century veneration of Solon, see ch. 3, pp. 
90-101. 
555. Miller (1968: 69) and (1971: 25-47) go against a sizable consensus that there was no monetary 
economy at this time. She accepts Androtion's assertion that Solon's economic reforms revolved around 
reorganization and regulation of currency (Ath. Pol. 10.1, 8; Plut. Sol. 15.4), and argues that Solon 
introduced the first state coinage (1971: 31-35). Andrewes (1982: 379) agrees with most other scholars that 
coined money was not available until at least fifty years after Solon's archonship, and points out that even if
Aeginetan coinage was making an appearance in Attica at this point, there would not have been enough 
small change present to be useful for transactions of the poor until the fifth century. For a comprehensive 
bibliography, see Kraft (1959: 21 n. 1), Kraay (1968: 9), and Harding (1974: 281-83), and Noussia-
Fantuzzi (2010: 42-44). On the mechanisms of debts involving payment in kind, see Woodhouse (1938: 
30-33) on Solon's advancement of "Athenian commercialism."
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